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Ever since the 1990s, when Internet technology was embraced by the Zapatista liberation 
movement in Mexico and the anti-globalization activists in Seattle, a wide range of cross-
disciplinary research has been conducted on the consequences of the Internet for activism in 
particular and for socio-political change as a whole. The bulk of the resultant literature sides with 
utopian or dystopian views of the impacts of the Internet, paying little attention to the socio-
political context in which activists operate and use the Internet. This thesis engages with the 
other camp of studies that recognizes the role of context in shaping the implications and effects 
of the Internet (e.g. Bennet, 2003; DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, & Robinson, 2001; Harlow & 
Harp, 2012; Harp, Bachmann, & Guo, 2012), focusing its investigation on the impacts of the 
Internet on activists in the context of Iran.  
Iran entered a period of political and social transformation with the victory of reform-
minded Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential election. During Khatami's reformist 
administration, civil society and democratic entities, such as NGOs and the press, flourished. 
This in turn helped activists -- mainly women’s, laborers’, and students’ rights activists -- gain an 
unprecedented collective aspiration for building a more democratic society (Behravesh, 2014). 
The Internet in Iran expanded during this reform era amidst clashes between reformists and 
conservatives over freedom of the press. The unprecedented liveliness of the civil society and the 
escalation of conservatives’ pressure on the reformist and independent press in the early 2000s 
was the beginning of the politicization of the Internet in Iran (Dehghan, 2009; Rahimi & 
Gheytanchi, 2008; Shirazi, 2010). The Internet, which in its early days of adoption served as an 
academic, commercial, and recreational means
1, began to offer “an alternative public discourse 
                                                          
1 Iran became the second Middle Eastern country to officially join the World Wide Web, since two of its 
universities established the first connection to the global network in early 1993 (Rafizadeh & Alimardani, 
2013). The Internet was promoted by the government as a new means of scientific and technological 
advancement that could assist the country during the troubled economic period following the Iran-Iraq 
war. Originating from universities, following the emergence of private Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
the Internet was introduced to the commercial and educational sectors, and then on to the Iranian public in 
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to the state-controlled media” (Rahimi, 2008, p. 37). Editorial teams of newspapers affiliated 
with the reformists launched their own online publications (Michaelsen, 2011). The younger and 
more technological savvy reformists, especially, used online personalized spaces like weblogs as 
a forum to debate topics of a complex and polemical nature normally banned in print media 
(Rahimi & Gheytanchi, 2008). The target audiences were not only political elites but also the 
younger audiences whose support would be crucial in pursuing reform programs. This younger 
population extensively took to the blogosphere, too, to express their independent viewpoints 
(Rahimi & Gheytanchi, 2008). This made the Iranian blogosphere one of the biggest and most 
active in the world (Deibert et.al., 2010, p. 547). 
The following decades have seen a growing trend toward the exploitation of the Internet as a 
force for socio-political change in the country. However, academics’ efforts to assess the 
democratic promises and threats of the Internet have left behind its widespread and quick 
deployment in Iranian society. Particularly, to date, the involvement of Iranian activists with the 
Internet has remained substantial but under-researched. In addition to reformists, activists from a 
variety of groups were among the early participants in virtual space. Individual activists living in 
Iran or in the diaspora exploited the blogosphere in order to strengthen their public voices, while 
various websites associated with NGOs and activist organizations also emerged. Since 2007, 
which saw the beginning of the decline of blogging in Iran (Akhavan, 2013, p. 9), social 
networking sites have begun to offer new space for Iranian activism. Particularly, before, during, 
and after the disputed 2009 presidential election, social networking sites, chiefly Facebook, 
became a popular means of communication for reformists and social activists who promoted 
issues of social groups such as women, students, and laborers (Golkar, 2015).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1994. (Rahimi, 2003). Recognizing its academic and economic benefits, and aiming to develop e-
government programs, the post-war governments conducted national plans to develop the infrastructure; 
thus carrying out Internet training programs at schools and governmental organizations (Sohrabi-
Haghighat, 2011). Spurred forward by the country’s growing youthful demographic and considerable 
growth of educational levels, these efforts resulted in the rapid growth of Internet users in Iran (Freedom 
House, 2012). While there were 250,000 Internet users by the end of 2000, the number of Internet users in 
2005 rose to several million (Internet World Stats, 2017). Seventy percent of the population had been 
provided Internet access by the beginning of 2017, which left Iran with the highest number of Internet 




The objective of this thesis is to explore the impacts of Internet-mediated communication on 
Iranian women’s rights activism. The case of women’s rights activism provides a window to 
understanding the role of the Internet within one of the most prominent and dynamic activist 
circles in the country and the region. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, women’s rights are a 
“central battleground in the fight for legitimacy and control (Bradley, 2007, p. 4).” Particularly 
since the 1979 Revolution, Iranian women’s rights activism has succeeded in advancing 
women’s equality within the realms of family, education, and employment. Such activism 
existed before the Internet age and became an early adapter of the Internet in the early 2000s. Its 
existence in both eras allows for a better realization and understanding of the changes it has 
experienced since the deployment of the Internet. Chapter Two of this thesis supplies a 
comprehensive explanation of the characteristics of women’s rights activism, its dynamic within 
Iran’s socio-political transformations, and the history of its engagement with the Internet 
communication.  
The investigation into the impacts of the Internet on Iranian women’s rights activism was 
conducted through three core research questions (RQs), which were derived from the review of 
the activism’s characteristics and the extant theoretical and empirical studies about online 
communication for activism and social movements. To wit: “How has Internet utilization 
affected women’s rights activists’ public communication?”, “How has Internet utilization 
affected women’s rights activists’ internal relations?”, and “How has women’s rights activists’ 
online media affected the resonance of women’s rights issues in the Iranian press?” The 
methodological approach taken to answer the first two research questions is a mixed 
methodology based on qualitative interviews with women’s rights activists and the observation 
of online activities of women’s rights groups and campaigns. The data for the third research 
question was collected through qualitative interviews with women’s rights activists and the 
country’s print media journalists.  
The first hand empirical results of this study are expected to make a contribution to the 
academic knowledge of the Internet and activism within civil societies suffering from direct state 
intervention and control. Iranian activists, including women’s rights activists, operate under 
constant closings and openings imposed on civil society. Particularly since the 1997 reform era, 
such a situation is being shaped by reformist-conservative conflicts over freedom of speech, the 
media, and social activities. While part of the literature on contemporary Iran considers an even 
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antagonistic relationship between state and social and political actors, the true picture of Iranian 
civil society exhibits the influence of the political elite fragmentation on the level of autonomy 
and control given to the Iranian civil society. This situation is illustrated through a popular 
metaphor that is used to describe the political situation in Iran: a ‘crossroads’2. Iran is described 
as a crossroads “between modernity and tradition, reform and conservatism, and democratization 
and political repression (Bradley, 2007, p. 6).” The study of Internet-mediated communication 
within the Iranian context with its own particularities can provide new insight into the 
understanding of activism and this technology. The remainder of this chapter defines what is the 
activist/activism referred to in this research and highlights the nature of women’s rights activism 
as a new social movement. It then goes on to explain the current status of the research and 
structure of this thesis.   
1.1 Defining an Activist/Activism in This Research 
It is important to define a key term that will be frequently used in this thesis: activist. There is no 
consensual definition amongst social movement and collective action scholars, who have made 
the bulk of contributions, on which level of involvement with a socio-political cause constitutes 
activism. Some scholars include low risk/cost activities, such as regular participation in the 
electoral process, or donating money to a movement, or signing a petition in the boundaries of 
activism (e.g. Corning & Myers, 2002; McAdam, 1986). Corning and Myers (2002, p. 704), for 
example, considered an activist who has “developed, relatively stable, yet changeable orientation 
to engage in various collective, social-political, problem-solving behavior spanning a range from 
low risk, passive, and institutional acts to high-risk, and unconventional behaviors.” In defining 
activism, other studies, however, have excluded people who make token contributions, and only 
considered those individuals who invest their time and energy to activities of a movement or 
activist organization that may come with personal costs and difficulties (e.g. Searle-Chatterjee, 
1999; Seguin, Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1998). For instance, Seguin et.al (1998) distinguished non-
activist individuals who show their concerns about the quality of their environment through easy 
or light behaviors from environmental activists who are more motivated and determinant to get 
involved in difficult behaviors in order to protect their environment.    
                                                          
2 See, for example, the book ‘Iran at the Crossroads’ by Esposito and Ramazani (2001).  
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This research perspective toward activism is in alignment with the latter strand of studies. 
Activists in this research are those who have greater involvement and determination than people 
who are just adherents to a cause. For the purpose of this research, inspired by the McAdam 
(1986) classification of high-risk activism, and Searle-Chatterjee’s (1999) definition in studying 
feminist and environmentalist activists, four criteria have been set out for an activist. The first is 
having a history of activism. As Searle-Chatterjee (1999) suggested, an activist consciously 
describes herself as such. The second is having a commitment to the objectives of activism. 
Therefore, as Searle-Chatterjee (1999) asserted, an activist expends a significant amount of time 
and energy on their cause. The third is having a relative acceptance of the risks involved in 
participation. Risk refers to “activists’ subjective anticipation or expectation of dangers - legal, 
social, physical, financial, etc. - of participation” (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991, p. 989). Last but 
not least, a condition for being labeled an activist has to do with having contacts in an activism 
network. This criterion reflects a harmony amongst most scholars on the fact that interpersonal 
ties with people who define themselves as activists are critical to propelling activism (e.g. 
Acheson & Williamson, 2001; Corning & Myers, 2002; McAdam, 1986). 
Therefore, throughout this thesis, the term ‘women’s rights activist’ refers to anyone 
describing her/himself as an activist, and who is actively committed to engaging in presumably 
risky activities in order to promote the rights of Iranian women. In addition, a women’s rights 
activist in this study is engaged with the women’s rights activism network. Iranian women’s 
rights activists are normally connected to a network of like-minded colleagues by participating in 
two forms of activist groups: well-defined groups (including established groups and NGOs) and 
loosely defined groups (such as informal associations and ad hoc groups). Both types normally 
have a decentralized structure and do not obligate activists to be registered or recruited. Fluid 
membership in one or more of these groups allows activists to pursue their individual women’s 
rights-related activities, while at the same time enforcing their collectivity. There are individual 
activists who operate entirely independent of any activist groups but are still connected to the 




1.2 Have Iranian Women’s Rights Activists Formed a Social Movement? 
The position of this research in the debate about the existence of a women’s rights movement in 
Iran should be clarified at the outset
3
. A recent and well-cited definition of social movements 
offered by Diani (1992) is as follows: “A network of informal interactions between a plurality of 
individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis 
of a shared collective identity” (p. 13). According to this definition and common understanding 
of social movements, the formation of a cooperation network between a collection of activists 
and activist groups is the defining characteristic of a social movement. The Iranian women’s 
rights activism demonstrates the existence of such informal networks linking the bulk of activist 
groups (both well-defined and loosely defined groups) and individual activists. Examples of 
cooperation among women’s rights groups which have resulted in the formation of special 
purpose coalitions and campaigns will be presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6. In line with the 
majority of studies on women’s rights discourse in Iran (e.g. Lorestani, 2003; Mahdi, 2004; 
Naghavi, 2008; Rostami, 2004), this research takes the position that there is indeed a women's 
rights movement in Iran, one exhibiting the core characteristics of a ‘new social movement’ as 
specified by prominent new social movements’ (NSMs) theorists. 
Underscored by all prominent social movement theorists, NSM is, above all, new to old 
movements, mainly working-class movements, by persuading social and cultural issues of 
everyday life rather than economic goals. Habermas argues that NSMs are rooted in a different 
dynamic from the old Marxist model of capital and labor. He perceived NSM movements as part 
of the resistance of lifeworld to the colonization of economic and administrative systems, and 
therefore located “at the seam between the system and lifeworld” (1981, p. 36). He asserted these 
                                                          
3 Due to the particular characteristics of Iranian women’s rights activism and the social-political aspects 
that affect its dynamic, the nature of this activism has been always the subject of debate. While a great 
part of scholarly studies and women’s rights activists themselves have commented that women’s rights 
activists in Iran have forged a women’s rights movement that has the features of a new social movement, 
some scholars question the existence of an established women’s movement in Iran mainly through 
comparison with Western feminist women’s movements. For instance, Jalayipour (2002) argued that 
women’s rights activism in Iran has not turned into a true movement because the activists avoid the label 
‘feminist’ for fear of being labeled instead as ‘anti-family’. (It should be noted that such fear was rarely 
recognized amongst activists interviewed for this study). 
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movements are shaped by feminists, nonconformist students, environmentalists, and people 
living alternative lifestyles who, rather than ask, “What we should get?” ask instead, “Who are 
we? How do we live? And who is accountable?” The Iranian women’s rights movement, like its 
Western counterparts, aims to improve women’s status and life quality by eliminating gender 
inequalities. It targets two sources of discrimination reinforcing one other: patriarchal beliefs and 
discriminatory legislation and policies. Although some women’s rights activists have 
periodically been involved with the economic demands of working-class women, the core 
activities of the activism are not around issues of economic distribution, but rather advancing 
women’s position in their own families and society. It is due to this social base of NSMs 
including, Iranian women’s rights movement, that member activists can be specifically referred 
to as social activists. Social activists are different from political activists in the conventional 
sense, for political activists aim to influence or alter state power (Brandt, 1986; Melucci, 1989). 
This while activists of NSMs advance the social and cultural status of people, even if some or all 
may also take political stances (Buechler, 1995) or have a political effect, such as the 
politicization of decision-making (Brandt, 1986).    
For NSM theorists, the social base of NSMs, rather than its material base, explains why 
NSMs such as the environmental, anti-nuclear, peace, and women’s movements were mainly 
operated by the middle class. Theorists explain that although the issues addressed by NSMs 
affect everyone in a society, it is the characteristics of a professional or new middle class - high 
educational status, relative economic security, and personal service employment - that make 
them the core participants in these movements (e.g. Calhoun, 1993; Croteau, 1995; Eder, 1993; 
Offe, 1985). While accepting that it is the members of the new middle class who are the main 
participants in these movements, prominent theorists have emphasized that since NSMs promote 
goals cutting across class lines, unlike that of conventional movements, class-membership should 
not manifest a new social movement identity (e.g. Buechler, 1995; Melucci, 1984; Offe, 1985). 
Since the early 20th century, the women’s rights discourse in Iran has been mainly articulated by 
women in the middle class. Particularly, since the Islamic or Iranian Revolution of 1979, the core 
agents of this movement have belonged to the new middle class of Iranian society, including 
intellectual women, academics, students, journalists, lawyers, and artists. These activists come 
from all over the country and from different sectors of society: secular, religious, modern, and 
traditional (Mahdi, 2004). Therefore, they give voice to the demands of women from different 
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social-class and social sectors. Explaining in Offe (1985) language, the movement is conducted 
“by” a class but “is not on behalf of a class.” The middle-class activists of this movement address 
the issues of rural women, such as under-age marriage and girls’ education at the same time they 
raise middle class demands, such as achieving equal job opportunities, as well as class-unspecific 
demands, like child custody and divorce rights.  
Another defining characteristic of contemporary movements is their new organizational 
form. Old movements normally consisted of hierarchical organizations with limited internal 
democracy (Croteau, 1995). In NSMs, by contrast, successful mobilization is not based on 
centralized organizational forms (Gusfield, 1994; Melucci, 1989; Offe, 1985). Although 
variations do exist, these movements tend to embrace diversity, decentralization, and informality 
rather that centralization, formality, and strong leadership (Gundelach, 1984). Such 
organizational correlations, in addition to their opposition to control and dependence, maintain 
their identity and autonomy (Offe, 1985). Therefore, as Melucci insisted, NSMs are “movement 
networks” since they are “the network(s) of informal relationships connecting core individuals 
and groups to a broader area of participation” (1984, p.828).  As already mentioned, the Iranian 
women’s rights movement is composed of informal, decentralized, and leaderless networks 
connecting women’s rights groups and individual activists. As Mahdi (2004) explained, this 
movement “lacks the necessary ingredients of the classical social movements, such as clearly 
defined goals and direction, strong leadership, and necessary organizations” (p. 444).  
Throughout this thesis, the term women’s rights movement is not used frequently because it 
may imply that concentration is only in networks comprised of activist groups and individuals. 
The women’s rights activist groups operate on their own and concentrate on specific women’s-
related fields on a regular basis while they also act jointly when a common cause is at hand. For 
this reason, the term ‘women’s rights activism’ is used to clarify that the focus of this study is 
not only on the social movement network and joint collective actions among various women’s 
rights groups, but also on the solitary activities of the activist groups and individuals.  
1.3 Current State of Research  
Research on the democratic potential of the Internet in Iran has mainly concentrated on public 
participation, providing little empirically grounded knowledge of the deployment of the Internet 
by activists. To date, the largest contribution in the understanding of the Internet's socio-political 
role in Iran was made by several studies emerging after the 2009 Iranian Green Movement. 
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These studies were mainly focused on citizens' online participation and the role of the Internet in 
the mobilization of spontaneous demonstrations (e.g. Karagiannopoulos, 2012; Sohrabi-
Haghighat & Mansouri, 2010; Tusa, 2013). Although various activist groups, including women 
and student activities, were involved in this movement, there is little published data on their 
online activities during the 2009 protests. Particularly in terms of Iranian women’s right 
activism, while there is a considerable amount of literature on the activism history and offline 
actions, there is not much on their activities in the online realm. While there is a number of 
scholarly non-empirical research supplying the general picture of Iranian activists on the Internet 
(Golkar, 2015; Lerner, 2010; Michaelsen, 2011; Rahimi & Gheytanchi, 2008), this section 
introduces very few empirically grounded works carried out on this subject. These studies 
focused on women’s rights activists and Iranian political activists in the diaspora.     
In their book, ‘Blogistan: The Internet and Politics in Iran’, Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) 
conducted a categorization of the types of Iranian blogs, hosted by two major Iranian blog 
hosting sites, and their content. They uncovered that alteration of various discriminatory laws 
against women was among key issues that set the blogosphere bubbling in Iran. Thereafter, as 
detailed in the fourth chapter of the book, the authors carried out an investigation of the 
emergence of women’s websites and blogs in Iran. They introduced the main websites and blogs 
of women’s rights activist groups and individuals from 2002 to 2007. They also conducted 
content analyses of two well-known women’s blogs. To date, this book chapter has provided the 
most comprehensive picture of women’s rights activist websites and blogs and their main areas 
of struggle. The authors illustrated that “[i]n cyberspace, a wide range of organizations and 
individuals have been actively debating the most mundane of topics that are related to gendered 
relations and state policies that affect Iranian women. (p. 129)” The result of their study was later 
reinforced by Shirazi, who has published several articles about the Internet for civil society 
empowerment in Iran. Shirazi (2012) analyzed the main women’s issues openly discussed on the 
most popular women’s blogs and websites. Although the amount of analyzed content and the 
time period were not specified, the analysis did suggest that discriminatory laws were indeed the 
main concern of women bloggers, along with various aspects of women’s daily lives in Iran, 
from the socio-cultural, like women and sport, to political and economic issues.  
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Analysis of the content of women’s blogs was also carried out by Akhavan (2011), someone 
also known for her efforts to shed light on the socio-political use of the Internet in Iran
4
. Her 
study provided a different account of women’s blogging compared to the above research. She 
explained that, as a result of considering Iranian women as always trapped, victimized, and 
disenfranchised, most of the narratives had taken the appearance of women blogs as resistance, 
dominated by radical and secular women opposed to religious-based governments. She revealed 
two often-overlooked dimensions of the blogosphere in Iran, which countered this dominant 
perception. First, through content analysis of a number of women’s blog entries, Akhavan 
showed that Iranian women’s blogging activities are affected by their offline personal 
experience. Thus, she discussed that narrative about women’s blogging in Iran should explore 
whether or how online texts are intertwined with the bloggers' experience. Second, she reported 
the often-ignored trend of the deployment of blogosphere by conservatives, uncovering that even 
the blog contents of conservative women are more in conformity with their on-the-ground 
activities rather than with their political orientation.  
This thesis fills two major voids in the extant literature on the Internet and Iranian activism. 
First, there is no previous academic knowledge about the ways women’s rights activism and 
other activist circles in Iran have been affected by the use of the Internet. Two studies which 
provided first-hand empirical evidence of the effect of the Internet on Iranian political activists 
both focussed on activists in the diaspora. The Ghorashi and Boersma (2009) case study of the 
Iranian diaspora transnational virtual network revealed the role of the Internet in facilitating 
interaction and a sense of shared identity between diaspora activists, Iranian NGOs, and activists 
inside Iran. The same result was reported by Michaelsen’s (2016) investigation on Iranian 
political activism in exile: “The internet and social media have multiplied channels for 
connections between in- and outside and on a transnational scale (p. 14).” However, his 
interview study showed that digital communication and information exchange has enabled the 
Iranian state to keep activists outside Iran under surveillance. This present research closes this 
notable gap in the literature about the impacts of the Internet on an Iranian activist circle in the 
country. Its research questions explore, for the first time, the promises and pitfalls of Internet 
utilization for women’s rights activism’s public communication, internal relations, and print 
media presence.   
                                                          
4 For example, see her book “Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution”. 
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Second, there is a significant lack of empirical knowledge about activists’ use of other types 
of Internet technologies other than blogs. To date, much of the research on women’s rights 
activists and the Internet have examined individual activists’ personal blogging practices. Two 
analyses on women’s websites by Shirazi (2012) and Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) only 
contained history of the women’s websites, as well as general information about covered topics. 
A recent article by Tahmasebi-Birgani (2017) concentrated on social networking sites’ usage in 
women’s rights activists’ struggles for gender equality but failed to develop a methodological 
approach providing an in-depth account of the phenomenon. The author provided very brief 
observational analysis of one virtual campaign that was based outside Iran and had no on-the-
ground presence or affiliation with the activists in Iran. The interview and observational analyses 
in this investigation generate fresh, in-depth insight into patterns of use and the impact of three 
Internet technologies that, at the time of data collection, were being utilized by women’s rights 
activists to the greatest extent: e-mail groups, websites, and social networking sites (SNSs).   
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The remaining part of this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 begins the process of 
examination by reviewing the dynamics and characteristics of women’s rights activism and the 
historical trajectories which need to be factored in. It begins by presenting a background on the 
emergence of women’s rights discourse in Iran in the early 20th century, with its chief focus 
being on the activism after the 1979 revolution. It explores the dynamics of post-revolution 
women’s rights activism, following the presentation of two aspects that are relevant to grasp this 
dynamic: fragmentation of political elite and controlled media. The chapter will go on to give an 
overview of the activism in the Internet age.   
Chapter 3 is divided into two main parts. Aiming to set out the theoretical framework used 
to address the core objective of the thesis, the first part situates the research within the broader 
context of scholarly debates on information and communication technologies and the Internet for 
activism and social movements. Drawing on the theoretical and empirical discussion presented in 
the first part, and Chapter Two’s reviews on women’s rights activism, the next part of the chapter 
presents three research questions that direct the empirical investigation. Chapter 4, meanwhile, 
lays out the design of the research methods employed to examine the research questions. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 form the empirical part of this thesis. Chapter 5 responds to the first 
RQ. It presents findings in relation to the utilization and impacts of the Internet on the activists-
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public communication. The discussions of this chapter concentrate on the activists’ websites and 
SNSs as their main public communication platforms. The results are presented via five 
overarching interview themes that are supplemented and verified by observational findings. The 
first three themes uncover three welcoming impacts of Internet utilization on activists-public 
communication, while the next themes reveal two perils associated with these promises.  
Chapter 6 supplies findings in relation to the second RQ. The four overarching interview 
themes and their associated observational insights, presented in this chapter, shed light on the 
impacts of the Internet on women’s rights activists’ internal relations. The first three themes 
suggest the promises of e-mail groups, and websites for activist groups’ intra- and inter-relations. 
Finally, the fourth theme uncovers one harmful effect that has emerged from the growth of 
women’s rights activists’ personal SNSs profiles.  
Drawing on interviews with activists and print media journalists, Chapter 7 sheds light on 
the third RQ. The findings about the impacts of activists’ online media on the resonance of 
women’s rights discourses in the country’s press are presented via two overarching interview 
themes. The first uncovers two factors that manipulate the influence of activists’ online sites on 
the press agenda. The second theme discloses three mechanisms through which activists’ online 
sites become effective in the resonance of women’s rights issues in the country’s press. The final 
section of the empirical chapters summarizes the key findings and discusses them in the light of 
the existing studies presented in Chapter 3.  
The discussion of key results, in light of grand theories that aided the development of the 
research conceptual framework is offered in the concluding chapter. In addition to the thesis 
theoretical contribution, Chapter 8 highlights recommendations for activists’ future practice, 
afterwards going on to outline the main limitations of the research and suggestions for future 









 STUDYING IRANIAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTIVISM 
 
This chapter analyses women’s rights activism and the socio-political context from which it has 
arisen and in which it operates. It begins by presenting an historical account of the emergence of 
women’s rights discourse in Iran in the early 20th century, but its main focus is on the activism 
after the 1979 revolution. This chapter provides an explanation of two aspects of the context that 
will help comprehend post-revolution women’s rights activism: (a) political elite fragmentation, 
and (b) controlled media. Then it goes on to explain the dynamics of the activism, also 
influenced by these aspects. In so doing, it focuses on four distinct socio-political turning points: 
the revolutionary period of 1979 to 1988, the post-war ‘Period of Construction’, the ‘Reform 
Era’ of 1997-2004, and the Ahmadinejad and hardliners’ administration. Finally the chapter 
supplies a picture of women’s rights activism in the Internet age and its current status under 
Rouhani’s presidency.  
2.1 Women’s Rights Discourse in Iran Before the 1979 Revolution 
In the 1890s, a series of risings and political arguments were initiated by modernist and religious 
reformers that confronted the ruling regime of the time, the Qajar Dynasty. By 1905, major 
protests were centered around the granting of a constitution. (De Groot, 2010). The Persian 
Constitutional Revolution took place from 1905-1911, causing an immediate shift in the social 
location of power from the royal Shah (the king) to a national parliament, and radically 
transformed the country’s despotic monarchy into that of a parliamentary monarchy 
(Abrahamian, 1979). The primary causes of the revolution were economic recession, the 
corruption of Qajar rulers, and the intervention by colonial powers into Iran’s domestic affairs5 
(Hashemi, 2010).   
Many of the historical studies on Iranian women point to the turn of the twentieth century 
and, more specifically, the constitutional revolution period as the beginning of women's 
"awakening" and the spread of gender debates among intellectuals, modernists, nationalists, and 
anti-colonial forces (McElrone, 2005; Paidar, 1997, p. 76). The constitutional revolution and the 
                                                          
5 Although Iran was never formally colonized, colonial powers imposed considerable influence in Iran in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Bradley, 2007). 
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establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which proposed a vision of Iran as a modern society, 
became a starting point for women’s social and political participation (Yeganeh, 1993). In the 
first place, women participated in the Constitutional Revolution as part of nationalist forces, 
regardless of specific women's issues. But as time passed, they started to raise their specific 
gender demands (Jahanshahrad, 2012).  
Many women, who were closely related by marriage or blood to politically active men or 
religious figures, actively supported the constitutional movement that aimed to limit the 
unlimited power of the Shah and set up a parliamentary system (Hoodfar, 1999). These women 
formed secret and semi-secret associations called women’s anjumans, an old Persian name that 
refers to a place of gathering for deliberation, that supported the constitutionalist movement 
(Afary, 1989). They helped organize strikes and boycotts, spread news, and encouraged the 
public to protest against foreign intervention, as well as the dictatorial rule of the Shah (Afary, 
1989). However, when the movement achieved its aims, and the first constitution of Iran was 
written, women were denied the right to vote and no gender issues were even discussed in the 
constitution (Hoodfar, 1999). The parliamentarians announced that women had the right to 
demand education, but only one that would prepare them for their domestic responsibilities at 
home and in the family (Afary, 1989). Also, they were to be kept out of politics, something 
assumed to be the ‘prerogative of men’ (Afary, 1989). 
From that point on, the political activities of Iranian women, which began focused on 
national matters, now mobilized around gender issues (Hoodfar, 1999). In their old and newly 
formed anjumans, in the capital and other big cities in the country, women started to raise their 
demands for social and political inclusion (Hoodfar, 1999). The women who participated in these 
anjumans were mostly from urban, privileged, and educated classes of the society (De Groot, 
2010). They were either from those families of the religious elite who discussed Islam’s 
disagreement with gender segregation, or the women were modernists, impressed by the 
activities and victories of women’s rights campaigns in Western countries (De Groot, 2010; 
Mahdi, 2004). One of the first meetings of these women was held in January 1907, when ten 
resolutions were announced, above all for the right for women’s education (Afary, 1989). As the 
government failed to support their demands, however, women held meetings and gave "garden 
parties" to raise funds for girls' schools (Najmabadi, 1993). These schools became popular 
among a certain segment of urban households, particularly the middle classes (Hoodfar, 1999). 
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In Tehran and other provincial towns, girls’ schools began to flourish (Mahdi, 2004). By 1913, 
63 girls' schools were established in Tehran, supervised by the Women's Congress on Education 
(Mahdi, 2004). 
These women's activities to achieve educational demands brought about gender 
consciousness and encouraged the development of women's political discourse (Hoodfar, 1999). 
Women’s associations held meetings for the sole purpose of discussing women-related issues 
(Hoodfar, 1999). Also, for the first time in Iran, women tried to spread awareness of women’s 
problems through the establishment of women-specific publications. In 1910, the first women’s 
newspaper began publication in Iran (Afary, 1989). The eight page weekly newspaper, Danesh 
(Knowledge), aspired to educate women on topics of interest to women (Afary, 1989). In 1912, 
another women's journal, Shikufah (Blossom), was launched in Tehran with a focus on women's 
education (Kashani-Sabet, 2005).  
Contribution to the Constitutional Revolution was the beginning of a new era for Iranian 
women, the beginning of the organized participation of women in political activities and the 
struggle for their rights (Mahdi, 2004). In this era, the necessity of women’s education was set up 
and women’s issues became part of the public and national concern (Paidar, 1997, p. 76).  
In 1921, Reza Pahlavi came into power through a British-supported coup, which seized 
power from the Qajar rulers. He announced himself the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. 
Inspired by the European model of society and modernization initiations conducted by Ataturk in 
Turkey, and also as a way to weaken the traditional social function of the clergy, Reza Shah 
initiated a rapid forced process of modernization of the country (Keddie, 2007; Najmabadi, 
1987). With regards to gender politics, his reforms toward modernity are remembered mostly by 
the promotion of women’s education (Afary, 1996). The women’s modernization project of Reza 
Shah also demanded that all Iranian women remove their veils in public, to receive greater 
opportunities for education and state employment. In practice, the benefits of employment and 
education were extended to a very few, but the violent enforcement of unveiling harassed and 
troubled many (Amin, 2008). Also, while one can say the government's policy on women's social 
participation like education and employment led to meaningful changes, the family policy, by 
contrast, lacked such reforms (Yeganeh, 1993). The 1936 Civil Code gave men the right to 
polygamy, divorce, and child custody, and prohibited women from education, employment, and 
travelling without their husband's permission (Yeganeh, 1993).  
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In the first year of Reza Shah’s monarchy, a variety of independent organizations and 
publications that were formed around women’s issues remained active (Afary, 1996). However, 
as his government became stronger, Reza Shah acted against any independent and spontaneous 
social and political organizations (Paidar, 1997, p. 105). Thus, after the 1920s, many women’s 
organizations were either officially dismantled or lost members due to strict control and 
censorship of their activities and publications (Hoodfar, 1999). The forced closure and members’ 
imprisonment of pro-Communist women’s organizations like Bidariye Zanan (Awakening of 
Women), Shokuhe Zanan (Women’s Prosperity), Jameye Zanan (Women’s Society), as well as 
non-Communist women’s newspapers like Zanane Iran (Women of Iran), Donyaye Zanan 
(Women’s Universe), which had been publishing for thirteen years, are among such examples 
(Paidar, 1997, p. 102). Also, restrictions were imposed on Iranian women’s communication with 
regional and international women's movements (Hoodfar, 1999). The fate of the Iran Left-Wing 
Patriotic Women’s League (1922-32) illustrates the situation (Afary, 1996). In 1932, the 
organization held its second regional conference of Women of the East.  Participants, who had 
come from a variety of regional countries, called for equal wages for equal work, greater 
political rights for women, changes in family law, and more opportunities for women's education 
(Afary, 1996). Following this event, Reza Shah ordered the Patriotic Women's League to be 
closed, as he would not tolerate any type of grassroots activity, let alone one composed of 
women activists (Afary, 1996).  
At the same time, Reza Shah tried to integrate many vocal and talented women into 
structures of his own, which successfully threatened the independence of the women's 
organizations (Paidar, 1997, p. 102). The state set up an official organization called Kanun-i 
Banovan (Ladies' Center) in 1935, which was limited to occupational training, education, and 
charity activities (Paidar, 1997, p. 102). By 1935, all efforts to establish grassroots women's 
rights groups had been  co-opted by the modernizing state  (Afary, 1996). This left the more 
radical women's rights activists with three options: tone down their more radical demands and 
join the government-sponsored organizations; stand instead with the conservative opposition to 
the Shah, which mainly included Islamic clerics; or unite with the left-wing political parties. 
Since the opposition groups, Islamists, and Marxist intellectuals were either co-opted or 
repressed by the state, with little hope of accomplish even some of their objectives, most of the 
activists resigned themselves to align with the Reza Shah modernist government (Afary, 1996). 
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In 1941, both the UK and the Soviet Union invaded Iran during the World War II, forcing 
Reza Shah to leave power to his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who formed the second Pahlavi 
state (1941-79) (Bradley, 2007). In a more democratic period of mainly parliamentary rule from 
1941 to 1953, both the religious right and leftist parties experienced a revival (Keddie, 2007). 
Independent women's rights activities, too, resumed during this period (Yeganeh, 1993). 
Women's organizations were re-established and many progressive women's organizations - the 
most active, the women’s branch of the Tudeh Party (the Left-Wing Party), which attracted many 
students, teachers, and secular women and men - were founded in the 1940s (Beck & Nashat, 
2004, p. 24). The 1940s also brought a new wave of optimism and a renewed interest in 
journalism, which lasted from 1941 through the popular movement for oil nationalization in the 
early 1950s. A total of 373 publications were active during the Oil Nationalization Movement, 
including many women’s titles (Khiabany, 2010, p. 186). 
The Oil Nationalization Movement was led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and 
resulted in the establishment of the National Iranian Oil Company, which took control over the 
oil industry from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The nationalization of the oil industry and 
mounting friction between the prime minister and the Shah led to the 1953 MI6/CIA-coordinated 
coup to overthrow Mossadegh (Abrahamian, 2001). Mohammad Reza Shah, who fled Iran 
during the coup, was reinstated by the countries backing the coup, and who continued ruling Iran 
with increasing authoritarianism. Many of the previous decade’s political freedoms were 
curtailed. The Tudeh party and its women's wing were banned and it became extremely hard for 
opposition groups and parties to be openly active. (Beck & Nashat, 2004, p. 24). In 1961, the 
new Kennedy government pursued a different foreign policy with regard to Iran, as the United 
States felt threatened by the communists’ 1958 revolution in Iraq. Thus was the Shah ordered to 
carry out new reform projects, resulting in a 1963 government program called the White 
Revolution, a six-point reform program that included Iranian women's enfranchisement (Afary, 
1996). 
From 1953 forward, Reza Shah’s strategy of centralization and co-optation of women’s 
rights activism was resumed by his son (Sanasarian, 1982). Just as women's rights activists’ 
voices were gaining strength, a program was re-launched to bring their independent activities 
under control (Sanasarian, 1982). In 1966, the Shah approved formation of the High Council of 
Iranian Women's Organizations (WOI), a new umbrella organization whose president was the 
22 
 
Shah’s twin sister (Sanasarian, 1982). In 1967, following the reforms of the White Revolution, 
the WOI presented a bill to the parliament known as the Family Protection Law (FPL), which 
restricted some of the rights that were given to men in the Civil Code of 1936, such as arbitrary 
divorce, polygamy, and men’s rights to child custody (Paidar, 1997, p. 155). Despite the state’s 
pretense that the main objectives of the law were to liberate women and enhance their position, 
there were other motives, such as population control (Paidar, 1997, p. 155). In addition, 
Mohammad Reza Shah used the FPL as a move to weaken the religious power of the clerics 
(Brooks, 2008). The law put judgments for marriage and divorce in the hands of the Family 
Court, taking it away from the clerics. The FPL was promptly reversed by Ayatollah Khomeini 
after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Brooks, 2008). Despite such decisions, 
the WOI remained unpopular with the opposition and many ordinary women, who argued it was 
directly sponsored by an undemocratic regime with authoritarian policies (Afary, 1996).  
Beside women’s organizations, women’s press was also affected by the state control and 
centralization process. Numerous independent women's publications were banned. In their place, 
big publishing firms supported by the state published women-specific magazines that devoted 
most of their pages to celebrity news, portraits of the royal family, foreign visitors, health and 
beauty, housekeeping, and, only on occasion, some serious articles on changes to the family law 
(Khiabany, 2010, p. 187). 
During the reign of the Pahlavis, the state became the major source for change in the status 
of women (Mahdi, 2004). Iranian women were granted education and employment rights, 
enfranchisement, and an improved position in the family law. To symbolize this modernizing 
state, its rulers increased the number of women in executive positions and enhanced their 
opportunities in the public arena (Mahdi, 2004). The increased social participation of women 
enhanced their self-perception. In practice, however, only upper and middle class women who 
had enough social and economic support to take advantage of such reforms benefited. (Hoodfar, 
1999). In addition, these rights came with a major cost for advocates of women’s rights. In Iran, 
like other modernizing authoritarian nationalist rulers in the region, such as Turkey, Tunisia, and 
Egypt, the move toward the enhancement of women’s position in society was associated with 
suppression and centralization of autonomous initiatives (Keddie, 2007). Independent women’s 
rights organizations and their publications were either officially dismantled, especially those of 
leftists, or incorporated and centralized by the state (Hoodfar, 1999; Keddie, 2007).  
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2.2 The Dynamic of Women’s Rights Activism After the 1979 Revolution 
Increasing political repression after the 1953 coup, Washington’s interference in Iran’s domestic 
policies, economic corruption, and the rapid westernization of the country all gave birth to a 
broad national resistance movement which resulted in the 1979 Revolution; and later the 
replacement of Iran’s monarchy by the Islamic Republic (Afary, 1996; Brooks, 2008). The 
movement gained momentum amongst a collection of political groups (leftists, nationalists, and 
Islamists) and social forces (middle class women and men, intellectuals, the working class, and 
the urban poor) (Moghadam, 2002). Women were a central part of the Iranian Revolution, 
participating in protests and becoming, for the West, an important visual symbol of the uprising 
against the Westernization of the Shah and the Pahlavi reign (Brooks, 2008). As the old regime, 
despite its feminist pretenses, was known for degrading women’s social position, it became the 
aim of the revolutionaries to advance women’s interests (Halper, 2005). This created a 
completely new space for women to actively and regularly participate in meetings and 
demonstrations criticizing the autocratic and Western-oriented modernization approach followed 
by the Shah (Halper, 2005).  
Various women’s organizations, which had their own publications and campaigns, were 
founded during and immediately after the Revolution. The communist Ettehade Melli Zanan 
(National Union of Women), which published Barabari (Equality) and Zan Dar Mobareze 
(Women in Protest); the secular Anjoman Rahaei Zan (The Society of Women’s Emancipation), 
published Rahaei Zan (Emancipation of Women); the Islamist Zanane Tarafdare Nehzate Azadie 
Iran (Women Adherents of Freedom Movement of Iran); and the nationalist Sazmane Zanane 
Jebheye Meli (Women’s Organization of National Front) were among the most active societies in 
the Revolution (Farhadpour, 2012). Women’s political protests involved not only members of 
established opposition groups, but also students, housewives and ordinary women from more 
traditional sectors of society. They participated in both peaceful and violent mass 
demonstrations, fought in street battles and joined strikes and boycotts. (Paidar, 1997, p. 211). 
Such large-scale, organized, and very active participation of women in the revolutionary 
upheavals not only had a profound effect on the politics of the era, it altered the consciousness of 
many women, particularly working class women, about their political potential (Keddie, 2000). 
A close look at women’s rights activism after the Islamic revolution makes it evident that 
the fragmentation of the political elites, particularly toward autonomy of civil activities and 
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organizations, along with freedom of the media, has influenced the dynamics of this activism. 
Thus, before proceeding to review the activism in post-revolution Iran, this section provides 
background to political factions within Iran’s political environment. It also explains political 
elites’ struggle over freedom of the media, particularly the press, as a key communication 
medium for activists. Then the review of post-Revolution Iranian women’s rights activism 
demonstrates the dynamics of the activism within the context of these aspects and within four 
distinct socio-political turning points. These periods may be referred to as the revolutionary 
period of 1979 to 1988, the post-war ‘Period of Construction’ (1988-1997), the ‘Reform Era’ of 
1997-2004, and the hardliner Ahmadinejad administration (2005-2013). The section on review of 
Ahmadinejad’s era ends with a brief explanation of the activism’s current status under the 
Rouhani administration.  
2.2.1 Political elite fragmentation 
In a national referendum a few months after the 1979 revolution, the monarchy of Pahlavi regime 
was replaced by the Islamic Republic. Iran’s Islamic Republic has a very unique form of 
government, one preserving both democratic and Islamic religious principles (Bashiriyeh, 1997). 
The main political institutions in Iran are the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Office of the 
President, the Parliament, and the Guardian Council
6
.  
Iran was led by highly conservative elites in the first decade after the Revolution, during 
which the country was preoccupied with promoting the Islamization of state and society (Vaez, 
2004). The foreign policy, meanwhile, was to first rule out both the United State, representating 
Western capitalism, and the Soviet Union, representing socialism; and second, to ‘export the 
revolution’ in order to free Muslim and non-Muslim countries from the domination of oppressive 
and corrupting states (Rakel, 2007). Domestically, at the most general level, this post-
revolutionary period manifested itself in a radical re-definition of social priorities, as all political 
parties involved in the Revolution shared the view that moral and social corruption was the main 
source of societal ills during the Pahlavi regime (Najmabadi, 1987). In the aftermath of the 1979 
Revolution, the anti-imperialism of the radical secular left was itself tainted by the West and did 
not offer any evident advantage over the more genuinely anti-foreign solution of returning to an 
                                                          
6 This council is composed of six experts in Islamic Law, all selected by the Supreme Leader of Iran, as 
well as six jurists elected by the Iranian Parliament. Any bill passed by Parliament must be reviewed and 
approved by the Guardian Council in order to become law. 
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original Islam (Najmabadi, 1987). In this situation, according to Bashiriyeh known as 
Iran’s father of political sociology, ‘the discourse of ideological traditionalism’ reversed many 
aspects of the ‘modern discourse’ established during the Pahlavi era and reinforced the positions 
of the bazaar, the clergy, and religion even as nationalism, secularism and industrialization were 
weakened (cited in Jahanshahrad, 2012). 
With the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the 
presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, the new era called the ‘Period of Construction’ began 
(Bahramitash, 2007). To boost the war-torn economy of Iran, the new government adopted neo-
liberal economic policies based on free trade, reduction of the role of the state, liberalization of 
the market, social program reduction, privatization, and re-integration into the international 
economy (Bahramitash, 2007; Rakel, 2007). “Although Rafsanjani encountered factional 
opposition from traditionalists or conservatives that tainted his legacy in effecting political and 
economic reform, this period was critical in facilitating significant domestic, social, and political 
transformation (Vakil, 2011, p. 101).” In the less restrictive atmosphere of the Rafsanjani 
administration, new reformist political and religious ideas emerged. Utilizing the press, the 
religious and secular scholars, as well as former revolutionaries, started criticizing the failings of 
the revolution, giving birth to a reform movement in Iran that would flourish under the 
presidency of Mohammad Khatami (Vakil, 2013). 
With the victory of Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential election, and by the 
domination of the reformists who won the majority of the seats in the 2000 parliamentary 
election, Iran entered the so-called ‘Reform Era’. From 1997 onward, the main political factions 
of the country were known as ‘reformists’ and ‘conservatives’. While both groups are firm 
believers in the general political structure of the Islamic Republic, they differ in terms of 
ideological and political visions (Kamrava & Hasan-Yari, 2004). The conservatives, who 
represent the interests of the traditional economic sector (the bazaars), a dogmatic clergy, and a 
highly religious public, emphasize a narrow and strict conception of Islam, along with the return 
to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and antagonism with the West - the US, in particular 
(Rakel, 2007, 2009). On the other hand, the reformists’ political elites, who are mainly 
intellectuals and clerics whose interpretations of Islam differ from those of the conservatives, 
advocate reform, modernity, and civil society (Kamrava & Hasan-Yari, 2004). Within this 
political spectrum, there are moderate figures and groups whose political views are closer to the 
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reformists, but do not advocate factionalism, and who otherwise have good relations with like-
minded figures in both political camps (Mousavian, 2013).   
“The shift in the nation’s social-political life” has been so profound (Tajik, cited in 
Behravesh, 2014, p. 265) that Khatami’s presidency and his reform programs were signified by 
Iranian intellectuals as the Reform Movement. The Khatami administration achieved 
breakthroughs in reforming many aspects of the power system: promoting civil and individual 
liberties, expanding civil society, easing restrictions on print media, forming a new political 
culture based on Islamic reformism and modernism, establishing a balance between market 
liberalism and social justice (Behravesh, 2014), and adopting a foreign diplomacy promoting 
peaceful coexistence and reconciliation with neighbors and the Western powers (Vaez, 2004). 
However, the reformist breakthroughs led the conservative hardliners, who held the main power 
over the major state institutions like the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council
7
, and the 
judiciary system, to resist pro-reform forces. Their strategies to limit the ability of the 
government and parliament to carry out reforms, and their crackdowns on the reformist press, 
were effective in slowing down and frustrating the reform process (Gheissari & Nasr, 2005).  
In the 2005 presidential election the conservatives supported Ahmadinejad, one of the 
strongest opponents of the reformists (Rakel, 2009). Prior to the election leading to his 
presidency, Ahmadinejad had never held elected office, and was almost unknown in the 
international arena. Nevertheless, and separate from the support of conservatives, his promises of 
more economic support to the poor and spending Iran’s oil income on improving basic living 
conditions for Iranians received large support from rural and urban lower class Iranians 
(Bahramitash, 2007; Hasan, 2007). He won the election against reformist rivals enjoying support 
of the modern middle class, intellectuals, students, and progressive clerics (Morady, 2010). He 
targeted the lower class that might have found the reform rhetoric too abstract to be relevant to 
the realities of their everyday lives (Sameti, 2007). With the parliamentary election of 2004, in 
which conservatives formed a majority, followed by the coming to power of a conservative 
president, the reformists lost significant political ground.  
The hardliners’ 2005 electoral triumph gave them a golden opportunity to inhibit civil 
society associations and dissent voices (Rahimi & Gheytanchi, 2008). Ahmadinejad’s Minister 
                                                          
7 The Council members who are appointed by the Supreme Leader determine the interests of the system 




of Culture tightened its control over the press, and intensified efforts to shut down any dissenting 
publications in order to suppress critical voices in the media and civil society (Media 
Sustainability Index Iran, 2009). Only after Ahmadinejad led various efforts during his two-term 
presidency to steadily reverse progress previously made with regard to freedom of the press and 
the opening up of the civil society sphere under Khatami, did the election of a moderate political 
figure, Hasan Rouhani, offer Iranians new hope for change. 
In summer 2013, the people signaled their rejection of President Ahmadinejad’s reactionary 
policies with the election of Rouhani’s government of ‘Prudence and Hope’. Rouhani is an 
insider who has secured official positions since the 1979 Revolution through professionalism and 
an avoidance of extremist positions, allying himself with most of the prominent players in the 
Iranian political system (Parsi, 2013). He declared, during his campaign, that he could recover 
Iran’s international standing, improve its economy, and solve the country’s social dilemmas. The 
composition of Rouhani’s government, and statements made by both him and his ministers, 
signaled a deliberate endeavor to deviate from Ahmadinejad’s policies and ease restrictions on 
society (Menashri, 2013). Today, Rouhani’s foreign8 and domestic policies are largely criticized 
by hardliner conservatives. 
2.2.2 Media control 
The media sphere in Iran has been largely affected by the reformists and conservatives’ conflict 
over the definition, role, and control of the media (Khiabany, 2010, p. 72). In general terms, 
conservatives call for tighter control of the media, arguing that independent and free media 
undermine religious and revolutionary values, with the potential to politically and culturally 
polarize Iranian society (Barraclough, 2001; Tarock, 2001). The reformists and moderates, on the 
other hand, advocate a greater degree of freedom for media, since they regard media as the key 
area for raising alternative socio-political viewpoints and gaining public support of same 
(Barraclough, 2001). Since the conservatives control the broadcasting content of the country, it is 
press that has been the main battleground for the reformists and civil society (Sameti, 2007).  
                                                          
8 The international agreement on the nuclear program of Iran was reached in 2015, following a series of 
meeting and diplomatic efforts between Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and the P5+1 
plus the European Union. Iran made nuclear concessions in the agreement in exchange for the lifting of 
international sanctions.  
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There are no private TV and radio channels in Iran. The state-run ‘Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting’ (IRIB), as the largest media organization in the county, is in charge of domestic 
and international broadcasting. The IRIB is an active member of the Asian broadcasting Union 
(ABU), the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development (AIBD), and an affiliated 
member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) (Khiabany, 2010, p. 173). IRIB airs both 
nationally and internationally, and is also streamed online
9
. The organization largely reflects the 
views of conservatives as all its appointed heads come from the conservative pool (BBC 
Monitoring, 2007). The Iranian constitution mandates a supervisory board for the organization 
with representatives from the presidency, the parliament, and the judiciary. However, they hold 
no executive role in the organization and only receive reports from the IRIB’s chief (Iran const., 
art. 175). The IRIB has been frequently criticized, mainly by reformists, for its biased coverage 
of domestic political and social issues (Samii, 1999).  
In contrast to the state-controlled broadcasting sector, which reflects the harmonious views 
of one faction, the Iranian press has been relatively controversial and diverse (Khiabany, 2010, p. 
163), reflecting various factions. Yet some, particularly those of reformists, have taken a step 
further and tried to cross a line commonly known as the ‘red line’ in Iran of consensual political 
practices (Barraclough, 2001). The reformist press has managed to raise political consciousness 
and popular discontent with the status quo (Sameti, 2007). Among the country’s most circulated 




 (East) and Aftab-e Yazd
12
 (Yazd’s 
sunshine). The conservative publications consistently accuse the reformists and their publications 
of being heretics, anti-Islamic, anti-revolutionary, and promoters of Western political and 
cultural views (Sokooti, 2002). Among the most prominent of the conservative newspapers are 
                                                          
9  live.irib.ir 
10 Etemad is a moderate reformist newspaper, launched in 2002, and shut down twice, each time later 
being allowed to resume publishing. (Rafizadeh & Alimardani, 2013). 
11 Regarded as the most leading reformist newspaper, Shargh was founded in 2003 and has since been 
shut down four times by the conservative judiciary (Rafizadeh & Alimardani, 2013).  
12 Launched as a regional paper in the Yazd Province, it went national in 2000. It is affiliated with the 





 (Galaxy), Resalat (Message)
14
, and Jam-e Jam
15
 (Cup of Life). Besides conservative 
and reformist publications, some newspapers represent the views of political pressure groups that 
have emerged across the political spectrum (BBC Monitoring, 2007). 
Similar to many democratic states, the newspaper industry within Iranian civil society is 
supposed to function as an intermediary institution between state and the society (Sameti, 2007). 
While reformists, in particular, have been largely successful in utilizing this potential, the politics 
of the press law have significantly complicated this issue and limited the binary division between 
Iranian state and civil society (Sameti, 2007). Iran’s latest amended press law, ratified in 1986, 
grants freedom of the press: ‘The press have the right to publish the opinions, constructive 
criticisms, suggestions and explanations of individuals and government officials for public 
information’ (Iran const., art. 3, cited in Khiabany, 2010, p. 143). ‘No government or non-
government official should resort to coercive measures against the press to publish an article or 
essay, or attempt to censure and control the press’ (Iran const., art. 4 cited in Khiabany, 2010, p. 
143). This same law, however, imposes two main limitations on the activities of the press. First, 
it prohibits contents that imply political offenses, and those which violate the principles of 
Sharia, Iran’s constitution, or the rights of the public (Iran const., art. 6). Second, it bans 
publications without legal permission to operate or with a canceled license (Iran const., art. 7). 
While licenses are granted by the Press Supervisory Board
16
 (Iran const., art. 11), offenses 
                                                          
13 The Keyhan daily is one of the publications of the Keyhan media institution founded before the 
Revolution. It is affiliated with the Office of the Supreme Leader and maintains close ties with security 
and judiciary officials. It is considered to be the most influential hard-line conservative newspaper in Iran. 
(Rafizadeh & Alimardani, 2013).  
14 Established a few years after the Revolution, Resalat maintains strong links to traditional bazaar 
merchants who are conservatives in favor of a market economy (BBC Monitoring, 2007). 
15 Jam Jam is owned by and reflects the conservative views of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
network (IRIB).  
16 The PSB is composed of seven members, with the Minister of Culture as chairman, a judge elected by 
the Supreme Judiciary Council, one representative from the parliament, one university professor 
appointed by the Minister of Science and Higher Education, one of the press managing directors elected 
by the press, a religious seminarian appointed by Qom religious school, and finally, a member of the 
Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution (Iran const., art. 10) 
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attributed to the press are examined by the competent courts in the presence of a press jury (Iran 
const., art. 34).  
Thus, the definition of political offenses in the press law that is open to interpretational 
abuse, the composition of the Press Supervisory Board, and conservatives dominance of the 
judiciary have paved the way for hardliners to repress the reformists’ and independent press 
(Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010). Particularly since 2000, and following the initial outburst of the 
reformist press, conservative elements within the judiciary have charged numerous newspapers 
with the publication of offensive content, and temporarily or permanently revoked their licenses 
(Sameti, 2007). Even during the 2013 presidential campaign, the hardliner conservatives 
crackdown on the press extended beyond reformists to include some conservative print outlets 
covering banned topics (Wojcieszak, Brouillette, & Smith, 2013). Nevertheless, despite such 
restrictions, Iran has a vibrant press industry, with a total number of national and officially 
registered publications at 4,054: 603 daily newspapers and 3,451 journals and magazines (Iran’s 
Ministry of Culture, 2017 December). 
2.2.3 Women’s rights activism in the revolutionary period of 1979 to 1988 
The political environment of Iran during the revolutionary period, which lasted until the end of 
the Iran– Iraq war in 1988, was dominated by a politicized and ideological definition of Islam, 
and the increased power of the state and autonomy from civil society (Jahanshahrad, 2012). The 
“woman question”, was immediately put on the agenda as religious forces gave gender issues a 
key role in differentiating life under a future Islamic government from that of the regime of the 
Shah (Halper, 2005). The Islamic Republic's gender policies were based on the Islamization of 
families and the nation. As a first step, this required a codification of the 'Islamic family’ 
(Yeganeh, 1993). The Family Court and the Family Protection Law of 1967 were quickly 
abolished, and policies regarding marriage, family planning, familial relations, divorce, and 
custody were developed that would establish Islamic standards for Iranian housewives (Yeganeh, 
1993). The second phase associated with this process established the degree of women's 
participation in national development (Yeganeh, 1993). In order to enable the Islamic nation to 
benefit from the creative qualities of its female citizens, policies were formulated for women's 
education, employment, and political participation (Yeganeh, 1993). The new Islamic state 
aimed at incorporating women into a national vision promising them equal rights and an 
important role in defending the revolution, albeit within the confines of their central role in the 
31 
 
family (Sameh, 2010). Therefore, the third aspect of the Islamic gender policies was concerned 
with setting strategies “to enable the family and the nation to remain in harmony in relation to 
women” (Yeganeh, 1993, p. 10). Policies were thus set up on gender segregation to de-sexualize 
male-female social contact in order to protect the sanctity of the Islamic family (Yeganeh, 1993).     
The revolutionary period in Iran is defined by many scholars as a simultaneous closure and 
opening period for women (e.g. Afshar, 1996; Hoodfar, 1999; Keddie, 2000; Moghadam, 2002; 
Najmabadi, 1998); “Years of hardship, years of growth”, as Najmabadi (1998) described. The 
elimination of women judges, the dismissal of large numbers of professional women from 
government jobs, and the repeal of women’s rights within the family indicated a serious defeat 
for women who had been promised greater equality under the Islamic state (Keddie, 2000; 
Sameh, 2010). But it was specifically that promise that enabled Muslim women’s rights activists 
to use Islamic discourse for actual reforms in women-related policies (Sameh, 2010). In fact, the 
Islamization policies of the revolutionary state had made women react to the state’s gender 
policies by introducing a new discourse under the flag of Islamic feminism (Jahanshahrad, 
2012). Islamic feminism emphasized the fact that the discriminating policies of the revolutionary 
Islamic state emerged from misguided male interpretations of Islam's holy texts, in contrast to 
the principles of the true Islam (Barlow & Akbarzadeh, 2008).  
Within the very system of the revolutionary state, Islamic feminists gained more 
participatory opportunities and public attention than their secular counterparts fighting to raise 
women's issues regardless of Islamic principles (Ahmadi, 2006). A few months after the 
Revolution, secular activists founded Komiteye Hamahangi Zanan (Women’s Solidarity 
Committee) with the aim of providing wider access to education, public life, and platforms for 
the expression of debates on gender issues (Farhadpour, 2012). Etehade Enghelabi Zanane 
Mobarez (The Revolutionary Unity of Militant Women) was founded as a women’s wing of the 
Communist Party of Workers and Peasants and published their Sepedih Sorkh (Red Dawn) 
journal (Farhadpour, 2012). Jamiate Zanan Mobarez (The Militant Women’s Society) was the 
women’s division of the Union of Iranian Communists, which also had its own paper Zanane 
Mobarez (Militant Women) (Farhadpour, 2012). Although important, the secular women’s 
efforts were neither effective nor widespread, mainly because of barriers blocking secular 
discourse within the framework of an Islamic Republic (Ahmadi, 2006; Halper, 2005; Hoodfar, 
1999). “An ‘inside force’, a ‘from within’ perspective, has been needed to alter the dominant 
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fundamentalist discourse. Iranian Muslim women, particularly elite women, have answered this 
exigency” (Ahmadi, 2006, p. 34).  
The most influential Islamist women's groups, Jameye Zanane Enghelabe Eslami (The 
Women's Society of the Islamic Revolution), was founded shortly after the revolution, with the 
aim of developing culturally appropriate ways to build a society that would end women's 
oppression (Paidar, 1997, p. 240). Most of the organization’s members were educated in the 
West: Fereshte Hashemi, Shahin Tabatabaei, and Zahra Rahnavard - who took over the editing of 
Etell’at-e Banovan (Ladies’ Information) and changed its title to Rah-e Zaynab (Zaynab’s Path) - 
all held PhDs from American universities. Others were connected to respected religious leaders 
or were known for their political activities against the Pahlavi Regime (Paidar, 1997, p. 240). 
The presence of prominent women such as Azam Talaghani, who had family links to religious-
political leaders, facilitated the association’s access to the country’s press (Hoodfar, 1999; 
Keller, 2010). Taleghani set up another women’s organization called the Moaseseye Zanane 
Mosalman (Islamic Women Institute) and launched the monthly Payam-e Hajar (Hagar’s 
Message) (Mir-hosseini, 2002), that raised serious questions about the necessity of reinterpreting 
Islamic laws (Kian, 1997). Other Islamist journals and newspapers published in this period 
included Zane Rouz (Today’s Women), a formerly pro-Pahlavi magazine, which kept the old 
name but transformed into a completely religiously oriented women’s journal; Mahbobeh (A 
Female Name), published in English; Vahdat Eslami Banovan (The Unity of Islamic woman), in 
Urdu; and Al-Tahereh (Pure), in Arabic (Farhadpour, 2012). 
By the mid-1980s, the Islamic state was consolidated. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) period, 
which intensified conservative Islamism, left no place for secular and left-wing organizations in 
the political scene of Iran. In this situation, Muslim women’s right activists and their publications 
- above all Payame Hajar (Hagar’s Message) and Zane Ruz (Today’s Women) - became 
platforms for opposing the new discriminating laws. 
The case best exemplifying the role of the Islamic feminists’ press was the objection to the 
annulment of the 1967 Family Protection Law immediately after the Revolution. In essence, this 
annulment meant returning to polygamy, a revival temporary marriage, free divorce for men, and 
automatic child custody to fathers (Keddie, 2000). Women’s journals broadcasted the negative 
consequences of such decisions mainly through publishing stories of women’s suffering in the 
hands of despotic husbands, including stories of wife-beatings, suicide, and the loss of children 
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(Keddie, 2000). They printed open letters to religious leaders asking if this was the way to 
achieve Islamic justice (Hoodfar, 1999). Parliamentary women representatives also made similar 
arguments; for example, against the official encouragement of polygamy. They produced 
Islamist-based arguments to strictly limit polygamy, positing that court permission should be 
required (Keddie, 2000). The Islamic activists’ press and women parliamentarian efforts created 
a serious outcry from Islamists and secular revolutionaries alike who noted the lack of legislation 
replacing the abrogated family law (Osanloo, 2008). Important religious leaders complained of 
confusion over the laws. Even judges called for a regularization of the judicial process for 
family-law disputes (Osanloo, 2008). As a result of such efforts, during 1984-85, twelve 
conditions were printed into all marriage contracts as grounds for women to get divorced, 
provided husbands signed them all (Keddie, 2000). Also, second marriages were allowed only 
with the first wife's consent (Vakil, 2011). 
2.2.4 Women’s rights activism in the 1988-1997 post-war era: the "Period of Construction” 
Women's role during the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-88) was multifaceted (Yeganeh, 1993). 
Initially the image of the true Muslim woman was rigorously limited to that of mother and wife 
who sacrifices her sons and husband for the Islamic cause and providing ideological support 
(Kian, 1997; Yeganeh, 1993). But as the war progressed, and the possibility of an early 
resolution with Iraq faded, the approach to women’s involvement became much more pragmatic 
and systematic. The government started to mobilize women for military action and Ayatollah 
Khomeini instructed them to receive military training in order to defend their country (Yeganeh, 
1993). 
The end of war with Iraq and the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani marked the beginning of 
a new phase for gender debate in Iran, resulting in the lifting of some major restrictions on 
women mainly in terms of employment and public activities (Khiabany, 2010, p. 194). As part of 
his liberalization and development program, Rafsanjani soon realized that enhancing women’s 
participation in society, rather than their marginalization, furthered his agenda, and boosted 
Iran’s political legitimacy and economic productivity (Vakil, 2011, p. 101). The state’s 
encouragement and economic pressure on families due to the inflation of the war years 
persuaded women - many of whom had never been employed outside the home - to join the work 
force (Halper, 2005). President Rafsanjani’s declaration that Iran was “in need of a women labor 
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force” even forced power elites to ask secular women professionals dismissed from their posts 
during the revolutionary period to return to their positions (Kian, 1997).  
The new role of women in society required the government to implement more favorable 
policies to women. That was when a transformation of gender rhetoric and policy began, and the 
government set up a promotion of women’s social participation as one of its overt goals (Halper, 
2005). In 1988, the state established the Social and Cultural Council of Women, which was 
responsible for studying the legal, social, and economic problems of Iranian women in order to 
provide recommendations to the executive branch of the government (Bahramitash & Hooglund, 
2011, p. 50). This council had an impact on major women's issues. For instance, in 1989, after 
numerous meetings that included university presidents and cabinet ministers, the council 
succeeded in lifting restrictions on the enrollment of women in the technical and scientific 
faculties (Bahramitash & Hooglund, 2011, p. 50). With respect to women’s employment, the 
government issued an official document on female employment in 1992 urging government 
organizations to enable women to fulfill both their domestic and paid duties; for instance, equal 
pay for equal work, and paid time off for women’s ‘mothering obligations’ (Afshar, 1996). In a 
similar move in 1992, the Bureau of Women's Affairs, a subsidiary of the presidential office, was 
created to detect problems and shortcomings and propose solutions that would enhance women's 
status and their social, political, cultural, and economic role (Kian, 1997).  
The new economic, social, and demographic post-war realities, and the need to mollify the 
restive, youthful population, pushed the government to authorize relative freedom of the press 
and NGOs (Vakil, 2013). By the mid-1990s, numerous non-governmental or quasi-governmental 
organizations dealing with women’s issues were created (Fazaeli, 2007). The unprecedented 
public presence of women, particularly those from the middle class, gave them self-confidence 
and new social skills that encouraged many to volunteer for non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and social activities (Bayat, 2007). Thanks to Mohammad Khatami, the liberal minded 
Minister of Culture, several hundred new journals and newspapers, including women-specific 
publications, began publishing (Kian, 1997), notably the independent Zanan (Women) magazine, 
which later became the main platform for women’s rights discourses, founded by Shahla 




Zanan critically discussed socio-political, legal, and economic issues from the perspective of 
women’s interests and presented new approaches for addressing women’s problems 
(Jahanshahrad, 2012). Among the important contributions of the magazine in the early years of 
its publication was a series of articles published under a female pseudonym discussing early 
decisions of Islamic Republic authorities to prohibit women’s authority in religious and judiciary 
institutions. Following the Zanan outreach, the debate was continued by both Islamists and 
secular gender activists (Bahramitash & Hooglund, 2011). Conservative journals like Payame 
Zan (Women’s Message), published in the religious city of Qom, continued the debate by 
quoting from those moderate clerics who did not perceive women’s being judges to be against 
Sharia rules (Keddie, 2000). Secular activists, who gained greater freedom during the 
construction era, contributed mainly by publishing articles in women’s journals like Zanan and 
Farzaneh (Wise), a quarterly women’s study journal first published in 1996 both in English and 
in Farsi (Farhadpour, 2012). Secular activists, including lawyers, sociologists, political scientists, 
and writers, criticized women’s exclusion from the bench mainly from the perspective of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international conventions to which the Islamic 
Republic was signatory (Bahramitash & Hooglund, 2011). These efforts, associated with the 
unfair treatment of women in the justice system, particularly in family courts, pressured the 
government to accept women’s participation in the judiciary system as consulting judges 
(Hoodfar, 1999). According to the new law, women could now be appointed as examining 
magistrates, counselors in the administrative courts, family courts, and counselor in the Office of 
the Protection of Minors (Kian, 2011). While this compromise was welcomed, Iranian activists 
are still concerned that women judges do not have the power to issue final verdicts (Keddie, 
2000). 
2.2.5 Women’s rights activism during the Reform Era of 1997-2004 
President Rafsanjani’s term ended in 1997 with the landslide victory of Mohammad Khatami in 
the presidential election. He came to symbolize the ‘Reform Movement’ which had the 
tremendous support of youth and women (Bahramitash, 2007). Iranian women provided 
Khatami, the former administration’s Minister of Culture, with a vital base of support, as they 
believed that under the reformists, women's issues could be raised more easily than under the 
conservative candidates (Barlaw & Akbarzadeh, 2008). Khatami received massive support from 
a diverse spectrum of women from upper, middle, and working class backgrounds, from both the 
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secular and Islamist camps, and from both the urban and rural parts of the country (Vakil, 2011, 
p. 138).  
Once in power, the reformist president had to respond to voters demanding greater social 
and political freedoms and a commitment to human and gender rights (Bahramitash, 2007). 
Women’s political, legal, and social status became one of the central concerns of his 
administration. Early in his first term, Khatami elevated the Bureau of Women’s Affairs to the 
cabinet level, changing its name to the Bureau of Women’s Participation and tripled its annual 
budget (Osanloo, 2008). He appointed Zahra Shojaee, longtime women’s right activist, as the 
center’s director, also his adviser on women’s affairs, and Iran’s representative on women’s 
issues abroad (Osanloo, 2008). For the first time since the 1979 Revolution, women were 
employed in top government posts, Khatami also appointing Massoumeh Ebtekar, the US-
educated lecturer and editor of Farzaneh (Wise) as Vice-President in Charge of Environmental 
affairs; and Azam Nouri as Deputy Culture Minister for Legal and Parliamentary affairs 
(Moghadam, 2002). Also, three women were appointed as presidential advisors, 16 women as 
advisors to ministers, and 105 women as Directors General or Deputy Directors in two-thirds of 
the ministries (Mohammadi, 2007). 
These women worked closely with the thirteen reform-minded women elected in 2000 to a 
reformist-dominated parliament (Moghadam, 2002). The women MPs of the Sixth Parliament 
formed a bloc, referred to as the Women’s Faction, and unlike their predecessors, fearlessly 
declared their intentions to change the laws in favor of women (Barlaw & Akbarzadeh, 2008). 
The reform movement not only resulted in women’s political participation in parliamentary 
elections, but in local council elections after 1999, in which one-third of the representatives were 
women, making for a total of 114 women in 109 cities (Bahramitash, 2007). These political 
achievements during the Reform Era were tightly associated with the unprecedented freedom 
women’s rights activists gained for their activities. In the press and through their NGOs, they 
explicitly supported reformist women MPs, who in return become their clear voice in politics 
and who could lobby for their causes in decision-making bodies (Mohammadi, 2007).  
The pro-NGO policies of the government for the establishment of a more vibrant civil 
society caused the burgeoning of non-government organizations, many of which were founded 
around women’s issues (Esfandiari, 2010). From 1997 to 2005, the number of NGOs that 
concentrated on the problems of the women population, including those run by women’s rights 
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activists, rose from 67 to 337 (Koolaee, 2012). Moreover, Khatami was well aware that since the 
conservatives controlled the national broadcasting organization (IRIB), he would need the press 
to disseminate visions of his social and political reforms and gather greater support for his 
policies (Sameti, 2007). Therefore, the measures his Minster of Culture undertook to relax 
government control over the press, arts, and cinema, and to ease the issue of publishing permits, 
transformed the face of the press in Iran (Tazmini, 2009, p. 65).  
In the first three years of the Khatami administration, the number of local and national 
newspapers, and weekly and monthly journals increased from a couple of hundred to several 
hundred (Tarock, 2001). This number of publications and their variety in terms of cultural, 
social, and political orientation was unprecedented in all of Iranian history, not just that of the 
Islamic Republic (Tarock, 2001). This was the situation that human rights activist and lawyer 
Mehrangiz Kar referred to as the ‘Iranian Media Spring’ (cited in Jahanshahrad, 2012). The 
number of women’s press also grew in this environment. By 1999, in addition to numerous 
women’s journals published locally, thirteen women's journals and newspapers were being 
published at the national level (Mahdi, 2004). The previously launched publications (Neda, 
Payam-e Zan, Payam-e Haajar, Zane Rooz, Farzaneh, Nameh-ye Zan, Nesa, Shahed-e 
Baanovaan, Al-Mahjoobeh, Al-Tahereh, and Zanan), were joined by journals trying to approach 
gender issues from different angles, and to frame them in various discourses (Mir-Hosseini, 
2002).  Zan (Woman), the first-ever women’s daily newspaper in Iran, launched in August 1998 
by Faezeh Hashemi, a member of the Fifth Parliament and daughter of ex-president Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (1989-1997) (Mir-Hosseini, 2002). Jense Dovom (the second sex), known as the most 
secular and radical of the women’s press in Iran, was launched in March 1998 by Noushin 
Ahmadi-Khorasani, a prominent women’s rights activist, writer, and publisher in her late 
twenties (Khiabany, 2010, pp. 205-206). The journal’s articles were marked by a leftist penchant 
and a noticeable absence of any discussion of religion (Mir-Hosseini, 2002). Hoqooqe Zanaan 
(Women’s Right) appeared in July 1998 and concentrated mainly on violence against women 
(Farhanpour, 2012). 
Although hardliner conservatives had been imposing control on the media sphere since the 
revolutionary period, their program to prevent the press from resonating independent voices 
within civil society manifested itself more conspicuously after reformists’ triumph. Particularly 
after the decisive victory of the reformists in the 2000 parliamentary election, the conservative 
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faction responded to the ongoing openness of reformist press that called for the 
institutionalization of democracy and the establishment of free political parties with a wave of 
closures and censorship (Rahimi, 2003). During this crackdown, the conservative-dominated 
judiciary system held the main executive power. As mentioned earlier, by abusing the definition 
of political offence in the press law, the judiciary was able to ban many progressive publications 
and even prosecute some of their journalists and editors (Sameti 2007; Tarock, 2001). Since 
2001, in line with the reformist press, women’s publications like Zan and Payame Hajar were 
closed and others threatened. It will be explained in section 2.3 that it was the conservatives’ 
crackdown on the women’s press that saw the beginning of the use of the Internet by women’s 
rights activists.  
During the Reform Era, the collaborative efforts of women’s legal establishments, 
parliamentarians, press, and women’s rights’ NGOs all pushed policy makers to lift some of the 
restrictions on women’s legal rights (Vakil, 2011, p. 108). Thus, was the legal age of marriage 
for girls and boys successfully raised (Esfandiari, 2010); and the reform of the child custody law 
entitled women to have custody of their children - boys and girls alike - up to age seven
17
; and 
the ban on giving government scholarships for the study abroad of unaccompanied single women 
was lifted (Esfandiari, 2010). In spite of these legal victories, though, many other bills passed by 
MPs to advance women were rejected by the conservative Guardian Council, including 
ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW).  
The achievements of women’s rights activists during the 1990s, specifically the eight-year 
period of the reformist government, were not limited to legal victories. Mainly three prospects 
created by the new social and political scene in the country, and by the efforts of the activists, 
had a profound impact on women’s rights discourse in Iran. First, despite traditionalist attempts 
to restrain women's awareness, the irreversible process of constructing women's social identity 
had begun, putting tremendous pressure on the Islamic state to adopt a more reconciliatory 
approach toward women (Kian, 1997; Mahdi, 2004). As the secular feminist Mehrangiz Kar 
described (cited in Halper, 2005, p. 119): 
                                                          
17 Previously, the law entitled the mother to have custody of boys only up to age two. Furthermore, with 
this new legislation, it is the court that decides if the mother or father should receive custody once 
children reach the age of seven (Koolaee, 2012). 
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[Iranian women gained] confidence in themselves. With all the sacrifices they 
made, Iranian women know how much their current and future rulers owe them 
and that egalitarian rights are part of what is due to them. This demand is no 
longer that of a group of women; it is a nationwide one. 
Second, in the 1990s the interconnectivity among women’s NGOs, along with the relative 
freedom of press before 2001, which permitted the publication of divergent ideologies, caused 
unprecedented cooperation among secular and Islamist activists, who had previously been 
divided in the 1980s (Ahmadi, 2006; Halper, 2005; Kian, 1997). This solidarity also originated 
from a general desire for improving women’s status in the family, workplace, schools, and in 
society at large – common interests that provided incentive for all to work more closely together 
(Halper, 2005). Islamic feminist journals like Farzaneh and Zanan started opening up new space 
for dialogue between Islamic and secular activists (Ahmadi, 2006), regularly publishing articles 
by prominent secular feminists like Mehrangiz Kar and Shirin Ibadi, a jurist who won the 2003 
Nobel Peace Prize. Mahbubeh Ummi, the editor of Farzaneh, described this trend (cited in Kian, 
1997, p. 91):  
Although secular women do not share our convictions, we can collaborate because 
we all work to promote women's status. We [Islamist women] no longer consider 
ourselves to be the sole heirs of the revolution. We have realized that our sectarian 
views of the first post-revolutionary years led to the isolation of many competent 
seculars, which was to the detriment of all women. We now hope to compensate our 
errors. 
Finally, the international recognition of Iranian women’s rights discourse drastically increased 
through the activists’ cooperation with international NGOs, their participation in international 
seminars, and in publicizing their activities in the international media (Hoodfar, 1999). 
Moreover, the interactivity of Iranian activists with other countries’ women’s rights activists led 
to the former learning from the experience of the latter (Vakil, 2011, p. 127). With regards to this 
debate, it should not be ignored that the post 9-11 expansion of the idea of Islam and Islamic 
societies are essentially backward, anti-modern, and opposed to women’s rights threatened the 
international credit that Iranian reformists and women’s rights activists had painstakingly 
acquired with their active and visible social and political participation (Povey, 2012). 
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2.2.6 Women’s rights activism and Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2013) 
Ahmadinejad’s program of restraining civil society escalated the control and monitoring of 
NGOs, social and political players, and reformist political elites (Morady, 2010). Women’s rights 
activists were among the most suppressed groups during the two terms of Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency. The growing presence of women in the public sphere had become a serious source of 
concern for fundamentalists and their selected president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad (Amir-
Ebrahimi, 2008). To decelerate this process, by the spring of 2006, Ahmadinejad had changed 
the name of the presidential office, the Bureau of Women’s Participation, to the Center for 
Women and Family Affairs, suggesting a new focus on women’s roles in the family over their 
public participation (Osanloo, 2008). He also appointed a new director for the center, Zohreh 
Tabibzadeh Nouri, who declared that Iran would not ratify CEDAW so long as she was in charge 
(Osanloo, 2008). Restrictions on commemorating International Women’s Day (8  March), which 
had been relaxed during the reformist government, were reinstated in 2006, and some women’s 
meetings in universities were canceled (Mir-Hosseini, 2006). A few months later, Ahmadinejad 
advised Iranian women to return to their homes and focus on their "primary" responsibility of 
raising children (Barlow & Akbarzadeh, 2008). Revealing a wide gap between the state and 
public opinion, his speech was greeted with shock and indignation among large segments of 
Iranian women (Barlow & Akbarzadeh, 2008). The government’s attacks on the network of the 
women’s rights movement became more severe following two endogenous and exogenous 
events: the emergence of Iranian activists’ One Million Signature (OMS) Campaign and 
Washington’s so-called ‘democracy promotion program’ in Iran.  
On 27 August 2006, a women’s NGO, Markaze Farhangi Zanan (Women’s Cultural 
Center), composed of self-identified secular and younger generation of feminists, launched the 
One Million Signature Campaign, modeled after a similar effort in Morocco. The majority of 
Islamist activists, who were in favor of reconciliatory approaches, like lobbying politicians, were 
not key players in this campaign, resulting in some tension amongst the feminists of that time 
(Sameh, 2010). The campaign aimed at collecting one million signatures, through door-to-door 
contact, on a petition which demanded the revision of the discriminatory laws against women 
(Sameh, 2010). While the petition, and its submission to the Iranian parliament, was the ultimate 
goal, the initiative also aimed at training women on their individual and human rights, as well as 
developing profound gender consciousness (Jahanshahrad, 2012). The campaign organization 
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was leaderless, comprised instead of committees coordinating actions. After a year’s effort, the 
OMS campaign spread to 16 provinces and succeeded in getting the support of students, workers, 
human rights activists, as well as that of reformist clerics (Vakil, 2011, p. 178).  
Despite support from a number of well-known clerics and members of the parliament, 
President Ahmadinejad responded to the campaign with harsh measures (Rahimi & Gheytanchi, 
2008). Being accused of challenging aspects of the Islamic constitution and spreading 
propaganda against the government, the campaign office was closed, its official website was 
blocked, some of its members fined and arrested, and the passports and computer files of others 
confiscated (Moghadam & Gheytanchi, 2010). After the formation of the OMS campaign, 
Ahmadinejad’s repression of women’s groups deteriorated, and the activists, particularly secular 
ones, were labeled as dissidents (Moghadam & Gheytanchi, 2010). 
Also during this time, a foreign-sourced trouble for Tehran caused the women’s rights 
movement to face yet more restrictions. As part of a plan to stimulate domestic changes in Iran, 
the US and its allies decided to spend billions on fake Iranian women’s NGOs, as well as funding 
for broadcasting services (Povey, 2012). The Bush Administration’s campaign of regime change 
in Iran, with a specific focus on women’s rights advocates, enabled Iran’s conservative 
government to frame women’s rights activists as ‘threats to national security’ (Raunio, 2014). 
Therefore, women’s rights activists and their NGOs were one of the first sectors to feel the 
hardliners’ backlash to Bush program (Raunio, 2014). Elahe Koolaee, the reformist MP in the 
Sixth Parliament, described in her article (2012) that the conservative government after Khatami 
closed down many independent women’s NGOs and replaced them with state-sponsored NGOs, 
claiming the former were supported by the USA.  
Despite the clampdown, however, women’s rights activists continued their efforts, 
especially after conservative members of Parliament tried to introduce a series of discriminatory 
bills. The most considerable effort was in response to the Ahmadinejad administration’s pressure 
on the conservative parliament to add a number of articles to the Family Protection Act law. The 
most disputed proposal would enable men to have a second marriage without the consent of the 
first wife, which, hitherto, had been a legal requirement (Theodoulou, 2008). The suggested 
article raised great controversy and caused the formation of a coalition of both secular and 
Islamist activists that prevented ratification of the bill (Vakil, 2011, p. 187). A broad array of 
women’s rights groups, including the Islamist Zeinab (a religious name) Society, and the 
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Women’s Organization of the Islamic Revolution, and more secular ones like the group of 
activists who formed the One Million Signature Campaign, collaborated in mobilizing public 
opinion against the bill and meeting with members of parliament to voice their objection (Vakil, 
2011, p. 187). Their efforts resulted in postponing ratification and sending the bill back to its 
legal committee for further investigation. The government, however, reinforced its intimidation 
of women’s rights activists, mainly targeting women’s press. Zanan, the most prominent feminist 
magazine, was thus banned in 2008.  
In April 2009, a few months before the disputed presidential election, women formed a 
broad pre-election coalition called the Convergence of Women (Hamgarayee Zanan). Instead of 
endorsing a specific candidate, they presented their issues to all four nominees and demanded a 
response from each (Shojaei, 2012a). The coalition received the support of 40 women’s rights 
groups, and 700 activists and well-known figures, turning it into the largest pre-election coalition 
of women in Iranian history (Shojaei, 2012a). While Karroubi and Mousavi, the reformist 
candidates, promised to submit bills to the parliament with the intent of reforming laws 
discriminating against women, Ahmadinejad’s representative responded with an attack first on 
CEDAW, for being against Islam, and then on Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Peace Laureate, accusing 
her of westernizing Iranian culture (Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2010).  
By the evening of the election of 12 June 2009, Mahmud Ahmadinejad was declared the 
winner, a result contested by the other candidates, particularly Mousavi and Karroubi, who called 
for a recount. Starting the next day, clashes by the supporters of these candidates occurred in 
Tehran and other major cities. These demonstrations, and the harsh government crackdown that 
followed, continued over subsequent weeks and months received wide coverage in the 
international media. As far as women's rights activists were concerned, the post-election 
uprisings known as the Green Movement were a link between improvements in women’s rights 
and the trend of political liberalization (Vakil, 2011, p. 202). One month after the election, 
women’s rights activists published a statement with 800 signatures condemning the election 
results and the crackdowns on the protesters (Allahyari, 2011). The government escalated its 
suppression over women’s groups and campaigns in response to their solidarity with protesters 
(Moruzzi, 2009).  
The new political scene in the country and the increased suppression of civil society largely 
influenced Iranian women’s right movement. A division was formed among activists who 
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believed it was time for strategies of confrontation, as reform was not possible within the 
structure of an illegitimate government and those who yet believed in negotiating with the state 
(Vakil, 2011, p. 203). Also, a shift in discourse: While activists’ main focus remained on 
women’s legal issues, they engaged more in human rights and democracy discourse after the 
protests (Shojaei, 2012b). The initiatives best exemplifying this shift was the foundation of the 
‘Green Solidarity of the Women’s Movement’ and the ‘Committee for Solidarity Against Social 
Violence’ a few months after the uprisings. Moreover, the movement lost a significant part of its 
resources due to the forced closure of many of its NGOs and groups, the attacks on its campaigns 
and coalitions, and the onslaught on individual activists, forcing many to go underground or flee 
into exile (Vakil, 2011, p. 202).  
Due to this widespread suppression and loss of the activism’s resources, in the second term 
of Ahmadinejad’s administration the battle for the advancement of women’s rights entered a 
period of inactivity. It was only with the coming of Rouhani’s 2013 presidency that hope and 
energy was once more in effect for women’s rights activists. On various occasions during his 
campaign and after the election, Rouhani emphasized the need to reduce government 
intervention in people’s private lives, to increase transparency in addressing the country’s 
problems, to eliminate discriminatory and gender-segregating policies, and to protect gender 
equality in rights and opportunities (Vakil, 2013). So far, Rouhani has visibly made certain 
improvements for Iranian women. He removed the Ahmadinejad-led segregation policies at 
universities; pushed for the elimination of discriminatory laws against women in gaining equal 
employment opportunities; and even discussed easing restrictions on veiling. Although he did 
not include women in his list of ministers, he did appoint two women to his cabinet, and also 
selected Iran’s first female ambassador. Also, as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, 
Rouhani appointed Shahindokht Mollaverdi, a jurist, scholar, and well-known women’s rights 
activist. Although it is still too soon to define the extent of freedom for women’s rights activism 
in this new political era, by the time of field research in 2014-2015, women’s rights activists had 
resumed their conventions and began to meet more openly, compared to the years under 
Ahmadinejad’s rule (Tahmasebi, cited in Jones, 2013). Several prominent women’s rights 
activists have been invited by the government to express their views for improving women’s 
status (Rezai-Rashti, 2015). Also, as a defining moment for women’s rights movement, Zanan 
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magazine, after being banned for almost seven years, was relaunched under the new name of 
Zanane Emrouz (Today’s Women).  
2.3 Women’s Rights Activism in the Internet age  
The nature of Iran’s women’s rights movement has been shaped through interaction with the 
context under which it operates. In the semi-democratic political context of Iran (Fadaee, 2012), 
the movement has adopted more incremental and penetrative strategies, rather than 
confrontational tactics (e.g. mass protests), to achieve incremental but sustainable gains (Mahdi, 
2004). Investigating Iran’s contemporary social movements, Fadaee (2012) argues: “This context 
has led to a specific nature of state and civil society, in which social action is not directly hostile 
towards the state but it is an interaction and negotiation with the state. This is totally different 
from an authoritarian context (p. 134).” Since the 1979 Revolution, in order to advance the rights 
of their compatriot women, women’s rights activist groups have created special purpose 
coalitions and campaigns which hardly operate on the basis of mass protests
18
. Rather, they 
concentrate on raising public awareness and support, and pressuring decision makers through 
public opinion, lobbying, and negotiations.  
The uneven relationship between the post-revolutionary governments and the activists, 
which has emerged from a different approach of political factions toward civil society, has 
affected the dynamic of women’s rights activism within the framework of its peaceful (i.e., non-
confrontational) nature and strategies. The first decade after the 1979 Revolution imposed 
restrictions on secular activists, which paved the way for the growth of Muslim activist 
organizations and for the persuasion of women’s rights mainly within the family, while the post-
war era saw the emergence of a women’s rights activism directing modern discourses and 
agendas in terms of women’s social and political presence (Kian, 1997). This effort culminated 
in the Reform Era’s unprecedented growth of women’s press and NGOs able to actively pursue 
such a modern agenda. Also in this era, activists achieved notable legal victories by investing in 
their NGOs and press, and through cooperating with reformist female politicians in the 
                                                          
18 As a very rare case, a coalition of women’s NGOs from Tehran and other cities and student activists 
held a demonstration in front of the University of Tehran on 12 June 2005 to call for eliminating the 
inequalities embedded in the Iranian legal system. This peaceful demonstration was mainly formed 




government and parliament. All these efforts at raising awareness, however, were restricted by 
the conservative faction’s crackdown on women’s and reformists’ press in Khatami’s final years 
of presidency. Then during the Ahmadinejad administration, the clampdown by hardliner 
conservatives extended beyond the activism’s publications to include closure of its very 
organizations and control of its interactions, as in the case of the OMS campaign.  
It was in the early 2000s, with the closure of some women’s and reformist publications and 
increased control on others, that the Internet came on the scene. “Follow in the long history of 
women’s public writing” (Sreberny & Khiyabany, 2010, p. 107), a variety of women’s websites 
and blogs emerged as the new medium for the communication of women’s rights discourse. 
Also, according to available reports (Lerner, 2010; Michaelsen, 2011; Sreberny & Khiyabany, 
2010; Tohidi, 2009), women’s rights activists’ use of the Internet as a means for internal 
interactions coincided with the suppression of the activist groups' meetings under the hardliner 
Ahmadinejad. Lerner (2010) reported during the 2006 One Million Signature Campaign, e-mail 
lists were established for communication between member activists. The utilization of e-mail 
technology was also witnessed during the 2009 pre-election coalition. E-mail groups were used 
to network different women’s rights activist groups and individuals forming the coalition 
(Tohidi, 2009).  
The first website devoted to women’s issues was launched in 2002. Zanane Iran19 (Women 
of Iran) disseminated gender-related news and information and served as a key place for raising a 
number of significant women-related demands, such as the ratification of CEDAW (Sreberny & 
Khiyabany, 2010, pp. 109-110). The other prominent women’s website of the time, Teribune 
Feministie Iran
20
 (Iranian Feminist Tribune) was launched in 2003. The Web site was owned by 
the Markaze Farhangi Zanan (Women’s Cultural Center), which in 2006 launched the One 
Million Signature Campaign. This NGO established a specific website for the OMS campaign, 
called ‘Change for Equality’. The website published the campaigners’ petitions, articles, news 
stories, interviews, and photos in different languages such as Persian, English, French, German, 
and Spanish (Sameh, 2010). Another activist website of the time was the well-known Meydan 
Zanan
21
 (Women’s Field). It was chiefly an online initiative providing a platform for the 
introduction of women’s campaigns, such as ‘My Mother, My Country’, which supported the 
                                                          
19 www.womeniniran.org  (The website is no longer available). 
20 www.iftribune.es 
21 www.meydaan.com (The Web site is no longer available) 
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right to Iranian nationality for children of Iranian mothers and fathers of Iraqi or Afghan origin 
(Sreberny & Khiyabany, 2010, p. 108). 
From 2002 to 2007, blogs became the dominant online sites for Iranian cultural and political 
production (Akhavan, 2010). Particularly, the Ahmadinejad crackdown on public spaces resulted 
in a burgeoning blogosphere with Iranians (Sreberny & Khiyabany, 2010, p. 116). In this period, 
a significant area of the Iranian blogosphere, known as Weblogistan (Land of the Blogs), was 
related to women’s issues (Akhavan, 2011; Amir-Ebrahimi, 2008; Shirazi, 2012). To a large 
extent, Weblogistan developed through the active participation of many female bloggers 
including professional journalists, women’s rights activists, professionals such as lawyers, 
engineers, and doctors, as well as ordinary women (Shirazi, 2012). In addition to many 
individual blogs, inspired by collective efforts in running women’s magazines and websites, the 
activists also formed collective blogs like herlandmag.com/weblog (Sreberny & Khiyabany, 
2010, p. 110).  
Ever since Iranians started exploring the sociopolitical implications of the Internet, 
development of this new communication technology has been subject to the same challenge that 
faced the print media: that is, the government’s fluctuation between a pragmatic and ideological 
media policy, as Khiabany (2010, pp. 151-52) described. Although the entire political spectrum 
advocated vast investments in digital communication technologies to fulfill the development and 
modernization requirements of the country, politicization of the Internet entailed factional 
frictions and tensions within the state as well as between the state and the people (Sohrabi-
Haghighat, 2011; Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010, p. 25). While politicians advocated the civil 
society shared a view of the Internet as inherently decentralizing, democratic, and progressive, 
conservatives were quick to limit and control the political potential of the Internet for their 
opposition while simultaneously utilizing it for their own benefit (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010, p. 
25). In 2002, a special committee for the “Legal Investigation of Internet-Related Crimes and 
Offenses” was formed by the judiciary. A year later, aside from pornography websites, dozens of 
other sites with political content, including those of American radio and TV stations broadcasting 
in Persian, were banned (Rahimi, 2003). Also, responding to the online shift of the reformist 
press, different conservative groups launched their own competing websites to publish news and 
political commentary against their opponents (Michaelsen, 2011). Thus, the breadth of the highly 
factionalized political landscape of the country found its way to the Internet (Michaelsen, 2011). 
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With regards to women’s online media, in 2005, a few months after Ahmadinejad’s first election, 
the Teribune Feministie Iran (Iranian Feminist Tribune) was blocked. In response, the Markaze 
Farhangi Zanan (Women’s Cultural Center) launched a second website named Zanestan22 (Land 
of Women), which was the first electronic magazine on women’s rights. This Web site was as 
well blocked after two years. Also, as politicization of blogging increased, the government 
filtering program was extended to the blogosphere, which was hardly controlled by the 
authorities prior to 2005 (Sreberny & Khiyabany, 2010, p. 70).  
The conservative bodies’ crackdown on the Internet became more severe following the 2009 
protests that greeted Ahmadinejad’s second term election and the ubiquitous role that social 
media found in its coverage of the conflict (Baldino & Goold, 2014). To confront what they 
called a ‘Soft War’, the authorities dramatically reduced download speed in order to restrict the 
flow of information, photos, and video clips, and blocked access to all major social networking 
sites, as well as hundreds of websites affiliated with the protesters and reformist candidates 
(Freedom House, 2012; Rahimi, 2011). Iranians have been widely using circumvention tools like 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and proxies ever since as the most popular solutions to 
bypassing the Internet filtering (Freedom House, 2012). 
Since 2009, Iran’s Internet governance system has become far more multifaceted 
(Ricchiardi, 2014)
23
. Unclear division of power within this system and the existence of so many 
contradictory viewpoints have resulted in conflicts amongst the Iranian officials over Internet 
regulations, particularly since President Rouhani came into power. In the run-up to his election, 
                                                          
22 Herlandmag.com. currently is available at www.zanestan.es   
23 After post-election protests different bodies were established by the state for the control of cyberspace. 
The Committee Charged with Determining Criminal Web Content was founded in 2009 under the 
supervision of the judiciary system to identify criminal web content to be filtered and blocked. Later in 
2012, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), the highest policy-making body for cyberspace was 
formed by the Supreme Leader. The SCC is composed of the country’s President, as Council’s Chairman, 
the Minister of Information and Communications Technology, the Minister of Culture, the parliament 
speaker, the head of the judiciary, the director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the 
commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the national police chief, and seven representatives of the 
Supreme Leader. In addition to these bodies, FATA, Iran’s Cyber Police, was established in 2011 as a 
division of the Iranian police force to confront cyber crimes.     
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Rouhani made a bold promise that if he won, he would push for greater Internet freedom 
(Ricchiardi, 2014). While the hardliner conservatives were propagating against social media as a 
threat to national security, after his election, Rouhani described social media as a welcome 
phenomenon and one which had an undeniable role in his victory (Naeli, 2013). He even 
launched his own official Twitter page
24. Since his election, Rouhani’s interventions25 have 
tangibly affected the country’s filtering policy (Bowen, 2015). In the most recent move toward 
greater Internet access, the government awarded 4G and 4.5G licenses to three Iranian mobile 
broadband companies; and allowed ISPs to offer wider bandwidth on home connections. In 
response to the conservative clerics who opposed the service, saying that it allows obscene 
images to be shared freely and more easily, Rouhani urged the clerics to be more tolerant of new 
technologies, saying: "We cannot close the gates of the world to our younger generation" (Iran 
Internet, 2014).  
In the present era, women’s rights activist groups maintain a significant online presence 
through prominent websites such as Madreseye Feministi
26
 (The Feminist School), Kanune 
Zanane Irani
27
 (Iranian Women Association), Bidarzani
28
 (Bidarzani), and Khaneh Amn
29
 (Safe 
Home). With the growth of social media users, these websites are also linked to their affiliated 
pages in social networking sites. The high presence of Rouhani’s cabinet members and even 
some prominent conservative figures on Facebook and Twitter has not yet resulted in the 
removal of filtering on these sites. Yet in spite of these remaining limitations, social networking 
sites are avidly embraced by a broad spectrum of Iranian society from the youth to elders, and 
from the general population
30
 to the political and religious elites (Iran Media Program, 2015). 
                                                          
24 @HassanRouhani 
25 When the Committee Charged with Determining Offensive Content ordered WhatsApp to be blocked 
in 2014, Rouhani advised his ICT Minister to refuse to implement it. As the committee’s hardliner 
secretary claimed that Rouhani had no basis for challenging the committee’s directives, the minister 
pointed out that as chairman of the SCC, Rouhani’s say on the matter was final, and the block on 
WhatsApp would not be implemented.  




30 In December 2017, there were 40 million Facebook subscribers in Iran (Internet World Stats, 2017). 
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Women’s rights activists took to social media during two major campaigns they ran during the 
Rouhani administration. The first was formed in 2013 in protest to an amendment to the 
Children’s Protection Law. The second was launched in October 2015 to push for a greater 
presence of female parliamentarians in the 2016 parliamentary election. 
2.4 Conclusion 
It must by now be evident that the dynamic of women’s rights activism has been significantly 
influenced by the political environment under which it operates. Before the expansion of the 
Internet among Iranian society, women’s rights activists extensively benefited from the growth 
of their NGOs and the press under the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations. It was right at 
the peak of their growth and legal victories that they found themselves one of key targets of the 
conservatives’ program to control and repress the civil society. What we know so far from extant 
reports is that the activists began to use the Internet upon the forced closure of the women’s press 
and the repression of their organizations. However, yet, there is no in-depth empirical knowledge 
of the role and impacts that the Internet has had for women’s rights activism. Accordingly, the 

















 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
The core objective of this thesis is to explore the impacts of online communication on Iranian 
women’s rights activism. This objective places the research within the context of scholarly 
debates on information and communication technologies (ICTs), particularly the Internet, for 
activism. The first part of this chapter provides an extensive reading of theories and studies in 
this field, highlighting the significance of communication technologies and the Internet for 
activism from the perspective of social movements, public relations, and communication 
theorists, while also embedding empirical studies and review articles on the promises and perils 
of Internet-mediated communication for activism. Armed with both this and Chapter 2’s study, 
those specific areas that should be attended to in the current examination of women’s rights 
activists’ Internet-mediated communication are defined in the second part of this chapter. It is 
these areas specifying the three research questions directing the examinations of this study.   
3.1 Communication Technologies and the Internet for Activism  
Theories and empirical studies around activism and social movements concentrate on the role of 
ICTs in general, and Internet technologies in particular, on two broad fields of activists’ 
practices: (a) activists’ relation with the public, and (b) activists’ internal relations. As Van De 
Donk, Loader, Nixon, and Rucht (2004, p. 3) explained, the centrality of external and internal 
interactions for activist groups points to the importance of communication, and considering the 
network structure of social movements and their limited resources, to the attractiveness of 
utilizing ICTs. The role of ICTs in the first field is rooted in a broader debate, mainly by social 
movements, public relations, and communication scholars, about activists’ public 
communication through alternative media and presentation on mainstream media. The sections 
that follow present these debates. The third section, meanwhile, concentrates on the second field: 
the Internet for activists’ internal relations. This field contains studies that are concerned with the 
impacts of the Internet on communication and organization within activist groups and social 
movement networks, as well as the participation of individual activists. Activists’ internal 
interactions have been historically under the focus of social movement scholars. But since the 
advent of ICTs and the Internet, communication scholars have also been investigating this field.  
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Before explaining theoretical discussions about these two fields, it is important to note a 
number of points about theoretical and empirical literatures in this chapter. As mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, this study focuses on women’s rights activists and activist groups' 
independent activities as much as it concentrates on the networks of cooperation among those 
actors forming the women’s rights movement. However, the theories that inform this research’s 
conceptual framework are mainly focused on activism within the context of social movements, 
since activists and activist groups’ activities, independent of the network of social movements, 
are under-theorized social phenomenon.  
With regards to empirical studies, addressing the thesis definition of activist presented in 
Chapter One, and considering the characteristics of the case of the study, the current review 
focusses mainly on the literature examining Internet communication for activism cases affiliated 
with on-the-ground activities and groups, rather than literature on online activism cases having 
no offline presence. Moreover, the greatest part of the empirically-based studies presented in this 
chapter are about activists’ experiences of the Internet within the context of Western countries, 
since, with few exceptions, most studies on activism and the Internet in transitional and 
undemocratic countries are anecdotal. The increasing amount of literature on the political 
Internet in Arab countries has provided valuable empirical evidence on the democratic role of the 
Internet in the Middle East. Much of these studies, however, are focused on public participation 
and mass mobilization through the Internet, likely to the studies on Iran's 2009 Green Movement. 
These studies have largely failed to shed light on the impacts of the Internet on activists and 
activist groups.  
3.1.1 Activists’ public communication through online alternative media 
According to public relation scholars Smith and Ferguson (2010), activists utilize various 
communication means to engage with the public for two main purposes. First, they should 
convince society about the legitimacy of their issues and position, while simultaneously 
undermining the legitimacy of their targets (an organization, a public policy, and/or a social 
norm). Second, in order to maintain their organizations and make their targets recognize their 
influence, activist groups need to manage relationships with supporters. New social movement 
theorists have discussed the importance of media and communication, while theorizing social 
movements. Melucci (1996) stated that collective identity in social movements requires the 
continuous act of recognizing and being recognized through an exchange of information between 
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social movements actors and the environment in which they operate (cited in Mattoni & Trere, 
2014). Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993), meanwhile, positioned media as central to their study of 
social movements, identifying three reasons why a social movement needs media, reasons 
bearing striking resemblance to the goals specified by Smith and Ferguson (2010): (a) to convey 
its message to its constituency and mobilize their support, (b) to validate that the movement is an 
important actor by receiving the recognition of its targets, and (c) To enlarge the scope of 
conflict to a broader public to improve its relative power versus that of its target.    
Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, p. 116) also emphasized the greater power of mainstream 
media when it comes to movements’ media transactions: “Movements are much more dependent 
on media than the reverse, and this fundamental asymmetry implies the greater power of the 
media system in the transaction.” Rucht (2004) asserted that this asymmetric relationship “stems 
from the fact that most movements need the media, but the media seldom need the movements” 
(p. 30). Communication scholars have also discussed that receiving mainstream media coverage 
is not a straightforward process for activists, because they are located outside the realm of 
institutional politics, and professional standards of media selection, as well, due to rigid 
competition for attention from a variety of causes and activist groups (Pfetsch & Adam, 2011). 
Under such circumstances, activists and social movements develop their own media, often 
denoted as ‘social movement media’ (Downing, 2008, 2010) and ‘alternative media’ (Atton, 
2002). These terms share the common assumption that by creating media of their own, activists 
gain independence in their communication activities and challenge the hegemony of mainstream 
media and political actors that result, in terms of public opinion, in their marginalization or, at 
worst, the elimination of activists and their issues (Atton, 2010).  
“The Internet represents a new era for alternative media” (Ford & Gill, 2001, p. 202). Since 
the early 1990s, scholars’ attention to activists’ alternative media has shifted from offline 
channels like leaflets, newsletters, and videos (Chiumbu, 2015) to the Internet due to its fast 
adoption by activist groups and social movements. Coombs (1998) discussed that while activists 
have limited control over how news media disseminate their issues, the Internet offers them a 
direct and controllable communication channel. Early research into social movements’ 
alternative media mainly in the form of websites and e-mail distribution lists (e.g. Bennet, 2003; 
Denning, 2001; Myers, 2000) reported the ability the Internet offered activists in bypassing mass 
media filters and gaining a considerable level of information and communication independence.  
53 
 
More theoretical and empirical studies have since emerged around the Internet providing 
activists with public communication opportunities not possible through mainstream media and 
older forms of alternative media. Drawing on literature on Internet for activism, Breindl (2010) 
explained that the elimination of intermediaries in online spaces gives activist groups and 
individuals unlimited editorial control on explaining, informing, and developing their own 
narratives. He also discussed that this process contributes to disrupting elite dominance in the 
field of information production and control. Distraction of elite control was also stressed by 
Micó and Ripollés (2014), who asserted that social media facilitated a transition from a situation 
in which news was constructed through an interaction of elites to a more open and competitive 
situation. They supported this assertion by evidence from the recent 15-M movement in Spain.  
Scholars have discussed that activists’ control over their own online media provides them 
with the opportunity to self-present themselves. Cammaerts (2012) discussed movements’ self-
mediation on the Internet includes self-presentation of their protests and activities to counter the 
negative bias of mainstream media reporting their actions. Analyses by Porta and Mosca (2009) 
on 261 websites of global justice movement (GJM) organizations in European countries 
demonstrated that activists’ websites and blogs serve as opportunities for self-presentation to the 
general public in a way considered by activists as ‘electronic business cards’ reflecting and 
representing their identity and past history. The GJM organizations that were studied increased 
their transparency by publishing information about their history and identity. Also, researching 
the self-presentation of European Women’s Lobby (EWL) activists on the Web, Pudrovska and 
Ferree (2004) illustrated that the thirteen involved women’s NGOs diffused their strategies and 
identities through web-based communication in order to increase their organizational visibility. 
In his literature review article, Garrett (2006) discussed that online information distribution by 
activists’ media increases the public visibility not only of the activists themselves, but also their 
target officials. He described this situation as the reverse of the Foucauldian Panopticon, wherein 
ICTs allow civil society to observe and quickly report the power elites’ inappropriate actions 
outside the traditional media spotlight.  
Besides the issue of control and independence, several empirical studies praised activists’ 
online media for compressing the space and time barriers of information dissemination, enabling 
them to reach out to millions of people at once. In his analysis of Internet Activism within the 
global context, Ayres (1999) expressed that “when a message is posted on a website, it is 
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immediately accessible, crossing time and geographic boundaries without a concern for time 
zones, media coverage, or customs barriers” (p. 138). Studies on the early adoption of the 
Internet in the 1990s by Zapatista, the Battle of Seattle, and Anti MAI movements strongly 
underlined the potential of the Internet for the dissemination of information much faster and to a 
greater audience (e.g. Cleaver, 1998; Deibert, 2000; Froehling, 1997). Studying the 
communication strategies of localized transnational activists, Cammaerts (2006) posited that 
“alternative information needs alternative channels of distribution and the Internet provides 
activists with a user-friendly medium for the unbiased and especially the (cost-) efficient 
distribution of alternative information across the boundaries of time and space” (p. 6). Harlow 
and Harp’s (2012) comparative analysis of activists in the USA and Latin America illustrated 
that for activists in both regions, “what made online activism important was the Internet’s ability 
to cross distances and time barriers to create communities and mobilize people for offline 
activism” (p. 208). 
In addition to compressing time and space barriers, the low cost adds to potential enthusiasm 
for online communication for activists. According to Coombs (1998), the Internet provides a 
low-cost communication channel for activist groups generally operating on limited financial 
resources. This potential has been emphasized by more recent studies on social media. 
Comparing three Mexican movements, Sandoval-Almazan and Gil-Garcia (2014) showed that 
web 2.0 technology provides a lower cost and higher performance information dissemination 
tools for activists compared to web 1.0. Kim, Chun, Kwak, and Nam (2014) described that 
initiating and managing a social networking profile requires American environmental NGOs to 
possess less expertise and financial resources because these sites provide free accounts and 
include, by default, some information sharing and commentary features. To sum up, “social 
media are cost-effective tools that enable advocacy organizations to do more for less” (p. 14) - 
declared by Obar, Zube, and Lampe (2012), following their study of activists in U.S.-based 
advocacy groups.   
For scholars who based their analyses on the social movement paradigm, the above-
mentioned opportunities, provided by online alternative media, can consequently enhance the 
opportunity structure empowering or restricting a social movement. Social movement thinkers 
frequently describe this structure as ‘political opportunity structure’, stressing “the opening and 
closing of political space and its institutional substantive location” (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, p. 
55 
 
277) facilitating or repressing activists’ collective action (Tarrow, 2011, p. 27). However, some 
social movement theorists have stressed that this structure also includes dimensions of the social 
and cultural environment, such as public consciousness and issue cultures (Gamson & Meyer, 
1996). Scholars have suggested that by improving social movements’ communication with their 
environment, ICTs can enhance their opportunity structure (Van De Donk et al., 2004, p. 9): 
ICTs enable activists to spread societal awareness of their issues by circumventing state 
regulation and mass media filters; to inform broader public, more quickly, about their ideas and 
tactics; and to mobilize and organize larger public support (Cammaerts, 2006, 2012; Garrett, 
2006; Scott & Street, 2000; Van De Donk et al., 2004).  
Less independence on mainstream media as a result of online media usage has been also 
discussed by a few number of scholars from the perspective of the movements’ framing process: 
“strategic attempts to craft, disseminate and contest the language and narratives used to describe 
a movement” (Garrett, 2006, p. 204). This concept of framing as used in the study of social 
movements and collective actions is a set of “beliefs and meanings” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 
614) intending “to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, 
and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). It has been discussed that 
online media has undermined the mainstream media power in framing a movement's messages 
by creating new networks over which activists can reframe/challenge extant frames in public 
opinion and communicate new frames towards their issues and activities (Breindle, 2010; 
Cammaerts, 2012; Garrett, 2006).  
While many studies have introduced the Internet as a potentially useful tool for activists to 
reach out to their people, for one strand of scholars the contributions of online communication is 
paradoxical. Two main arguments are notable. First, that the lower cost and lower barriers of 
information distribution on the Internet can undermine the value of activists’ information. Ayres 
discussed “while there is little question of the internet’s ability to quickly disseminate 
information, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the value of this information. That is, much 
of the material available on the internet is often unreliable and clearly unverifiable” (1999, p. 
141). The absence of gatekeepers while avoiding the distortion of mass media filters makes it 
more difficult to differentiate accurate information from fabrication, as Garrett (2006) 
highlighted. Breindle (2010) argued that in such a condition “actors who can best manage a 
fragmented informational environment will likely emerge as political counter-forces” (p.55). 
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Lebert (2003) emphasized that this new informational environment not only requires activists to 
develop more skills and strategies to protect themselves from less credible information, but also 
calls for people to be savvier in their media literacy so that the accuracy of online information 
can be properly assessed.     
Second, for critics, the public use of the Internet, and consequently activists’ access to their 
target public in the online realm, is being restricted, mainly due to Internet control and 
censorship, the digital divide, and digital literacy. While acknowledging the Internet's ability to 
bypass state control over mainstream media, Garrett (2006) warned about government control 
and manipulation by, for instance, blocking access to some pages or providing a mechanism for 
screening information traveling to and from the Internet. Focusing on activism in authoritarian 
states, Rød and Weidmann (2015) explained that similar to traditional media, the Internet is not 
free from government interference, since the advent of sophisticated tracking and filtering 
technologies enables governments to block unwanted online opposition activity and to use the 
Internet in their favor. Deibert and Rohozinski’s (2008) study of global civil society warned that 
Internet censorship is growing in sophistication, scope, and scale, and though it began in a small 
handful of oppressive regimes, it has since expanded to include transitional and democratic 
countries. Lebert (2003) reported state surveillance on the Internet is a central concern for 
activists in many countries spreading human-rights related information. Also, it has been 
reported by studies in the case of Iran that Iranian activists not only faced with Internet filtering 
policies, they are more easily and quickly tracked down by the state when they communicate 
through social media (e.g. Baldino & Goold, 2014; Michaelsen, 2011; Morozov, 2011).  
Pointing to the challenge of the digital divide and digital literacy, Coombs (1998) raised the 
point that the Internet cannot be effectively implicated for communication with every target 
public: “The Internet is useless if the target stakeholders cannot or do not use it” (p. 300). 
Breindl (2010) argued that due to Internet usage and knowledge inequalities, online political 
activities are rarely representative of the various social segments: “This is an important challenge 
to the principle of equality, central to all democracy models” (p. 55). Examining the 
distinguishing characteristics of activism in the United States and Latin America, Harlow and 
Harp (2012) showed that while for US activists online spaces serve as the main public 
communication channel, activists in Latin America could not rely on the Internet as their 
primarily communication tool since they were aware of the reality of the digital divide in their 
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societies. Surman and Reilly (2003) explained the interconnection between the digital literacy 
gap and the difficulty African civil society organizations have in moving on to more strategic 
uses of web technologies. 
While activists’ online media has most often been used as one-way, top-down message 
dissemination tool (Taylor & Sen Das, 2010), public relations scholars have discussed that this 
new media creates a unique space for engaging activists and their audiences in two-way 
communication. Kent and Taylor (1998) argued that strategically designed websites have the 
potential to foster relationship building by engaging activist organizations in dialogic 
communication with their visitors. They offered a theory-based strategic framework consisting of 
five strategies that practitioners can follow to develop dialogic relationship through web 
communication. Later, Taylor, Kent, and White (2001) asserted that dialogic communication can 
construct “effective and mutually rewarding interpersonal communication” (p. 267). To examine 
this potential in practice, they conducted more a detailed empirical study on 100 environmental 
activist organizations. The results revealed that the technical and design aspects that 
organizations implemented in order to build dialogic relationship on their websites did not result 
in a full and successful engagement in two-way communication with their publics. Sommerfeldt, 
Kent, and Taylor (2012) gained the same result. Through interviews with activist practitioners, 
they illustrated that the interactive features of activist websites do not translate into dialogic 
engagement with their visitors mainly due to the challenge that websites are pull mediums and 
their relationship building power depends on the currency of issues, as well as promotion by 
traditional public relation practices. The authors also argued that activist organizations cannot 
build bi-directional relations with their online audiences if they “do not view their websites as a 
dialogic tool” and do not “consciously invest time and resources into building online 
relationships” (p. 311). 
While early public relations scholars focused on activist websites, recent ones have extended 
the line of inquiry into social networking sites. They discussed that the inherent interactive 
features of these sites, such as message posting and commentary features, provide the ideal 
condition for dialogic communication (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Kim et al., 2014). However, it 
has been illustrated by the bulk of empirical studies that advocacy and non-profit organizations 
are not fully and successfully taking advantage of the dialogic potential of social media, similar 
to their websites (Bortree & Seltzer, 2009; Bürger, 2015; Kim et al., 2014; Waters & Jamal, 
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2011). Waters and Jamal’s (2011) study on public communication of non-profit organizations on 
Twitter concluded that such failure was related to the advocacy groups’ trend in operating on 
social media to simply broadcast information rather than build relationships. Kim and his 
colleagues (2014) related this failure also to resource constraints. Drawing on the analysis of 60 
US-based environmental organizations, they argued that although the mere creation of social 
media is cost-free, the maintenance of the profiles requires a regular allocation of human and 
financial resources. Bortree and Seltzer (2009) highlighted the same challenge, noting that while 
advocacy organizations assume that the mere creation of an interactive social networking profile 
is sufficient for dialogic communication, it is crucial to designate someone to respond to users’ 
comments and to post timely and relevant information.  
This section has thus presented discussions on activists’ communication with their public 
independent of mainstream media. Social movements and communication scholars who have 
studied activists’ media activities, aside from theorizing on activist alternative media, have paid 
great attention to efforts to push issues into the traditional mass media agenda. The next section 
provides scholarly debates on the consequences of the Internet for activists’ media presentation.  
3.1.2 The Internet and activists’ presentation on mainstream media  
Several studies have highlighted the fact that although activists are enabled by the Internet to 
inform their public independently, they still compete to push their issues into conventional media 
agenda in order to reach a broader populace (Cammaerts, 2006; Casero-Ripollés & Feenstra, 
2012; Micó & Ripollés, 2014; Rucht, 2004). For activists, traditional mass media remain crucial 
“as pre-selectors of credible information and as ‘serious’ political commentators” (Rucht, 2004, 
p. 26). Activists are also aware of the reality of the digital divide preventing their voices from 
reaching disadvantaged groups of society through the Internet (Cammaerts, 2006). They struggle 
to get media attention “which in turn may be crucial to influencing people’s hearts and minds 
and, eventually, policy decisions” (Rucht, 2004, p. 25). Therefore, as Pfetsch and Adam (2011) 
asserted, the media agenda “reflects the effort of different political actors and pressure groups to 
become visible in public” (p. 4). 
Scholars’ emphasis on the influence of mainstream media on public opinion toward 
activists’ issues is a reflection of the basic assertion of agenda-setting theory: mass media 
coverage of an issue is a key step in the formation of public opinion (McCombs, 2005). Or as 
McCombs and Ghanem (2001) explained: “The core theoretical assertion is that the degree of 
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emphasis placed on issues in the mass media influences the priority accorded these issues by the 
public” (p. 67). With the advent of the Internet, more recent agenda-setting thinkers have added 
online media to the traditional agenda-setting theory. Reviewing the evolution of the theory, 
McCombs (2005) noted “now the Internet is the new frontier for research on these traditional 
agenda-setting effects” (p. 544). He explained that online communication channels challenge the 
agenda-setting role of journalists and offer the public a more diversified agenda compared to the 
time when the public received redundant information from mainstream news media. Pfetsch, 
Miltner, and Maier (2016) argued that through the Internet, challengers can avoid the 
gatekeeping functions of traditional media and gain direct access to the public sphere. As such, 
“they may contribute more effectively to setting the public’s and the political issue agendas” (p. 
54).  
Scholars have not only discussed the Internet as having a direct effect on the public agenda, 
but also paid attention to its agenda-building potential: influencing the mainstream media 
agenda. For theorists who were concerned with the sources of media agenda, the question was 
‘‘If the press [mainstream media] sets the public agenda, who sets the media agenda?’’ 
(McCombs, 2005, p. 548). One answer has been “the influence that the news agendas of different 
news organizations have on each other” (Robert & McCombs, 1994, p. 249), which is known as 
inter-media agenda-setting. It refers to the transmission of both object salience (first-level 
agenda-building) and attribute salience (second-level agenda-building) from one media to 
another. The inter-media agenda-setting model was extended by incorporating online media in 
the mix of agenda-builder media (Song, 2007).  
A key argument about activists’ ability to influence mainstream media agenda is around the 
inter-media agenda-setting effects of their online media. Pfetsch and Adam (2011) concentrated 
on the nature of online-offline inter-media agenda-setting from the perspective of the “interplay 
and dynamics” (p. 7) between these two communication realms. From this perspective, they 
explained two types of online-offline spillover of challengers’ issues and frames. The first, direct 
spillovers “occur when messages from the discourse of challenger networks are selected by 
journalists of traditional media” (p. 7). The second type occurs when, through involvement with 
challengers’ online issue networks, online outlets of traditional media or particular online news 
media resonate challengers’ issues and frames. This type will be called double spillover “if these 
issues and frames are then taken up by the offline editions” (p.7). The authors discussed that the 
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spillover of challengers’ issues from online networks into traditional media is context-sensitive. 
They proposed a combined theoretical framework and methodology to examine how ‘specific 
types of online networks’, ‘different media outlets’, ‘country characteristics’, and ‘issue 
characteristics’ affect spillover processes (p. 10). By the first two factors, they referred to the 
nature of online and offline communication as the supply and receiving sides, whereas by the 
latter they considered the impact of macro level factors indirectly affecting online-offline 
dynamics. As Pfetsch and Adam (2011) highlighted, while speaking of country characteristics, 
online-offline spillover is influenced by countries’ political and media systems. The extant 
empirical studies, however, have tended to examine this process mostly within the context of 
democratic media systems. They have largely failed to specify whether and how spillover occurs 
under a political structure such as that of Iran, which imposes a strong control on the media 
system and social actors’ media activities.  
Lester and Hutchins’ (2009) studied Australian environmental activists’ efforts to push their 
issues into mass media agenda. Their research showed that ‘direct spillover’ (Pfetsch & Adam, 
2011) successfully occurred in their case: the activist websites and SNSs became a primary 
source of information for mainstream media journalists. They highlighted that “the internet has 
become another device in the strategic toolbox of the environmental movement for gaining 
mainstream news media access” (p. 581). Similarly, Casero-Ripollés and Feenstra (2012) and 
Micó and Ripollés (2014) showed that news that activists produced on social media during 
Spanish 15M movement broke into mainstream media agenda and informed journalists’ 
coverage of the movement.  
In addition to the online-offline transition of issues and attributes, a few studies have argued 
that activists’ online media can affect media coverage by providing content, such as press 
releases, policy papers, members’ biographies, and e-mail addresses in order to foster 
relationships with journalists (e.g. Reber & Kim, 2006). It is discussed that such self-presentation 
not only provides mass media journalists with information informing their coverage, but also 
familiarizes them with new groups and experts who can bring an update on their cases (Jha, 
2007; Jha, 2008; Lester & Hutchins, 2009). Two empirical studies by Jha (2007, 2008), however, 
showed that such potential is not fully explored by journalists in the traditional media. Her 
studies on the anti-WTO and anti-globalization protests in the USA provided no evidence to 
suggest that activists’ online sites have changed journalists’ source of contacts, as journalists 
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give preference to traditional sources, who are mainly the movements’ spokespersons. These 
empirical studies uncovered that the priority journalists gave to spokespersons - also their 
reluctance to retrieve relevant information from activist websites - was related to their skepticism 
over the credibility of the accounts that protest organizers published online.  
3.1.3 The Internet for activists’ internal relations   
In addition to studying activists’ relationship with their public in the age of communication 
technologies, scholars have paid significant attention to the deployment of ICTs in particular, the 
Internet, for activists’ internal relations. With regards to activists’ relations at the movement 
level, it has been discussed by social movement thinkers that the decentralized and participatory 
system of ICTs conforms to the non-hierarchical and informal network structure of new social 
movements (Juris, 2005; Melucci, 1996; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2002). Therefore, contemporary 
movements have been both supported and raised by activists’ efforts to embrace Internet 
technologies into their everyday communication practices (Juris, 2005). At the level of activist 
groups and individuals, Bennet (2003) discussed many activist organizations within 
contemporary movements reflecting a similar decentralized, distributed model, allowing the 
Internet to become an organizational resource to shape their internal communication networks. 
Based on his definition of social movement, quoted earlier in Chapter One, Diani (2000) asserted 
the behavior of activist groups and individuals, the relations linking them to each other, and the 
‘feeling of mutual identification’ bonding various groups and individuals within a movement, are 
among aspects of movements’ networks expected to be shaped by computer-mediated 
communication. 
The debate around the Internet and activists’ internal relations is mainly formed by empirical 
and theoretical analyses on three specific areas presented in this section. First, scholars have 
attempted to show how communication inside activists’ networks is affected by their Internet 
use. A central argument is that online technologies fill communication gaps between face-to-face 
meetings and can overcome limitations of space and time for activists’ interactions (Wellman, 
2001). Through the Internet, activists have found access to the ideas, experiences, and support of 
other activists with whom they might never have had contact (Myers, 2000). Exploring the 
potential of the Internet for social justice, activists who participated in the Seattle WTO protest, 
Eagleton-pierce (2001) discussed that the Internet facilitates the participation of marginalized 
actors and groups in decision-making and other collective processes. How online technologies 
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facilitate the maintenance of geographically dispersed networks has been the main focus of 
empirical studies on transnational activism cases. For instance, researchers showed that the 
Internet, especially e-mail lists, was critical for communicating information swiftly among Anti 
MAI activists (Ayres, 1999; Clark & Themudo, 2006; Deibert, 2000) and members of anti-
globalization movements (Bennet, 2003; Juris, 2005) spread across several countries.  
The above-mentioned studies also showed that the Internet enabled large numbers of activist 
groups within transnational movements to establish cost-efficient communication channels. For 
instance, Clark and Themudo (2006) studied a widely noted case of the Internet’s role in the anti-
globalization movement through concentrating on ‘dotcause’ organizations, which are mobilized 
primarily, but not exclusively, through the Internet. They revealed that by reducing the costs of 
information and resource sharing, online communication channels between these organizations 
lowered the transaction cost of forming coalitions. An early study by Bonchek (1997) revealed 
that ICTs reduced communication, coordination, and information costs of transnational, national, 
and local interest groups and social movements. On the other hand, the empirical findings by 
Nielsen (2009) posited that those same qualities that make online communication cheaper and 
easier can also generate new costs, thereby increasing the transaction cost of activism. His study 
on activists involved in the 2008 U.S. Democratic presidential primaries identified three 
interrelated problems associated with reduced up-front costs of communications, more 
communicators, and more forms of communication: redundant communication (over-
communication), discrepant information (miscommunication), and more communication than 
individual activists and their groups can deal with (communication overload).  
The second line of investigation into activists’ internal relations seeks to explain how the 
organization of activist groups and the network which could connect different activist groups and 
individuals are influenced by these groups’ and movements’ use of the Internet for internal 
communication. With regards to activist groups, a salient argument is that the Internet facilitates 
the adoption of decentralized and non-hierarchical groups. Bennet's (2003) observation of 
transnational activism cases aimed at trade organization illustrated that utilization of the Internet 
may affect the internal development of activist organizations. He raised the issue that the 
distributed structure of the Internet can push contemporary activists to organize in remarkably 
non-hierarchical, broadly distributed, and flexible networks. Surman and Reilly (2003) 
maintained that while in traditional organizing techniques, information distribution required a 
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rigid, somewhat hierarchical approach, mailing lists and peer-to-peer technologies flatten this 
relationship. They, however, emphasized the potential of new tensions within activist 
organizations as the result of the fluid, instant possibility of online information distribution, 
which increasingly hands out the power of publishing to members at lower levels within the 
organizational hierarchy. A similar argument was raised by Clark and Themudo (2006), who 
provided empirical evidence from some organizations within the anti-globalization movement 
that suggested that by giving voice to traditionally excluded actors, online communication can 
upset the existing balance and trigger conflicts and a tendency to split.  
As for the organization of a network linking different movement actors, scholars have 
presented the idea that the Internet creates a more flexible and collaborative network over which 
activist groups and individuals can mobilize and form collective actions. Surman and Reilly 
(2003) maintained that online technologies have both driven and benefited from the increased 
enthusiasm of civil society organizations about collaboration. They discussed that the celebrated 
feature of the Internet is its ability to serve as a cheap and fluid platform where civil 
organizations can easily work together. Bennet (2003) showed that the Internet not only affected 
the internal development of member organizations in global protests against trade unions, it also 
influenced the organization of networks connecting these organizations. His study illustrated that 
by increasing inter-organizational contacts, the Internet enabled the formation of larger coalition 
networks. While there have been little scholarly reports about the social media usefulness for the 
interactivity of activist groups, there are several empirical studies about the contribution of e-
mail lists and websites to the formation of more collaborative network of activist groups (e.g. 
Eagleton-pierce, 2001; Simi & Futrell, 2006; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2004). Eagleton-pierce 
(2001) explained how websites and e-mail lists, which were established by NGOs involved in the 
Seattle WTO protests, facilitated the formation of coalitions. The websites connected 
information, places, and organizations, while e-mail lists facilitated many-to-many interactions 
and discussions. Van Aelst and Walgrave (2004) analyzed the websites of 17 anti-neoliberal 
organizations. They showed that these websites created a network for these organizations to 
maintain a high degree of collaboration. Analyzing the web presence of white power movement 
activists, Simi and Futrell (2006) suggested that websites are developed by activists and 
organizations to provide access to other groups’ members and cultural items, such as music and 
literature, and as a coordinating platform for on-the-ground activities. 
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The well-cited conceptual framework about the organizational dynamic of action networks 
and online technologies was developed by Bennett and Segerberg (2012). They identified three 
types of action networks that exist in the contemporary era. At one extreme of the typology, they 
placed ‘collective action networks’, characterized by strong organizational coordination of 
actions, where digital media are used for managing participation and coordinating goals rather 
than the self-organization of action. On the other side of the extreme is the ‘connective action 
self-organizing networks’ that self-organize through social media, mainly with little or no 
organizational coordination of actions. In the middle of these two extremes of networks, a third 
hybrid type was introduced, ‘connective action organizationally enabled networks’, 
encompassing loose organizational coordination of action with formal and informal 
organizational actors that step back from setting strong agendas in favor of deploying social 
technologies to form networks around personalized action frames (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). 
The third research area relating to the discussion of the impacts of the Internet on activists’ 
internal interactions examines the relationship between utilizing online-communication and 
participation of individual activists in collective processes. This relationship is addressed through 
studies about collective identity and in increasing debates around the rise of so-called 
‘slacktivism’. Thinkers of contemporary activism have paid great attention to the process in 
which people who have shared beliefs and a sense of solidarity participate in collective action. 
While traditional social movement theories, most prominently the resource mobilization 
approach, have focused on the formal organization of movements to secure resources and 
collective actions (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), new social movement theories have been concerned 
about the role of collective identity in social movement networks as the prerequisite of 
participation in collective actions (Cohen, 1985; Klandermans, 1994; Melucci, 1989). Melucci, 
who made great contributions to the concept of collective identity in contemporary activism, 
referred to this  as “an interactive and shared definition produced by a number of individuals (or 
groups at a more complex level) concerning the orientation of their action and the field of 
opportunities and constraints in which such action is to take place” (1996, p. 70). By being 
interactive and shared, he emphasized that this definition should be “constructed and negotiated 
through recurrent process of activation of the relations that bind actors together” (p. 70). Thus, 
the collective identity process refers to “a network of active relationships between the actors, 
who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions” (p. 71). Besides 
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forms of organization, Melucci identified communication channels and technologies of 
communication as constitutive parts in this relationship network (p. 71).  
Several review and empirical studies have contributed to this theoretical debate by 
concentrating, specifically, on Internet technology to explore if it can serve as a platform for the 
development of collective identity. These studies fall within two major camps. Optimists suggest 
that the development of collective identity benefits from establishment of online communication 
channels among activists. Garrett (2006) stressed that the Internet has promoted the perception 
among individuals that they are a member of a larger community by sharing the same goals; 
therefore, reinforcing collective identity. Drawing on the notion by Melucci that “collective 
action in itself is an indication that the actors involved have achieved a certain extent of 
collective identity” (Melucci, 1995, cited in Nip, 2004, p. 26), Nip (2004) concluded the fact that 
the Internet has contributed to coordinating actions in many local and transnational cases, 
demonstrating that it has succeeded in stimulating collective identity among actors. Also, his 
empirical study showed that the online bulletin board that the Queer Sisters, a lesbian activist 
group in Hong Kong launched, played a successful role in establishing a sense of solidarity and 
trust among the members.  
In contrast, skeptical scholars noted that online communication is insufficient for 
encouraging a strong collective identity that is necessary for sustained collective action. Earl and 
Schussman (2002) warned that the spread of online activism has been accompanied the decline 
of commitment and the rise of protest ‘users’ rather than ‘members’. This will weaken the 
network of activists and threaten the maintenance and coordination of future social 
organizations, as van Laer (2010) asserted. Diani (2000) discussed the issue that virtual networks 
cannot promote collective identity when they are not backed by real social linkages. He asserted 
that under such conditions, participation happens only occasionally, with activists otherwise not 
tied in a committed relationship. In recent years, as the use of social media for activism has 
grown, those voices skeptical about the harmful impacts of the Internet on activists’ shared 
identity and commitment are concerned mainly about the rise of so-called ‘slacktivism’ instead 
of activism.  
Slacktivism has become somewhat of a buzzword (Christensen, 2012). In an extremely 
negative sense, it has been described as “feel-good online activism that has zero political or 
social impact” (Morozov, 2009, para. 1); a “five-minute activism” (Earl & Kimport, 2011, p. 74) 
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by people who are unwilling to ‘get their hands dirty’ and engage in actual efforts to achieve real 
social and political goals (Christensen, 2012).  As a not an entirely ineffective phenomenon, 
slacktivism was referred to as “low-risk, low-cost activity via social media, whose purpose is to 
raise awareness, produce change, or grant satisfaction to the person engaged in the activity” 
(Rotman et al., 2011, p. 821). The phenomenon does not include online political activities 
involving more effort and personal risk (Jordan & Taylor, 2004).  
Critiques of slacktivism have related slacktivists’ concern about social or political issues to 
the persuasion of ‘selfish and narcissistic’ purposes rather than contributing to the achievement 
of societal benefits (Breuer & Farooq, 2012; Morozov, 2009). Even with the aim of pursuing a 
collective good, critics consider these ‘least effort-consuming’ activities ineffective, as political 
change requires time investment and a very real risk to personal safety (Christensen, 2012; 
Skoric, 2012). Regardless of its real outcomes, it has been demonstrated that slacktivism can 
enhance the political interest and engagement of a normally politically passive public; for 
instance, as Breuer and Farooq (2012) showed in the case of the Brazilian anti-corruption 
campaign. But with regards to people who are active in the offline realm (i.e. activists), there is a 
serious concern that the possibility of low-cost and low-risk activities on the Internet damages 
their offline participation. As Skoric and Poor (2013) explained: “The fear is that those who are 
highly engaged could become less engaged due to the lower barriers to entry for activity, 
however slight” (Skoric & Poor, 2013, p. 343). Slacktivism can satisfy previously active 
people’s motivation to take real action (Lee & Hsieh; 2013) and distract them from making more 
meaningful contributions (Skoric & Poor, 2013). Therefore, as Morozov (2009) maintained, 
there is the possibility that a significant portion of activist population chooses slacktivist options 
over more risky activities more likely to get them in trouble with authorities. It should be noted 
that such a claim about how slacktivism hurts activism is hardly supported by empirical data. 
Most of the empirical studies on slacktivism concentrate on its consequence for the political 
participation of ordinary citizens. 
This section has thus presented theoretical and empirical debates about the role of ICTs and 
the Internet for communication and organization within and among activist groups and for the 
participation of individual activists. Garrett (2006) asserted any discussion on the impacts of the 
Internet on participation level and organizational issues demonstrates how social movements’ 
mobilization structure is affected by online communication. McCarthy (1996) referred to 
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‘mobilization structure’ as the agreed mechanism of engaging in collective actions, which 
includes the organizational forms of social movements. Thus, the abovementioned studies can 
have implications for underrating potential changes in the mobilization structure of movements 
that operate in the Internet age, although they have rarely discussed this change in an explicit 
way. According to McCarthy’s (1996) definition, the mobilization structure also includes the 
forms of collective actions or activists’ tactical repertoire. Vegh (2003), and Van Laer and Van 
Aelsts (2010) acknowledged that besides supporting activists’ conventional tactics, digital 
technologies have offered advocacy groups a wider range of actions, mainly internet-based 
tactics, such as online petitions, email bombings, and virtual sit-ins. Therefore, it has expanded 
their repertoire of contention. Wells (2015) claimed that the change can go beyond the extension 
of conventional action repertoire, and may create new action possibilities that do not imply 
application or the extension of pre-existed tactics.  
3.2 Research Questions 
The background reviews of Chapter 2 demonstrate that Iranian women’s rights activism is no 
exception to the assumption made by social movements and communication scholars that 
activists are in desperate need of media. Over the course of Iranian history, since its emergence 
during the Constitutional Revolution to the contemporary era, the activists have used all media 
available in order to communicate with the Iranian people. They have struggled to gain a higher 
presence in the country’s print media as much as they have relied on establishing their own 
media. The long list of women’s press, some of them introduced in Chapter 2, shows the efforts 
of the activists to increase their independence in putting women’s rights issues on the public 
agenda. As noted in Chapter 2, in the early 2000s the activists began to embrace the Internet as 
their alternative media. 
Women’s rights activists pursue two main inter-related objectives through communication 
with the Iranian public. First, they aim to enhance societal awareness towards women’s rights. 
Second, they seek to de-legitimize discriminatory gender policies and legislation to gain the 
support of public opinion to pressure the government. The activists-public relationship rarely 
aims at mass mobilization, as the organizational structure of the women’s rights movement and 
its constructive groups is based on recruitment and mobilization of professional members. As 
Diani (2000) stated “any discussion of the impact of computer-mediated communication has to 
acknowledge the differentiation in the organizational forms adopted by social movements (or 
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better, by the organized actors operating within them)” (p. 392). The organization of Iranian 
women’s rights movement, to a large extent, conforms to Tarrow’s (2011) observation of many 
contemporary movements:  
What we see in movements today is a new type of professional, who is not 
dependent on mass membership but specializes in the diffusion of information and 
the construction of temporary coalitions among groups of activists. Possession of 
such skills makes it possible to mobilize a large reservoir of support at short notice, 
allowing movement organizations to be both small and professional. 
As a new social movement, the Iranian women’s rights movement is organized around a 
decentralized and leaderless network of actors, the activist groups, and individuals, which come 
together to form issue-based coalitions and campaigns. The activist groups within this 
movement, to a great extent, adopt the same non-hierarchical organizational structure. The 
mobilizing structure of women’s rights groups and movement is centered on the gaining active 
participation of women’s rights activists rather than mobilizing as large a population as possible. 
These characteristics illustrate the significance of internal relations for Iranian women’s rights 
activism and underline the role of communication technologies in this relationship network. The 
previous chapter illustrated that the activist groups began to employ the Internet as their internal 
communication channel during the first term of the Ahmadinejad presidency.  
As already mentioned, the core objective of this study is to explore the impacts of Internet-
mediated communication on Iranian women’s rights activism. Based on this chapter’s readings, 
and the Chapter 2 review of this activism’s characteristics, activists’ public and internal relations 
are defined as central to the conceptual framework of this thesis. This thesis seeks to explore 
how patterns of women’s rights activism’s communication with the Iranian public have been 
affected by their online media. In which ways have the impacts of activism’s online media been 
experienced as beneficial to its efforts at reaching the public? And has Internet usage inflicted 
any harm on the activists’ relation with their audiences? This study also aims at exploring what 
promises and pitfalls Internet deployment has had for women’s rights activists’ internal relations. 
It examines whether and how the utilization of Internet technology has influenced the activist 
groups’ intra- and inter-communication and organization. Equally, it seeks to uncover the 
impacts of online communication on the participation of individual activists in the activism’s 
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collective processes. Therefore, the first two research questions of this thesis are specified as 
below: 
RQ1: How has the utilization of the Internet affected women’s rights activism’s public 
communication?  
RQ2: How has the utilization of the Internet affected women’s rights activism’s internal 
relations? 
The words ‘Utilization of the Internet’ in these RQs highlight that in order to provide a 
better understanding of the impacts of the Internet, this investigation should also uncover how 
women’s rights activists have utilized the Internet as both their independent media to reach out to 
public and as an internal communication channel to interact internally.  
RQ1 lies within the string of theoretical and empirical studies discussing the role of the 
Internet as activists’ alternative media (Section 3.1.1). As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, another 
thread of research on activists’ relation with the public has discussed the prominence of 
mainstream media presentation for activist groups and movements. For Iranian women’s rights 
activism, like other activist groups in the country, the print media enjoy a unique position due to 
the absence of independent broadcasting channels (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). Since its 
emergence, this activism has been struggling for a larger presence in the country’s print media. 
Particularly since the 1990s, as a constructive part of Iran’s civil society, the reformist and 
independent press has played a key role in the process of democratization, including gender 
equality. Informed by the theoretical discussions and the prominent role of print media for 
Iranian women’s rights movement, activists’ online media is also examined in this study in terms 
of its influence on the print media agenda. Therefore, the third RQ investigates:  
RQ3: How has women’s rights activists’ online media affected the resonance of women’s rights 
issues in the Iranian press? 
The three research questions specified in this section direct investigation of the impacts of 
the Internet on Iranian women’s rights activism. To evaluate the applicability of previous studies 
to this activism’s experience of Internet-mediated communication in the specific context of Iran, 
three data analysis chapters will discuss the empirical results in light of the discussions presented 
in this chapter. Also, the research contribution to broad theoretical debates, which aided in the 
formation of the research questions (social movements’ opportunity structure, framing process, 
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and mobilization structure; and agenda-setting and agenda-building), will be presented in the 






























This chapter explains the design of the research methods worked out to investigate the research 
questions. It begins by providing an overview of the methodological approach and giving reasons 
for adopting ‘within-methods triangulation’. It will then go on to present data collection methods 
and lay out data analysis processes. Lastly, the ethical aspects of the research and data collection 
limitations will be discussed.  
4.1 Methodological Approach and Research Design 
Because of its flexible methods of investigation, the qualitative approach is used to look at the 
dynamics of how a social phenomenon functions, and to examine effects or consequences that 
can arise from that phenomenon (Ritchie & Ormston, 2013). To address the exploratory and 
evaluative nature of this study, the qualitative research strategy was adopted. The semi-structured 
qualitative interview was chosen as the principal method of data collection. Rapley (2004) 
defined qualitative interviewing as “social encounters where speakers collaborate in producing 
retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their past (or future) actions, experiences, 
feelings and thoughts” (p. 16). It is not a neutral tool of data gathering, but an active interaction 
between researcher and informants of the phenomenon (Fontana & Frey, 2000). In such a “fact-
producing interaction” (Gomm, 2004, p. 230), researchers assist interviewees in describing 
perceptions they would otherwise find irrelevant or feel inexpressible in their daily social context 
(Newton, 2010). These potentials have made interviewing one of the most widely used 
qualitative data collection methods; also in media and communication studies (Jensen, 2002a, p. 
240).  
In this research, semi-structured interviews were well suited in providing rich and detailed 
insight into the practices and impacts of women’s rights activism on the net. The study was, 
however, inevitably subject to a number of associated limitations of qualitative interviewing. 
Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest (1966) noted that interviews are limited to respondents 
who are accessible and are willing to cooperate. Jensen (2002a) argued that the difficulty of 
interviewing, which emerges from the significance of the language to the method, is that “people 
do not always say what they think, or mean what they say” (p. 240). Myers and Newman (2007) 
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highlighted that a restriction of the method is caused by the interviewees’ concern with how 
much the interviewer can be trusted. To address this concern, the interviewees may choose not to 
uncover information they consider to be ‘sensitive’.  A very similar practical concern is “how 
interviewees respond to us based on who we are in their lives, as well as the social categories to 
which we belong, such as age, gender, class and race” (Miller & Glassner, 2010, p. 134).    
To address these limitations, and to add to the validity of the interview results, the mixed 
data collection technique, or ‘within-methods triangulation, was adopted with respect to the first 
and second research questions, which seek to investigate the impacts of women’s rights activists’ 
Internet use on their public communication and internal relations. Denzin (1970, 1989) 
introduced two types of method triangulation: within-methods and between-methods. While 
between-methods refers to the combination of two or more qualitative and quantitative data 
collection approaches, within-methods triangulation is the use of either multiple quantitative or 
multiple qualitative methods (Denzin, 2009, pp. 308-310). Methodological triangulation has been 
given particular attention by qualitative researchers as a strategy to gain several perspectives on 
the same empirical context, and to verify and validate the findings (Jensen, 2002b). With respect 
to RQs 1 and 2, followed by interviews with women’s rights activists, and in order to supplement 
and verify the results from the interviews, four cases of Internet utilization by women’s rights 
groups and campaigns were examined through the online observation method. Investigation on 
RQ3 - “How has activists’ online media affected the resonance of women’s rights issues in the 
Iranian press?” – was conducted through interviews with women’s rights activists and print 
media journalists. Interrogation of the interviewees’ testimonies with regards to this RQ would 
have required content analysis of the country’s print media, something beyond the limit of this 
research.  
“Observation, in its different forms, tries to understand practices, interactions, and events, 
which occur in a specific context from the inside as a participant or from the outside as a mere 
observer” (Flick, 2009, p. 282). Although much research has been done on the adaptation of 
offline social research methodologies to online settings (Baym & Markham, 2009; Hine, 2005; 
Johns, Chen, & Hall, 2004; Mann & Stewart, 2000), few studies have investigated specific 
online observation (Markham, 2011; Nørskov & Rask, 2011). Nørskov and Rask (2011) defined 
online observation as “a method employed to study interactions in virtual communities in their 
natural setting” (p. 21). They identified a number of promises and limitations in an online setting 
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observation compared to offline observation. First, in online observation, the observational data 
exists in written form, which lowers the risk of interpretative judgments by the observer. 
Furthermore, observing people’s behavior in an online context is certainly less obtrusive, in that 
the researcher can lurk and not be noticed. The authors offered that this prevents undesired 
influences on the observed setting and decreases the possibility of the observer being contacted 
and influenced by the actors in the research field, the benefits of which are also caused by the 
possibility of anonymous observation (Markham, 2011; Nørskov & Rask, 2011). Nørskov and 
Rask (2011) specified two major limitations of online observation. First, private conversation; 
for instance, those communicated on social messaging applications are not normally accessible 
by the observer. Second, due to the lack of a social presence, the researcher may lose the diverse 
interpretations that are communicated through dimensions such as body language, facial 
expressions, and tone of voice. These limitations may increase the risk of overlooking important 
issues and misinterpret communicated data. In this research the impacts of these limitations were 
undermined by mixed data collection method. 
4.2 Qualitative Interviews  
In semi-structured or standardized open-ended interviews, the researcher has a list of questions to 
cover. But the questions are open-ended to allow participants to express as many viewpoints and 
experiences as they desire and to allow the researcher to follow up on those questions (Turner 
III, 2010). This form of interview allows the interviewer to pursue a line of discussion initiated 
by the interviewees, and enables interviewees to answer in their own terms, but also set a sort of 
structure for comparison between responses by covering the same topics (Edward & Hollands, 
2013, p. 29).  
In this thesis, individual, face-to-face, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
11 Iranian women’s rights activists and seven press journalists. In selecting interviewees, two 
principles were considered for each interviewee group: the activists and the journalists. Applying 
Polkinghorne’s (2005) logic, the word ‘selection’ is used here instead of ‘sampling’, as the latter 
is more applicable to quantitative studies and carries the connotation of representativeness. As 
Polkinghorne (2005) explained, in qualitative investigations, the aim is not to enable findings to 
be applied to a population. The focus instead “is on describing, understanding, and clarifying a 
human experience. It requires collecting a series of intense, full, and saturated descriptions of the 
experience under investigation” (p. 139).  
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The first criterion for the selection of women’s rights activists was to consider the definition 
of an activist as adopted in this research (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1). The potential interviewees 
were those who described themselves as women’s rights activists (i.e. have a history of 
activism); who have devoted a significant amount of time and energy to women’s rights causes, 
despite known risks; and who was involved in the activism network. With respect to the final 
point, it should be noted that, at the time of the interviews, respondents were all active 
participants of one or more informal women’s rights groups or NGOs. Also, they all had a 
history of cooperating with women’s rights campaigns; specifically, three interviewees were 
previous members of the OMS campaign, the best-known women’s rights campaign in Iran (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.6). Regarding the interviewed journalists, the initial selection factor was 
to find those who had a record of working on women-related subjects. It was obvious that 
journalists unfamiliar with this subject could not provide responses based on real practices. The 
seven interviewed journalists had published numerous gender-related stories and opinion articles 
in the leading and largely circulated Iranian national press. 
Among the activists and journalists who passed the first filter, the final interviewees were 
selected based on the maximum variation technique. The technique’s strengths relate to the logic 
that “any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in 
capturing the core experiences and central, shared aspects or impacts of a program” (Patton, 
1990, p. 172). This variety was ensured for both interviewee groups. The researcher selected 
women’s rights activists with different lengths of involvement in activism in order to reflect 
diverse viewpoints of generations. Having gotten involved with women’s rights affairs before the 
1979 Revolution, three interviewed activists had over thirty years of experience in the activism, 
while four had between ten and 20 years, and four young activists had less than ten years of 
experience. In addition, to uncover the experiences of those contributing in different spheres of 
women’s rights activism, interviewees were selected from activists with heterogeneous 
occupational categories. Among the interviewed activists: a lawyer, a women’s workshop 
instructor, a website manager, a website developer, a social worker, two NGO managers, two 
journalists, two gender study researchers, and two podcast producers – note that two 
interviewees had two specialties. And finally, to avoid being restricted to the viewpoints of 
activists in the capital, two interviewees (Interviewees 2 and 6) were selected from women’s 
rights groups operating in smaller cities. Although, this is not to say that the interviewed activists 
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based in Tehran had no operation in other cities. Table 4.1 outlines the interviewees’ profiles. 
Regarding the interviewed journalists, the combination of respondents was set in a way that 
would provide evidence about the resonance of different aspects of women’s rights in the print 
media. The seven interviewed journalists had interchangeably worked on cases about the 
participation of women in the political structure, legislation related to women and family, and 
problems of socially harmed women. In addition, the researcher contacted journalists from 
different, although popular, reformist and moderate journals and newspapers. It should be noted 
that journalists who are interested in woman’s rights issues rarely work for the conservative 
press. Seven interviewed journalists worked for seven distinct newspapers. Table 4.2 outlines the 
interviewed journalists’ profiles. 
The very common concept of data saturation was used as the guideline for defining the 
number of interviews. Data saturation happens when data becomes repetitive and the collection 
of new data does not shed further light on the issue under investigation (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, 
p. 139; Mason, 2010). Based on this concept, qualitative researchers should continue identifying 
interviewees until they do not hear anything that has not been raised before (Edwards & 
Hollands, 2013, p. 65). Thus, while the number of samples is representative of the types of 
people in a quantitative research, in a qualitative study it is the range of meanings that should 
determine the number of interviewees (Edwards & Hollands, 2013, p. 65). During the last 
interviews with the activists and journalists, the researcher noticed that the expressed viewpoints 
became repetitive. Although different stories were told, the conveyed meanings were the same as 
in the preceding interviews.  
Creating effective interview questions is a key component of an interview design, as it 
allows the researcher to dig into the experiences and/or knowledge of the participants in the 
interviews (Turner III, 2010). In this research, McNamara’s (2009) suggestions for the design of 
effective interview questions were considered: (a) using open-ended wording, (b) constructing 
neutral questions, (c) creating clearly worded questions, and (d) carefully asking 'why' questions 
that would put respondents on the defensive. By considering these criteria, initial questions to be 
covered during all the interviews were set (see Appendix A for the interview questions). 
However, the sequence of the questions and their wording were shifting in relation to different 




The interviews with ten activists took place during October 2014 to January 2015. The 
researcher long endeavored to find access to a well-known women’s right activist (indicated as 
interviewee 11 in Table 4.1) and finally succeeded seven months after the tenth interview, when 
the interview analysis process was completed. The analysis of her testimony did not generate 
new themes, which proved once more that the data saturation level had been achieved. However, 
quotes from her experiences and viewpoints were included in explanations about the developed 
themes. Roughly all the interview sessions took more than two hours. Interviews with the 
journalists were initiated in 2016. Five interviews were conducted from April to June 2016 and 
two in September 2016. On average, they lasted about two hours. It should be mentioned that the 
interviewees’ requests, mostly with regards to the venue of interviews, were completely met in 
order to provide them with the utmost convenience for conversation. Also, they were offered on 
and off the record talks, and were given assurances that the recordings would be exclusively 
heard by the researcher for transcription before being erased.  
 
 
Interviewee Gender Areas of expertise Years of experience 
as women’s rights activist 
Interviewee 1 
 
Female NGO manager 
 
More than 30 years  
Interviewee 2 Female Journalist 9 years 
Interviewee 3 
 






Female Former administrator of a known 
women’s right campaign’s website, 
and the current manager of  a 





Female Social worker 9 years 
Interviewee 6 
 
Male Developer of a number of women’s 






Male NGO manager 
 
More than 30 years 
Interviewee 8 
 
Female Women’s workshops instructor More than 30 years 
Interviewee 9 
 





Female Gender studies researcher 15 years 
Interviewee 11 Female Journalist 
 
16 years 
    
Table 4.1: Interviewed activists’ profile  
 









































Female  A well-known reformist newspaper 7 years 
    
Table 4.2: Interviewed journalists’ profile 
4. 2. 1 The Interview analysis 
When it comes to considering different approaches towards qualitative interview analysis, the 
major distinction lies between those methods that strongly focus on the language and relate to 
social constructionist tradition and those that are more concerned with the content of interview 
data and are classified under realist epistemology (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 142). As this 
research aims to understand participants’ experiences, the thematic analysis method, which is 
very much compatible with the latter group’s experiential nature (Braun & Clarke, 2006; King & 
Horrocks, 2010, p. 142), was selected for analysis of the interview data. Braun & Clarke (2006) 
defined thematic analysis as the process of “identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns 
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(themes) within data” (p. 79).  Thematic analysis represents a purely qualitative and detailed 
account of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013).   
Drawing on Braun and Clarke’s (2006), and Braun, Clarke, and Terry (2015) pragmatic 
view of the method, four phases were conducted for the thematic analysis of the collected 
interviews. As a first step, the recorded interviews were transcribed. By reading and re-reading 
these transcripts, the researcher familiarized herself with the data and noted the potential points 
of analytical interest, as Braun et al. (2015) suggested. In the next phase, the transcripts were 
initially coded to identify the key patterns and analytic ideas in the data. The codes are “the most 
basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful 
way regarding the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 63). Within the frame of the three research 
questions, the interviews’ thematic analysis was principally inductive or ‘data-driven’, as there 
was no ‘pre-existing coding frame’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The codes were derived while 
reading through the transcripts. They were written on the transcripts next to the relevant extract 
of data. Then the coding lists containing the codes, the specifications of the interviewees who 
raised them, and the main related extracts of data were all prepared for the next phase of 
analysis.     
The third step focused on the broader level of the analysis and involved sorting the codes 
that conveyed the same meaning into potential themes, as suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
During this phase, the lists of codes were reviewed to identify those codes that form a potential 
pattern of interpretation. These codes were grouped into different levels of candidate themes. 
While some initial codes formed the main overarching themes, others formed sub-themes, and 
those which were not truly relevant to the research questions were discarded. 
The last phase of interview analysis involved the refinement of the compiled themes and 
sub-themes. In this phase, a central question introduced by Braun and his colleagues (2006, 
2015) for checking the quality of the identified themes was considered: Can the researcher 
identify a central organizing concept for each candidate theme? They asserted that identifying 
these concepts is critical to ensure that themes are internally coherent and distinct from each 
other (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this phase, a review of candidate themes and sub-themes, and 
their related data extract, resulted in three forms of modification. First, data extracts that did not 
properly fit one theme were either discarded or assigned a new theme. Second, themes and sub-
themes with overlapping concepts were combined to form new ones. Finally, those that 
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conveyed more than one concept were split. At the end of this phase, the final themes, their 
names, and their definitions, which include their related sub-themes – if they had any – and the 
extracts of data were finalized to be thoroughly presented in the data analysis chapters. Table 4.3 
summarizes this research’s four phases of the interviews’ thematic analysis. It should be noted 
that the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Farsi. Then the statements that were 
selected to be quoted in the empirical chapters were translated into English. 
 
 Phases of the interviews’ thematic analysis 
I The interviews were fully transcribed 
 
II The transcripts were initially coded   
 
III The codes were grouped into different levels of  main overarching themes and sub-themes 
 
IV The themes and sub-themes were reviewed. Their definitions were finalized.  
 
Table 4.3: The interviews’ thematic analysis phases (adopted from Braun & Clarke, 2006) 
4.3 Online Observation  
After completion of the thematic analysis, in an effort to triangulate and complement the 
interview findings, the online activities of four women’s rights groups and campaigns were 
examined through online observation. It is very popular in qualitative studies to verify 
interviewees’ responses with the observation of their behavior in the environment under study. In 
this research, however, the observational data was not obtained from online activities of the 
interviewed activists but collected from cases initiated by women’s rights activist groups and 
campaigns. The reason is that a large part of the interviewees’ testimonies about the utilization 
and impacts of the Internet was concentrated on the activists’ collective use of the Internet. 
Therefore, observation of their individual activities could not verify their statements. Even when 
they spoke of the individual activists’ on the Internet, they not only concentrated on their own 
Internet use, but also referred to that of their co-activists. To investigate interview findings that 
emerged concerning individual activists’ online activities, the online observation expanded to the 
Facebook profiles of four activists who were members of the observed campaigns. 
‘Changing the Parliament’s Male Face’ or ‘Women for Parliament’, and ‘Stepdaughter’ 
were selected as the campaign cases because they were the best-known women’s campaigns at 
the time, as remarked earlier in Chapter 2 (Section, 2.3). Besides a series of on-the-ground 
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activities, these campaigns saw considerable online activity during their existence. In addition to 
the campaigns’ collective online sites, the Facebook profiles of four activists who were highly 
engaged with these campaigns were also observed. To identify these four activists, the researcher 
searched for the campaigns’ names in Facebook search section. After the campaign profiles, the 
most number of generated results were updated by these activists. The group cases Bidarzani (the 
Persian equivalent for ‘Feminism’) and Khaneh Amn (Safe Home) were selected because they 
were among the popular activist groups at the time, and, assessed by their Alexa ranking, their 
websites had the highest number of monthly incoming traffic compared to other women’s rights 
groups in Iran. 
The data analysis chapters will explain that the interview analysis generated evidence with 
respect to the three most used online technologies by women’s rights activists: e-mail groups, 
websites, and SNSs. The researcher’s restriction for the observation of the activists’ e-mail 
groups will be explained later in this chapter. The observational analysis was conducted on the 
cases’ websites and Facebook profiles. Facebook was selected among the social networking sites 
operated by these cases, because for all four cases, it was the most active in terms of number of 
posts, and the most popular in terms of the number of followers. The researcher acted as a 
complete observer and did not interact with the websites and Facebook pages. Particularly, in 
online observation, where the interactive nature of the Internet escalates the risk of unintended 
influence on researchers, being a complete observer serves as the best option to maintaining the 
objectivity of the research (Nørskov & Rask, 2011).    
The online observation process launched after the completion of the interview analysis with 
respect to the first and second research questions. Two group cases, Bidarzani and Safe Home, 
were observed on a daily basis for four months, starting from March 2015. March was selected, 
since normally under the pretext of International Women’s Day, 8 March, women’s rights 
activists increase their online activities. This enabled the researcher to acquire optimal 
information from observation. The Stepdaughter campaign ended in August 2014, before the 
observation process started. Therefore, the campaign’s last four months’ archived posts were 
observed. The Women for Parliament campaign was the last analyzed case to be researched. The 
websites and Facebook profiles related to this campaign were observed for four months, starting 
from October 2015, when the campaign issued its first public statement, up to the ultimate 
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statement of the campaign in February 2016. Followed by a brief introduction to these cases, the 
observational analysis process is explained in more details. 
 
Safe Home 
This group was founded in 2013 “by a group of activists who focus on preventing and tackling 
domestic violence” (“Who we are,” 2015, para. 1). The group’s foremost objective is to assist 
women who are victims of domestic violence by encouraging them to speak out, and providing 
them with guidance on how to learn to bring an end to the abuse (“Who we are,” 2015). The 
subsequent objective of Safe Home activists is to raise social awareness on the different forms of 
domestic violence; how to assist the victims; and about the strengths and restrictions of the 
country’s legislation in dealing with this social phenomenon (“Who we are,” 2015). 
Besides offline activities, like holding panel discussions and providing phone consulting 
services, the group maintains significant online presence through its website
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 and social 
networking sites’ profiles. Although the number of social media followers does not remain static, 
at the time of observation, the group’s Facebook profile32 was the most followed amongst the 
other cases. Among the Safe Home Facebook followers were prominent figures like Mrs. 
Shahindokht Mollaverdi, Rouhani’s Vice President for Women and Family Affairs.  
 
Bidarzani 
The Bidarzani group was founded in 2010 in response to a new set of modifications in the 
‘Family Protection Act’ that were being reviewed by the Iranian Parliament. The group, which 
initially consisted of thirteen women’s rights activists, carried out a diverse set of on-the-ground 
and digital activities mainly through its website and Facebook page to publicize the bill and its 
adverse effects (Zangeneh, 2015).  The group, initially named Ghanoone Khanevadeye Barabar 
(Equal Family Law), was renamed Bidarzani in 2012 as it broadened its activities to five main 
fields: “changing laws that are discriminatory against women, eliminating violence against 
women, fostering job creation and entrepreneurship, improving health education, and furnishing 
reproductive rights education to women” (Zangeneh, 2015, p. 362). While the group interacts 
with other women’s rights activists by holding workshops and seminars, it mainly targets the 





Iranian public through its websites
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 and social media profiles
34. As the group’s ‘collective 
media’, Bidarzani’s website is regularly updated with gender-focused content by members and 
guest writers (About us, 2015).  
 
Changing the Parliament’s Male Face/Women for Parliament Campaign 
This campaign came ahead of the February 2016 parliamentary election, in which the reformists 
managed to dominate the parliament. In the run-up to the vote, a group of women’s rights 
activists launched it to push for greater women’s presence in the legislature. It was initiated by 
prominent women’s rights activists, such as publisher Shahla Lahiji and author Noushin Ahmadi 
Khorasani. It also won the support of some renowned cultural and political female figures in the 
country. The organizers aimed at undermining the dominance of men in the parliament, and 
hoped to see the number of women in parliament eventually grow to at least 50, or 30 percent, if 
not in the February 2016 election, then in the future (“About the campaign”, 2016). Aside from 
that, they planned to promote the candidates of both sexes who supported greater women’s rights 
(“About the campaign”, 2016). In addition to promoting its cause in print media, in holding 
meetings, and in visiting officials and MPs, the campaign maintained a significant online 
presence through its website
35
 and social networking sites’ profiles36. The personal Facebook 
profiles observed for this campaign were maintained by 33 and 42-year-old women’s rights 
activists and gender study researchers (hereinafter: Activists C and D).  
Women’s breakthrough in the 2016 February election cannot be separated from the efforts 
of the women’s rights activists in this campaign. The number of women who were elected into 
the 2016 parliament was twice that of women in the previous one. Seventeen women were 
elected, a record since the 1979 Revolution. 
 
Stepdaughter Campaign 
In September 2013, the conservative-led parliament in Iran passed the Parentless Children 
Protection act. The bill included a clause outlawing a stepfather’s marriage to his mature adopted 
daughter, allowing exceptions depending on family court's approval. The clause turned into a 







controversy. Proponents of this piece of legislation viewed it as being in the interest of adopted 
children on the grounds that no law banned such marriages in the past, allowing debauched men 
take advantage of this legal loophole. They claimed that there have been numerous reports of 
such unions. In reaction, opponents said that even speaking publicly about such marriages would 
harm stepchildren because their guardians would view them as their wives-to-be. They claimed 
that this change in view would have consequences and would raise the rate of sexual assault 
against such girls. The proponents however maintained that the adoption of such an act would 
keep these girls safe from sexual abuse.      
A campaign was formed by opposing women and children rights’ activists to get the Iranian 
legislature to overturn the controversial clause. Besides various on-the-ground endeavors, such 
as meeting with MPs, soliciting senior clerics and political figures, and holding meetings with 
relevant experts, the campaign had a significant web presence. The campaigners’ efforts and 
public backlashes made President Rouhani’s Deputy for Women and Family Affairs promise to 
push for the parliament to withdraw the clause. She then submitted a new motion to the 
parliament to have the controversial clause dropped altogether.   
Unlike the Women for Parliament campaign, this campaign did not have a website and 
social networking profiles under its own name. Various concerned activist groups devoted their 
online platforms to the promotion of the campaign’s cause. One of the groups most involved in 
this campaign was Iran Adoption. This group created a separate tab in its websites under 
‘Marriage with Stepdaughter’ in order to provide an online platform not only for reporting its 
own activities, but, to a greater extent, for broadcasting any efforts made jointly or independently 
by other activist groups and individuals to overturn the clause. Observation was conducted on 
both this tab
37
 and Iran Adoption’s Facebook38 posts, which were updated in relation to the 
campaign. The personal Facebook profiles examined in relation to this case were those of a 29-
year-old women’s rights activist-cum-journalist and a 45-year-old women’s rights activist-cum-
lawyer (hereinafter: Activists A and B).     
                                                          





4.3.1 Observational analysis  
Observation of the cases was conducted with respect to the findings generated from the 
interviews’ thematic analysis. In fact, the interview evidence served as the guide for 
observational analysis. This guide provided a systematic structure in which the researcher 
recorded and analyzed the observational data (Nicholls et.al, 2013). Schneider and Foot (2004) 
found two sets of approach to online sites analysis: (a) those that are more concerned with the 
content of a site, and (b) those that are more focused on the structures and features of the units of 
analysis. They discussed that both approaches are incomplete by their own, as “connectivity 
matters as much as content” (p. 4). Relying on this assertion, and given the fact that the interview 
findings were pertinent to both the content and features of the activists’ online sites, both 
approaches were applied in this research. The types and quantities of reviewed content posted 




Type of content Safe 
Home 







Articles 82 116 98 30 
e-brochures, e-booklets, and 
slide share presentation 
16 7 0 1 
Audiovisual contents 
(podcasts, videos, and 
images) 
8 9 25 1 
 
Facebook 
Textual posts 4 26 96 37 
Audio-visual posts (Audios, 
videos, and images) 
35 5 70 2 
Comments 97 25 327 240 
Table 4.4: Types and quantities of observed contents 
Note 1: The Facebook row for campaign cases includes posts in collective and individual profiles. 
Note 2: In the websites and Facebook pages, articles or statuses were attached with images considered as 
textual posts. Those posts, the core of which is an image, but are described by few lines of text, are 
assigned to the audio-visual category.    
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The initial phase of the analysis was run on all types of content on the websites and 
Facebook profiles in order to verify the interviewees' assertions about the modes of utilization of 
these online platforms. In this phase, the contents were analyzed in terms of their manifest 
meanings (for textual contents) and their motifs (for audiovisual updates). The second phase was 
carried out to find evidence in relation to interview themes and sub-themes describing the 
impacts of the activists’ online spaces. That websites and Facebook profiles content which was 
related to interview findings were identified. Such content was then copied and pasted into Word 
documents and assigned to the related interview theme and sub-themes. The compiled content 
was then analyzed to illustrate the commonalities and differences with interviewees’ assertions.  
The structural analysis of the websites was required in order to shed light on interviewees’ 
notions about a two-way form of communication with the public. The websites were observed 
for the identification of available features for visitors’ engagement. Findings derived from 
observational analysis of the cases were then listed for themes and sub-themes to be represented 
in the data analysis chapters. Chapters 5 and 6 will present and discuss the findings of the 
interview and observational analyses with respect to RQs 1 and 2 in that order. The last data 
analysis chapter will expose those interview results which are responsive to the third RQ.   
4.4 Ethical Considerations  
The ‘informed consent’ of participants in a research, their anonymity, and the confidentiality of 
their information are the main ethical concerns in qualitative studies (Hopf, 2004). Informed 
consent refers to the research subjects’ rights “to know that they are being researched, the right 
to be informed about the nature of the research and the right to withdraw at any time” (Ryen, 
2011, p. 418).  Prior to the interviews, the interviewees were informed about the general purpose 
of the research, the nature of the questions, and the approximate length of the sessions. Also 
possible risks of participation and likely social uses of the results were clearly spelled out. 
Therefore, all the respondents made informed decisions to take part in the individual face-to-face 
interviews. As far as observational data collection is concerned, informed consent was not the 
subject since the researcher acted as a complete outsider by solely observing the publicly 
available online sites and not interacting. The four observed individual profiles were also open to 
the public and the researcher did not follow them to be able to see their posts.  
The issue of confidentiality assures participants that the data collected from them will be 
safeguarded. And anonymity provides the condition of rendering the participants unidentifiable 
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(Porr & Ployhart, 2004). It was explained to the participants that the results will be used for 
academic purposes. Also, it was clarified at the very beginning of the interview sessions that the 
researcher had no interest in revealing respondents’ identities. However, maintaining anonymity 
and confidentiality is challenging in any Internet-mediated research context as such, when the 
reader can search the web for the interview excerpts and the interviewees’ online practices 
(Maczewski et al., 2004). Therefore, in this thesis, not only is the respondents’ anonymity 
maintained by assigning them numbers, but also any details in the interviews which could expose 
their identities have been concealed. Also, the anonymity of the four activists who their publicly 
available Facebook profiles were observed was maintained by indicating them with alphabets. 
Even when a comment on their posts was quoted, the follower was given pseudonym.    
4.5 Data Collection Challenges and Limitations  
The researcher faced two main challenges in interviewing women’s rights activists. The first 
could be successfully handled. Following years of surveillance and repression under the 
Ahmadinejad administration, it was very challenging for the researcher, as an outsider to the 
activist groups, to find access to Iranian women’s rights activists’ networks and get them to share 
their stories and viewpoints. E-mails were sent to the candidate interviewees, in which the 
researcher identified herself, her affiliated institution, her research objectives, and the 
confidentiality and anonymity terms of the study. Initially, only four activists accepted to 
participate. But, fortunately, after meeting the researcher and being impressed by the research 
subject, these four activists accepted to link the researcher to the activists she had asked for. 
Thanks to their recommendation, the activists answered the researcher’s e-mails and other 
interview sessions were set. The second challenge, which could not be handled ultimately, was to 
convince the activists who had left the country after 2009, but who had remained attached to 
women’s rights groups inside Iran, to share their experiences. Both the researcher’s efforts and 
the co-operation of a couple of interviewed activists failed to receive their consent.      
The observation phase of data collection faced a challenge that could not be addressed and 
became the chief data collection limitation in this study. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
scholars have discussed that a limitation of online observation is associated with the difficulties 
in gaining access to private communications. This restriction affected this study. The researcher 
was not able to triangulate the interviewees' testimonies about the implications and impacts of 
the activists’ e-mail groups through observation. The activists had an understandable concern 
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about the security of their e-mail groups as their private communication channels. Even the 
researcher’s request from a number of the interviewed activists to provide her with a printed 



























WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTIVISM ON THE NET: THE IMPACTS ON 
ACTIVISTS’ PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 
  
Addressing the first research question, this chapter presents findings in relation to the impacts of 
activists’ online media on their communication with the Iranian public. The interviewed activists 
differentiated between the modes of utilization and impacts of the three most utilized online 
platforms by women’s rights activism: e-mail groups, websites, and Social Networking Sites 
(SNSs). The interview analysis illustrated that the e-mail group is the main Internet technology 
implicated for this activism’s internal communication. There was an absolute lack of evidence to 
point at the use or impacts of e-mail groups on the activists’ public communication. Therefore, 
the findings about e-mail groups will be presented in the next chapter, which concentrates on the 
activism’s internal relations. The findings of this chapter, therefore, concentrate on activist 
websites and SNSs as the main Internet technologies utilized for the activism’s public 
communication.  
The impacts of activists’ online media on their public communication are illustrated through 
five dominant themes that emerged from the interview analysis. The evidence produced by the 
observational analysis is presented with respect to each theme. Themes one, two, and three 
uncover how the activism’s communication with the Iranian people has benefited from 
deployment of the Internet. The interview themes four and five reveal two pitfalls that are 
associated with those opportunities explained in the previous themes. Finally, the discussion 
section outlines the main findings of this chapter and discusses them in light of the studies 
presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.1).  
Before proceeding to the description of the impacts of the Internet, in order to provide a 
general picture of how women’s rights activists utilize websites and SNSs for their public 
communication practices, it is necessary to explain a number of findings regarding information 
that is disseminated through these online technologies. The interviewees’ testimonies, presented 
throughout this chapter, show that websites and SNSs are deployed to raise societal awareness 
toward: (a) women-related issues, and (b) the activism itself. To triangulate this finding, and to 
examine in practice how the activists utilize these online technologies, web sites’ and Facebook 
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profiles’ updates of all four cases were analyzed in terms of their manifest meaning for textual 
content, and dominant motifs for audiovisual updates. The results confirmed the aforementioned 
interview finding. During the observation period, the studied groups and campaigns utilized 
websites and social networking profiles, both collective and individual, to, above all, boost 
public awareness towards the gender-related issues they were addressing, disseminating 
information to make the public aware, particularly women, of their issues, as well as the deficits 
in the policy making and officials’ actions relating to those issues. The particular issues 
addressed by each case were explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). Throughout this chapter, more 
explanation will be provided.     
In the second place, these online platforms were used to present information about the 
activists themselves. The websites and Facebook pages published posts reporting on the groups’ 
and campaigns’ goals, strategies, and activities, as well to familiarize the public with influential 
activists and their efforts. The observational analysis complemented the interview finding by 
revealing the third group of information disseminated to the Iranian public. It was uncovered 
only through the two cases concerning Bidarzani and Women for Parliament that activist 
websites and Facebook profiles were insignificantly used for informing the public about the 
possibilities of online collective actions, such as online petitions and photo campaigns. More 
explanation and examples of these trends of online information distribution by the observed 
cases are provided throughout the chapter.  
It should also be noted that the interview and observational analyses illustrated that aside 
from the aforementioned information addressing the general public (i.e. information about 
women-related issues, about the activism, and about the possibilities of participation in online 
actions), a small portion of content on the activist websites is particularly directed toward 
activists. The evidence in relation to this finding is presented in the next chapter.    
5.1 Theme One: Women rights’ activists’ online media has enabled them to inform the 
public beyond print media restrictions 
The interview analysis indicates that for Iranian women’s rights activists, websites have been the 
first and key alternative media to that of the controlled press. Interviewee 9, the high-profile 
activist-cum-lawyer explained that the first websites of women’s rights activists were launched 
in reaction to the closure of the gender-specific press during Khatami’s presidency. Interviewee 
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1, who has been working on women’s issues since the 1979 Revolution, remembered the second 
term of Khatami’s and the first term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency:  
Our access to the press was becoming more and more limited. Women’s journals 
were being closed, either the reformist press which covered our causes. We even 
had difficulties in talking to people in public spaces.… At that time, websites 
were the only place through which we could have our say.  
The notion that the Internet was initially utilized by activists as a substitute to a shut-down or 
controlled press is further clarified through two testimonies in which the terms ‘immigration’ and 
‘journey’ were used as metaphors to describe the relocation of the offline publications to the 
Internet. Interviewee 3 stated: “It was not the activists’ strategy.… They were forced to 
immigrate to this space [the Internet].”  Interviewee 10 said: “A kind of pressure and force 
deprived us of the old media [the press] that we had. So, we took a journey to this alternative 
space [the Internet]. This strategy was set by force. It was not an absolute conscious decision.”    
Some interviewees held the notion that force was the most determining, but not the sole, 
reason behind the formation of women’s websites. Interviewee 4, who had years of experience in 
administering activist Web sites, believed it was a combination of force and the personal 
capabilities of women’s rights activists that put them among the early adopters of websites and 
blogging. She maintained that these activists could recognize the potential of the Internet as a 
substitute to the press and could exploit this technology because they were among the educated 
class of the society. Her point is also explicit in the following quote by Interviewee 2, activist-
cum-journalist:  
In comparison to other groups, such as labor activists, we had more people who 
were familiar with the know-how of website updating and article writing.… X 
and Y [two leading women’s rights activists] even used to write articles in 
English. The known women’s websites of that time, like Madreseye Feministi 
(The Feminist School) published these articles.  
The interview analysis suggests that the free public communication lines that the Internet 
provided for the activists in its early days of adoption is yet its major advantage for the activism. 
Although the closure of the independent press has been periodical, and was reported less 
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frequently after the end of Ahmadinejad administration, state control of the media and editorial 
filters still restrict the presence of the activism in the Iranian press. Interviewees 10 and 11 
explained this problem and highlighted the Internet ability’s to circumvent these press 
restrictions. Besides its central assumption, the testimony by Interviewee 10 also directs attention 
to the challenge of Internet filtering, which will be discussed more at the end of this chapter 
(Section 5.6). 
Interviewee 10: While your articles have to pass multiple filters of the press in 
order to get permission for publication, and you rarely have a place in the 
conservative media, which looks at women’s rights activists as political 
opponents, the Internet creates a realm where there are no restrictions to the 
expression of thoughts. If our readers can pass the sites’ filters, they will see no 
censorship in the content. 
Interviewee 11: The activism’s major problem with the Iranian press is that, 
because of the censorship, they can give little space to our demands. Besides, we 
have seen, in many cases, that the editors have no interest in women’s demands or 
do not consider [the subject of] the article to be a current issue. We have to enter 
into long discussions to convince them that our issues are worth publishing.… It 
is easier to publish an article in the women’s press. But their number is very 
limited and they have a low circulation.     
Interviewee 11, the high-profile activist-cum-journalist, also emphasized that the editorial 
constraints in the Iranian press are escalated by state pressure. “Sometimes, they don’t have the 
permission to work on specific issues. Sometimes, they attempt self-censorship to avoid getting 
noticed.” In addition to providing a general explanation of the situation, respondents spoke of 
specific opportunities the activists have gained through the Internet, with its ability to circumvent 
press constraints. The most mentioned were: raising the popularity of activist groups and 
individuals; reporting politicians’ actions; and addressing women’s issues behind cultural taboos. 
Indeed, the following sub-themes explain these specific opportunities.  
It should be highlighted that the interviewed activities’ testimonies, with regards to these 
opportunities, were to a larger extent directed towards activist websites. It appeared that they 
consider SNSs of secondary importance in activists’ public communication. A number of 
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observational evidence also underlines that it is the website that remains the activist groups’ 
main online media, in spite of the rising popularity of social media in Iran. The researcher 
observed the existence of social media icons on all four websites, indicating the willingness of 
activists to engage users with their social media platforms. Further analysis, however, showed 
that activist groups and campaigns did not give SNSs equal weight to the websites. Indeed, 
during the time of observation, all four cases updated their Facebook profiles less frequently 
compared to their affiliated websites. Also, the majority of Facebook updates were unfolded 
from the websites’ posts, demonstrating that the groups and campaigns devoted a relatively 
insignificant amount of time generating separate content for their Facebook profiles. 
Statements by Interviewees 4 and 5 suggest that the failure to utilize social media in the 
early stages of its emergence has made the activist groups incapable of exploring its full potential 
to this date. These interviewees were very well aware of the secondary position of SNSs in 
activist groups’ public relations. They believed one could make sense of this trend by 
remembering the challenges the women’s rights movement encountered in the aftermath of the 
2009 presidential election, when social media were gaining popularity in the country. 
Interviewee 4 stated: “While we were the front-runner in using e-mail and websites among 
Iranian activists, we lagged behind these networks [SNSs]”. When asked for the reason, she 
replied: “Because when these networks [SNSs] were growing, the state repression had reached 
its climax. We lost our organization; we lost many [activists] who fled the country.” Interviewee 
5 provided the same reason: “The groups couldn’t set a plan for social networks [SNSs], like the 
one we had for the websites, because after the 2009 incidents, many of them became almost 
inactive”.    
5.1.1 Activist groups and individuals have gained an opportunity to represent themselves  
The interview and observational evidence has uncovered that the Internet has provided activists 
with a possibility that they could hardly gain via print media: to provide the Iranian public with 
information about themselves. Interviewees 7 and 8, who have been working on women’s issues 
for more than 30 years, described that the press publishes articles about the activism issues, but 
rarely introduces the individuals and groups promoting women’s rights. Interviewee 7 asserted 
this as the reason: “If the Internet did not exist, very few people would have known who we are, 
what we are aiming for, and what we do.” Interviewee 8 compared the current time to the 80s 
and 90s, when the press was the only medium for the activists-public relationship. “During those 
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years, most of our efforts were conducted in absolute silence.” Referring to the workshops her 
group holds about issues such as domestic violence and marriage rights, she said: “Even now, 
women in the other provinces contact and ask us to hold workshops for them. Because of the 
Internet, people have become more aware of our activities.”  
From the perspective of Interviewee 10, similar to the time that the press enabled the 
women’s rights movement to make its issues public, the Internet enabled the same to present 
itself and “enhance its public image”: 
Before we used the Internet, women thought that we were very specific group of 
women and very different from them.… Neither the activists had the possibility to 
present themselves, nor the people had a way to find information about who we 
are. I think the Internet took the activists and the movement out of this isolation. 
Women understood that we are as one. They realized our activities could affect 
their lives and that we were not the voice of a particular social class, but the 
whole of female society.… I am sure that since the Internet [utilization], the 
movement has gained more trust and attention.   
Interviewees’ assertions illustrate that since the early days of Internet embracement, numerous 
women’s rights groups and campaigns have launched their websites to, besides publishing 
information about the issues at hand, represent their identities, goals, and activities. Taghir 
Baraye Barabari (Change for Equality), for instance, was launched by the organizers of the One 
Million Signature Campaign in 2006. Interviewees 2 and 5, who were members of the campaign, 
explained that this website, along with about thirty other websites associated with campaign 
centers in the provinces, informed the people about the objectives and strategies of the campaign. 
Also, as Interviewee 5 recalled, the Web site had a section called Kooche be Kooche (From One 
Street to Another), in which activists’ experiences were published to make people aware of the 
difficulties members faced during the collection of signatures. Interviewee 9 pointed at the 
Ghanoone Khanevadeye Barabar (Fair Family Law), founded by the campaign against 
Ahmadinejad’s proposed amendment to the Family Protection Law (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.6, 
for more information regarding this campaign). She said this website introduced the activists co-
operating with the campaign and reported their lobbying activities to readers. Speaking of the 
Internet use by the groups they worked with, three other interviewed activists expressed that, 
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through their websites the groups familiarized people with their activities and member activists. 
Interviewee 11 also emphasized that activist groups “use the Internet for the introduction of 
activists who are paying with their personal lives to advance the status of women.”         
This mode of Internet use was evident in various posts on the websites and, to a much lower 
extent, the Facebook profiles of the observed group and campaign cases. As mentioned in the 
opening of this chapter, the largest portion of online content produced by the activists in these 
cases supplied knowledge of the issues they were exposing. To a smaller extent the groups’ and 
campaigns’ web-presence introduced themselves to the people, in addition to the ‘About Us’ 
sections on the websites; public statements about campaigns’ objectives; minutes of activists’ 
meetings; news of their activities (e.g. their gatherings, seminars, workshops, and lobbying 
efforts); and articles about individual activists and their endeavors indicating such a pattern of 
utilizing websites and Facebook profiles.  
Bidarzani and Safe Home provided descriptions of the groups’ objectives and policies on 
their websites’ ‘About Us’ tabs. The Bidarzani website also had a tab called ‘Report’. This tab 
reported meetings and seminars held independently or jointly by Bidarzani and other activist 
groups. Within the observation period, a minute extract from a panel meeting was published on 
this tab. Compared to the other cases, Bidarzani provided the greatest number of posts about the 
activists of the women’s rights movement since its formation up to the present time. The group 
posted biographies of the movement’s leaders before the 1979 Revolution under a section named 
‘Who Are My Mothers?’ Aside from that, it introduced the high profile activists of the current 
time through interviews and profile articles. Just as well, a tab called ‘Equal Right Defenders’ 
reported the activities of individual activists defending women’s rights and how they are met 
with state crackdowns. The group’s Facebook profile also linked some of these website posts.      
Two campaign cases assigned a larger portion of their online sites to publicizing their 
executed actions, achievements, and challenges as compared to those of the groups, a trend that 
can be related to the short-term and issue-specific nature of such cases. Compared to the long 
term aims of Bidarzani and Safe Home for gradual policy adjustments and building an informed 
society, the campaigns persuaded specific goals within a limited period of time requiring greater 
social recognition and acceptance. To this end, aside from providing information about the issues 
at hand, the campaigners utilized their websites and Facebook pages to publicize on a steady 
stream basis their strategies and on-the-ground actions.  
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The Stepdaughter Campaign unit in the ‘Iran Adoption’ website, for example, constantly 
reported activists’ on-the-ground efforts, such as inquiries from politicians and clerics against the 
controversial clause. The website also released the minutes of the meeting of the women’s 
division of Iran’s bar association, held to discuss the consequences of the controversial clause. 
The Women for Parliament website published two statements to the Iranian people about the 
campaign’s goals and strategies. As well, it informed the public about the statements that 
campaigners sent to the Guardian Council in protest to the disqualification of numerous women 
candidates who had registered to run in the 2016 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the 
website was being regularly updated with reports of internal meetings and activists’ visiting with 
the MPs and officials. The website also published a video during the first days of the campaign 
that introduced the prominent women’s rights figures co-operating with the campaign.  The links 
to some of such posts on the campaigns’ websites were shared on their Facebook walls.     
5.1.2 The Activists have found more opportunity to report officials’ actions  
A number of interview statements also illustrate the possibility the Internet has offered activists 
to broadcast reports of Iranian officials’ inappropriate decisions and actions quickly and without 
dependence on the press. “Now we have the means to inform people about the wrong decisions. 
For example, when we witness that a recruitment policy in a public organization is 
discriminatory, we immediately broadcast it through online media,” said Interviewee 11. 
Interviewee 9 asserted that “the press power to publish news of officials’ wrong actions is 
limited, but on the Internet we [always] notify the public.” She went on to declare that “we report 
their [the officials] actions because we think public opinion can pressure government.” The 
experiences of two other activists proved this assertion. Interviewees 1 and 8 declared that, in 
some cases, officials have been forced to act more moderately toward activists because they 
knew that their actions will be broadcast on online media. Interviewee 1 explained:  
The Internet increased the fear of the state about our potential to inform people. 
We use online media as leverage with the government and the parliament. In our 
meetings, we always remind them [the officials] that we won’t keep silent and 
that we will be reflecting our problems in the media. 
She narrated two stories about how officials cooperated with her NGO for fear that she, as a very 
prominent activist, would broadcast the issue on the Internet. To protect the anonymity of this 
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activist, the details of her experiences cannot be revealed. Interviewee 8 also remembered that 
the OMS campaign’s website continuously published news about the prosecution of the 
campaign’s members by the judiciary: “Because of that, once we had a meeting with an official 
in the judiciary, he told us to 'Stop writing. Stop spreading the news.’ Then he picked up the 
phone and asked a colleague to follow our request.” 
Informing people of decision makers’ actions was also evident in the observed cases. A 
significant portion of the news article on the websites and Facebook profiles of the Bidarzani 
group and Women for Parliament campaign was reports on Iranian officials’ discriminatory 
speech and behaviour, as well as the policy proposals and bills under consideration that would 
discriminate against women. In addition to such reports, these two cases ran particular initiatives 
to make transparent officials’ deficits and wrongdoings. Women for Parliament launched an 
initiative to publicly introduce the anti-women MPs in order to prevent them from being 
reelected. To this end, they created the novel ‘Red Cards’ system to ‘name and shame’ those 
MPs who had taken a stance against gender equality. The campaign issued red cards to 15 MPs, 
quoting their anti-women speeches and explaining why people should not reelect them in the 
upcoming parliamentary election.  
Biarzani created a specific tab on its website called ‘The Statements’, informing people 
about the letters that are issued by the group itself and other women’s rights groups to different 
political figures and organizations. During the observation period, the group published two such 
statements on its online platforms. The group also incorporated online petitions to these 
statements so that visitors can sign them as a show of support. Figure 5.1 shows the screen shot 
of one of these statements. It urges President Rouhani to revise the decision for giving men a 
higher portion of the 2015 governmental organization’s recruitment exam. By the observation 
time, this statement was signed by 1900 petitioners.            
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Figure 5.1: An open letter to Rouhani’s government and a link to its online petition published on 
Bidarzani website. Retrieved April 27, 2015, from http://bidarzani.com/21616. In the public 
domain.  
A finding emerged from the interview analysis should be noted here. Three respondents hold 
the notion that activists’ online sites have not only pressured officials by reporting their actions, 
they have also moderated the hostile attitudes of many politicians towards women’s rights 
activism and its discourse. These interviewees believed that activists’ online sharing of 
information to the public has affected the attitude of politicians towards the nature and demands 
of women’s rights activists. Interviewee 2, who had direct interaction with politicians due to her 
journalism career, declared that: 
Over the recent years, the Internet has not only affected people’s awareness, but 
also has raised the awareness of the MPs and other parts of the state about our 
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demands. Even they have become more aware of the problems with the existing 
legislation.… By reading the contents of our websites, for instance, the 
description of our objectives, they found out that the activists express natural 
needs, which are not political and against the principles of the state.… So 
fortunately, we are now in a situation that the more informed society is pressuring 
the politicians who themselves have become more aware of Iranian women’s 
demands.  
Similarly, Interviewee 10 asserted that one of the greatest impacts of the activist websites is that 
they illuminate the activism’s types of activities to the state: “For instance, they [the officials] 
read reports of our meetings. They see that we have nothing to hide. Well, this reduces their 
antagonism toward us.”  In addition, according to Interviewees 6 and 2, the Internet provides 
politicians with more insights about the societal demand for greater women’s rights. “This 
information has helped them to apprehend the public opinion toward women’s social and 
political rights,” said Interviewee 6. Interviewee 2 emphasized that enhanced awareness about 
women’s demand have even influenced politicians’ political behavior. Supporting her statement, 
she exemplified the rallies of the presidential candidates over recent years:  
We witnessed in the last two presidential elections [2009 and 2013] that the 
candidates offered separate plans for women’s affairs. They took their wives with 
them in their campaign rallies.… Well, they have either accepted that women’s 
demands need to be addressed more seriously, or they are pretending to gain the 
women’s vote. Even if the latter is the case, it is still a good incident.  It shows 
that they know that women are now more aware of their rights. 
5.1.3 The activists have gained freedom to expose women’s issues beyond cultural taboos 
“Women’s rights activists always try to break the cultural and religious taboos which cause 
backwardness and troubles for women,” said Interviewee 7. This assertion points at the third 
opportunity that interviewed activists specifically raised while talking about the advantage of 
their online media over conventional print media. The interview evidence suggests that over the 
recent years, the websites and SNSs have played a substantial role in exposing topics which are 
seldom discussed publicly in Iranian society. Interviewees’ experiences and study of the cases 
from this perspective illustrate that the main taboos activists have been trying to break are around 
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different aspects of Iranian women’s sexual rights. Interviewee 4 explained that before the 
advent of the Internet, the only way activists could educate women about their sexual rights were 
through workshops, which she emphasized are still very prevalent. She maintained that the 
Internet enabled them to provide such education to wider audiences. Later in her interview, she 
narrated her attempt to raise the question of women’s rights for having an abortion by sharing her 
own story on her Facebook page. Interviewee 10 also remarked that the Internet has provided a 
space for content about the issues of sexuality, claiming that the spread of such online content 
and increased public awareness has even made it possible for the mainstream media to cover 
topics about the female body, although not to a significantly satisfying degree. Her point was 
also implicit in a testimony by Interviewee 7:  
At present, we can see some articles about sexuality on newspapers.... We can see 
women are more easily talking about their bodies.... It was not like this a couple 
of years ago. The only source of information about sexual behavior, sexual 
harassment, and women’s sexual subordination was the Internet.… In our website 
and Facebook [profile], we publish numerous educational materials about 
women’s control over their bodies.       
During the observation time, various types of content were shared by the Bidarzani and Safe 
Home activists about different forms of sexual violence, like sexual harassment at the workplace, 
sexual assault by family members, and forced pregnancy. Figure 5.2 shows an electronic poster 
which the Bidarzani group published for the occasion of International Women’s Day, defending 
women’s reproduction rights. The displayed text on the image says: “No woman is free unless 
she is free to decide whether or not she wants to be a mother.” The Bidarzani Web site also 
published a couple of psychological studies on women’s sexual behavior and equal rights in 
sexual relations. These studies were republished by the group’s Facebook page.  
Among the observed cases, Safe Home seemed to be the one that gained the most benefit of 
online media for the communication of sexual education to Iranian women. In line with its 
educational objectives, Safe Home website’s training section provided numerous articles, 
electronic booklets, and audio that were either directed to victims of domestic violence and their 
families to guide them on the options and resources that are available to them to end the abuse, 
or addressed the general public in an effort to raise social consciousness towards forms of 
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domestic violence, in particular sexual violence. For instance, the group published a series of 
warning signs indicating that a woman or a child has been affected by sexual abuse. The website 
also published many stories of women suffering from domestic abuses, many of which are based 
on cases of women who contacted the center for advice. Intriguingly, this group hardly used its 
Facebook profile to offer such educational materials. For the most part, its Facebook posts were 
of photos about peace and love in the family, sometimes with inspirational quotes from 
literatures and famous people.  
 
   
 
Figure 5.2: A poster published on the Bidarzani website on International Women’s Day about 
women’s reproductive right. Retrieved March 08, 2015, from http://bidarzani.com/21354. In the 
public domain.  
Before proceeding to the second theme, an additional finding regarding the first theme 
should be highlighted. The interviewees focused on the ability of their online platforms to 
circumvent the restrictions that are imposed on print media by the state and editorial policies of 
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the press. Observational analysis supplements this finding by suggesting that the Internet has also 
enabled activists to bypass content presentation constraints in print media. Print media are, by 
nature, incapable of delivering the wide spectrum of online content containing motion and sound, 
and interactive elements. The activists who organized the online cases of this research backed up 
their Facebook statuses by links, videos, and photos. Taking advantage of web 2.0 technologies, 
the websites of four observed cases delivered different types of content that do not exist on print 
media: images, videos (clips, animation), podcasts, e-brochures, e-newsletters, slide share 
presentation, and electronic forms.  
5.2 Theme Two: SNSs have facilitated young activists’ communication with the Iranian 
public  
This sub-theme suggests that SNSs extend the freedom of communication on the Internet for 
lower profile young activists. Through these online sites young activists, who are not given 
enough of a presence in the print media and activist groups’ websites, can nevertheless 
contribute in building public awareness. An underlying assumption behind the testimonies of 
young interviewees was that high-profile activists have dominance over the analytical discourses 
on the activist websites. They presented different reasons for this trend. Interviewee 2 asserted 
that “it is not easy for unknown activists to reflect their independent perspectives on the groups’ 
websites because the women’s rights groups consider strict policies for their websites.” She 
believed this can be related to the fact that websites are the groups’ formal public platform. 
“Therefore, they spread opinions that are consistent with their collective viewpoint.” Her 
statement underlines a statement expressed by a leading activist, Interviewee 9: “The websites 
represent various women groups’ collective visions, their social and political ideologies, and 
their approaches in addressing problems.” Interviewee 6 claimed the priority given to the articles 
of big name activists on the press and websites is due to the fact that they receive more public 
attention and coverage. Interviewee 5, however, believed that the hegemony of high-profile 
activists on women’s websites is shaped not only by their names, but also by their skills of 
formal media activities: 
Interviewee 5: “Take a look at the [activist] websites. It is obvious that the 
experienced and well-known activists have more presence.… Well, I think that is 
because they know how to write their ideas, how to meet the editorial guidelines 
of the websites” 
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The researcher: “So you think less presence of inexperienced activists on these 
websites is because they cannot meet the editorial requirements?” 
Interviewee 5: “Well, yes. That is part of the story. Many of us [young activists] 
cannot expand our views into an analytical article. We might have an 
interpretation about an event, but it is not easy to present it as a piece of writing 
for a website. We should admit that writing formal articles on Web sites needs 
special media skills.”  
To examine respondents’ assertion about the hegemony of high-profile women’s rights activists’ 
viewpoints on the websites, the researcher listed authors of opinion articles on the observed 
websites. The result confirmed that the young activists had considerably less contribution in 
comparison to the big-name activists. Bidarzani and Safe Home had a noticeable trend in the 
reflection of the ideas of world activists and academicians. Thus, translated articles made the 
largest portion of opinion articles on these websites. With regards to opinion articles written by 
Iranian activists on the websites of these groups, as well as those of campaign cases, the largest 
numbers of authors were the known faces of women’s rights movement, ones who had several 
years of activism experience. During the observation period, some of these prominent activists 
had multiple articles on the Bidarzani and Safe Home websites.  
At numerous points during the interviews, the younger respondents in particular spoke of the 
SNSs as the desired platform for inexperienced young activists to express their personal 
viewpoints and garner their own audiences. Their experiences reveal that the advent of SNSs in 
Iran has decentralized the activists’ public communication, giving more opportunities to low-
profile activists to participate in building public opinion. Interviewee 3 said websites do not have 
the capacity for the participation of all activists, particularly unknown ones. Speaking of the 
growth of SNSs, he said “now Iranian social media users are exposed to the diversified opinions 
of not only prominent activists, but also unknown activists.” Interviewee 6 recalled:  
We were young and inexperienced activists who were hidden behind big 
names.… For me, Facebook was the beginning of my speaking with my people.… 
When I started using Facebook and later Google Plus, I explored my ability in 
attracting people.… I understood that my ideas were interesting to many people. I 
could have never brought up these ideas so straightly.  
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Aside from the autonomy that younger activists have gained on SNSs to post what they like to 
express, the informality and simplicity of communication over these sites was also treasured. 
Based on the principle of User Generated Content, these online technologies allow for writing in 
a more informal language in comparison with conventional websites. Against the difficulties of 
writing on formal websites of activist groups, Interviewee 5 acknowledged the “informal and 
simple” communication channel that SNS status updates provide for inexperienced young 
activists: “I do believe that these networks [SNSs] assisted many of the activists who did not 
have proper media skills, to express their thoughts. Facebook gave them the opportunity to write 
their views in just a few lines.” Her assertion is underlined by Interviewee’s 4 experience. When 
she created her Facebook and Twitter profiles, she found her own audience: “With them, I could 
share my personal viewpoint in simple words, for instance on the negative and positive sides of a 
piece of legislation”.  
The observational analysis revealed that while campaigns’ collective Facebook profiles were 
used in a very similar way to their associated websites for the publication of communal 
standpoints, the observed individual Facebook profiles of Activists A, B, C, D were primarily 
and substantially used to expose their personal views about the campaigns’ issues. The personal 
views of the big name activists – Activists B and D - were mostly echoes of their published 
articles, which were sometimes attached by the articles’ links on the women’s groups’ or press 
websites. For these activists, Facebook seemed to serve as an additional online platform to 
increase the coverage of their previously published arguments. This while the lower profile 
activists – Activists A and C - used their Facebook statuses as the primary place to disclose their 
personal opinions.  
5.3 Theme Three: The activist online sites have created a two-way communication between 
activists and the public   
The previous themes uncovered that online communication has amplified activists’ voices in 
Iranian society. This theme explains that the Internet has also created a communication channel 
for the activists to receive a public voice in return. For the majority of the respondents, such two-
way communication between women’s rights activists and the public was particularly a product 
of SNSs. Interviewee 10 noted that: “Before the [use of] the Internet, our communication with 
society was mostly one-way. Through social networks, we have been enabled to hear the voice 
of our audience.” Interviewee 3 remembered the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election and 
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said: “In the situations where the activists had lost their real [offline] communication channels, 
[online] social networks were the main channel to access public opinion.”39 Interviewee 4 
explained that SNSs enabled her to observe people’s reactions to her ideas and activities. She 
noted “I choose what I want to post very carefully because I want to see its impact on my 
followers.”  Interviewee 2 recounted: 
I do care for the opinions of my online audiences, particularly when we cannot 
speak with people regularly.... How does society perceive our activities? What is 
their stand on the government’s decisions? The comments we receive on [online] 
social networks give us a sense about questions as such.   
There is a variety of technical features that SNSs provide for users to interact with posts. These 
sites offer their visitors commentary features, mainly likes, shares, comments, and replies to 
comments; and the possibility for private messaging, mainly real-time chat and private messages. 
Interviewee 5, for instance, focused on Facebook commentary features: “Contrary to the weblogs 
and websites, people can see the comments next to the posts. So they are unintentionally exposed 
to the previous comments.… Seeing the previous comments provokes them to participate in the 
discussion.” However, for the activists interviewed in this study, such technological possibilities 
appeared as a subordinate cause of the two-way communication on SNSs. It was more often 
expressed that the willingness of the readers to openly share their opinions and experiences with 
the activists is associated with the informal nature of communication on SNSs. 
A set of experiences suggests that the informality of SNSs allows activists to share 
information about their private lives. When audiences are exposed to activists’ personal lives, 
they are encouraged to share their own experiences and observations in return. Interviewee 9 
noted that the information she has shared through her social media profiles has created a more 
accurate portrayal of her life behind the stereotypical image of a feminist woman: 
A woman who does not like to get married, who hates having children, who is 
against religion, who thinks that all women are living in pain and suffering.… My 
image on my pages [social networking profiles] shows that these are not true. I 
am married. I got divorced not because I hate men but because I made a wrong 
                                                          
39  It will be discussed in the next theme that his acknowledgement of this opportunity was accompanied 
by his skepticism to use the term ‘public’ to refer to SNSs’ users in Iran. 
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decision. I raised my child with love and I am a true believer in Islam because it 
promotes men and women’s equality. I acknowledge women’s breakthroughs and 
happiness as much as I fight for their unachieved rights. When I make a true 
picture of myself, I may lose those who have a problem with the way I live, but I 
make a real and long relationship with the rest of my readers. 
From her perspective, this “truthful” relationship has encouraged her followers to engage with 
her posts and share their own problems. “They know who they are talking to. They understand 
that I can make sense of their problems because I am an ordinary woman like them,” she noted. 
Talking about activists’ self-disclosure on their social networking profiles, Interviewee 6 also 
asserted: “People feel closer when they watch each others’ photos and read each others’ memos.” 
He used the term ‘sense of intimacy’ to note that: “many activists have consciously or 
unconsciously created this sense of intimacy for their followers by sharing information about 
their private lives.” This sense can be the key to justifying the willingness of Interviewee 4’s 
audiences to disclose their private experiences and views. Interviewee 4 explained how the 
testimony of her personal experience of abortion sparked an intense conversation among her 
followers:  
A year ago, I wrote about my abortion story on Facebook. I explained the 
difficulties I had in terms of the costs and the location of the abortion. I did not 
expect such a reaction. I had about 1000 followers at that time. This post was 
shared 120 times and received about 90 comments. Some of them shared their 
own abortion stories, and explained that they had the same problems as mine… 
Some of them talked about their decisions to continue with their unplanned 
pregnancy. And many of them argued why they were for or against restriction of 
abortion services [by the state]… I remember there was a woman who narrated 
the reaction of her friends and her family when they found out about her abortion 
and said we could not change the laws so long as abortion without medical 
reasons is considered a sin in our culture and religion. 
By letting her readers know about her personal story, Interviewee 4 made them feel that they 
were in a close relationship with her. A lack of this kind of interpersonal relationship between 
the Facebook profile of the Safe Home group and its followers can explain readers’ reluctance to 
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write about their private incidents willingly and openly. As explained in Chapter 4, one of the 
objectives of the group is to educate people and make them aware of the forms of domestic 
violence. In one post on the Facebook profile, the admin shared stories of victims to explain 
instances of domestic violence, asking users if they had ever been faced with the same behavior. 
The observation of the comment section identified only one comment which reflected a personal 
experience: “My mother does not have a good relationship with me. I was even alone during my 
pregnancy and delivery.” The negligible number of comments which conveyed a personal 
experience is particularly noticeable considering three facts. First, this group’s Facebook profile 
possessed the largest network of followers compared with other observed individual and 
collective profiles (about 110 k). Second, there were many followers who did not use their full 
names, therefore were able to express their experiences or observations without revealing their 
identities. And lastly, the stories that were shared by the page administrator were about the range 
of abusive behaviors. Neither those which exemplified extreme cases such as sexual abuse, nor 
the more regular cases, such as emotional or economic abuse, were replied to in the form of real 
experiences.  
The observational analysis also revealed a disparity in the dialogic outcome of the individual 
and collective Facebook profiles. Compared with the four individual profiles, the groups’ and 
campaigns’ Facebook profiles were not successful in establishing enough of a relationship with 
their visitors to lead them to conversation. The greatest portion of comments to collective 
profiles’ posts was written by one-time visitors directed to the main posts. This while the 
majority of comments to the Facebook posts of the four individual profiles were the exchange of 
views between activists and their new and returning commentators. A more in-depth observation 
of the comments suggests that this disparity can stem from the level at which administrators 
respond to visitors’ comments. Compared to collective profile administrators, individual activists 
responded to comments more frequently. Apparently, their engagement in dialogue with such 
commentators heated up and extended the conversations.  
Considering the limited dialogic feature of Web sites compared to SNSs, it is no wonder that 
the majority of interview testimonies about bilateral form of communication with audiences 
concentrated on SNSs. Nevertheless, two interviewees remarked on the possibility to receive and 
reply to visitors’ inquiries and feedback through the websites. Interviewees 1 and 7, the NGO 
managers, pointed at the e-mail contacts on their NGO’s websites connecting members with 
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people seeking help and the general interested public. The observation also showed that the 
groups and campaigns made efforts to get involved in a two-way relationship with their readers 
by incorporating comment forms into the posts, and e-mail contact information into their 
websites. A notable use of e-mail contacts was observed in the Women for Parliament case. The 
campaign asked its website audience to e-mail their photos with the campaign logo as a show of 
support. The best shots were then published on the campaign’s website and Facebook profile. In 
addition to the aforementioned interactive features, the Safe Home Web site provided distressed 
women not wishing to use the group’s hotline with online forms enabling them to book online 
consulting sessions. In these forms, those seeking help were asked to indicate their problems and 
preferred time and manner with which they wish to be contacted, including a wide range of real 
time chat services. Using live online chat, visitors could put their questions to counselors and 
receive free personal and confidential replies. 
So far, this chapter has revealed that women’s rights activism has benefited from the 
deployment of its online media. It has gained the possibility of disseminating information which 
cannot pass press restrictions; gotten the young and low-profile activists involved in the process 
of building public awareness; and it has engaged in two-way communication with Iranian public. 
The next themes, however, disclose that the Internet impacts on the activism-public 
communication have not been entirely constructive. They will expose concerns regarding two 
drawbacks the activism has experienced by communicating with people through online media.  
5.4 Theme Four: The quality of the activism’s discussions has been undermined on SNSs  
This theme reflects a serious concern among interviewees that SNSs undermine the quality of the 
activism’s discussions by allowing everyone to be the producer of information - the same feature 
which was acknowledged as the facilitator of younger activists’ participation in public 
communication practices. Interviewee 5 seemed to be very conscious about this dual impact of 
SNSs. As shown in Theme 2, she praised the simplicity of status updating on these online sites 
for young activists to expose their personal views. But later she noted that, unlike many young 
activists, she herself is reluctant to present her views on her Facebook profile, as she thinks “such 
short and brief presentation makes my viewpoints look superficial.” When the researcher asked 
her for more explanation, she replied: “When you present your views without discussing all its 
aspects, you are risking the influence of your debates. You evoke emotions of your followers but 
give them a superficial knowledge of the cause.” Interviewee 7 raised a similar argument, noting 
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that on social media “the audiences receive a huge amount of information, but we should really 
ask ourselves how rich this information is.” He asserted that the few-line discussions raised by 
SNSs are not comparable with activists’ articles in terms of “their analytical value.” Interviewee 
10 went further, suggesting that public communication through SNSs will bring about a ‘lack of 
theoretical support’ for women’s rights activism: 
The wideness of debate subjects on Facebook has affected the quality of discourse 
in this network [SNS]. Facebook is like an ocean with one meter depth. Over the 
recent years, we have not seen a serious and long-living argument emerging from 
these places.… I think in the long-term these networks [SNSs] will cause a lack of 
theoretical support for the activism.    
In addition to the depth of the discourse, the term ‘quality’ in this theme also refers to 
interviewees’ concerns about the information credibility on SNSs40. It should be noted that the 
interviewee’s testimonies with regards to this concern were directed towards individuals’, and 
not the groups’, usage of SNSs. Interviewee 4, who had the experience of managing two activist 
websites, compared the credibility of content on websites with individual activists’ Facebook 
profiles: “If an activist wants to publish news on the websites, she or the websites’ editors will 
cross check the news validity through multiple sources.” She noted that this has rarely been the 
case with activists’ social networking profiles: 
They can share information within a few seconds with no need to gain their 
teams’ approval.… Sometimes, my friends make statements that are derived from 
their emotions, not real evidence. I think, as activists, we should give more 
thoughts to what we share because our debates receive more attention than an 
ordinary [social media] user.  
Likewise, Interviewee 11 declared her criticism toward some “groundless” discourses on SNSs 
by maintaining that “like any other social phenomenon identification of women’s problems 
requires empirical studies. Also, the realization of the best treatments would require sociological 
methods.” She claimed that as part of the educated class of society, women’s rights activists have 
                                                          
40 Chapter 7 shows that the same concern restricts print media journalists’ use of activists’ social 
networking profiles as an information source.  
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been always trying to look at the women’s problems scientifically. She warned that this 
constructive trend is being threatened by the deployment of SNSs:  
For example, we can see many posts on Facebook suggesting that the Maternity 
Leave Law
41
 will shrink women’s employment rate. My question for them is what 
is your evidence? Which part of the labor market are you talking about? Women 
in public organizations or private companies? We should not assert general and 
groundless views toward the sensitive women’s issues.    
Observational analysis proved that interviewees’ concern about the quality of information on 
SNSs is not unfounded. However, the evidence of groundless information did not exist in all four 
observed individual Facebook profiles. On the one hand, the observation identified status updates 
presenting inaccurate or ambivalent information about the issues at hand. On the other hand, 
there were examples of posts that contained objective argumentation and reasoning. The posts 
that can best represent both groups were updated by individual activists involved in the 
Stepdaughter campaign.  
As explained in Chapter 4, the issue that this campaign tried to address was legally technical 
and complicated. A brief and unsupported status update by Activist A seemed to create more of a 
buzz about the legislation. This was particularly evident through the comments to this post. In a 
status, Activist A expressed her objection to the ‘family protection law’, and in particular the 
controversial stepdaughter marriage clause: 
The parliament has passed the Child and Adolescent Protection Bill and has sent 
it to the Guardian Council for the final approval. Two articles of the bill are too 
dangerous for a stepchild and they should be challenged before it’s too late. The 
first one is Article 27 stating that marriage of the legal parent with the 
stepdaughter will be legal upon the approval of the court either during child 
custody or afterwards (such marriage has been illegal and it is now being 
legalized). And the second one is Article 22 that says it must be mentioned in the 
                                                          
41 She refers to the controversy over the law which was ultimately passed by the Parliament in 2015. The 
law extends the period of maternity leave for three months to make it nine months. 
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kids’ birth certificate/ID that they were adopted; this will create pressure on them 
all through the child’s life. 
While this post says that the clause is legalizing the previously illegal marriage, the researcher’s 
investigation shows that this activist either misinterpreted or misrepresented the reality; for, prior 
to this clause, there was no law or any type of law enforcement prohibiting this type of marriage. 
This mistake was also noticed by her commenters. From 44 users who left comments, five 
expressed their confusion in making sense of the situation, and 14 readers accused her of being 
biased. The quotes that follow are examples of such comments: 
Amir:  Sorry, but I think it is a bit confusing, I have heard that this marriage was 
not abandoned in the first place and now the parliament is trying to restrict it. 
Ali: Such a marriage is shameless. But do you know why such a bill has been sent 
for ratification? I think we should know the details before assaulting the MPs.  
Safa: Unfortunately, your information is not precise. There was no law about this 
marriage before. This is the story: the parliamentarian voted to make it completely 
illegal. They, however, were faced with the Guardian Council’s objection, arguing 
that as a stepdaughter is not a blood child the law could not make it completely 
illegal. Therefore, they made it illegal except with the family court approval and 
stepdaughter consent.       
Hossein: We don’t expect an active woman like you to make such mistakes. For 
your information, this kind of marriage was not illegal. There was no law about it 
and there were some ill and maniac men who abused this legal gap.  
Interestingly, one reader invited the activist to also talk about the positive aspects of the law:  
Sheil: I think you should also talk about the advancement in the law. The new law 
gives single women over thirty the right to adopt a child. I think this is a great 
breakthrough for women.… I cannot wait to reach thirty.   
While the statement by Activist A was subjective, Activist B demonstrated more of an effort in 
providing back-up for her words, which can be related to her higher level of experience and 
proficiency. In one of her Facebook posts, she provided her audiences with the summary of an 
article she had published describing why the negative consequences of the bill overweigh its 
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positive aspects. In this article, she presented the main arguments put forward by the proponent 
of the bill, then drew upon legal and physiological principles to justify her position. Also, to 
respond to most of the questions and views left for this post, this activist used links to articles 
and interviews with experts in the field in newspapers and other websites, as well as to legal 
documents in governmental portals, and Facebook posts by lawyer-cum-activists supporting the 
validity of her claim. A reader, for instance, questioned her information by asking: “You said the 
court might approve the request in exceptional cases. I think it is impossible because a man 
cannot have her stepdaughter’s name on his identity documents and at the same time officially 
marry her,” to which Activist B responded: 
Well, you are right; you cannot have your stepdaughter’s custody and marry her. 
That is why it is said in the bill that if the family court approves the marriage in 
the exceptional case, it should first invalidate the custody. Please refer to article 
27 of the proposed bill. 
What is noticed from these mentioned comments is the knowledge of readers and their ability to 
challenge activists on their positions. Of those interviewed, Interviewee 9 remarked that the 
Internet has increased the searching ability of people, requiring activists to make more efforts to 
validate what they share on the Internet. She noted: “I do my best to present precise information 
of incidents because I know that my readers receive this information from multiple sources. I do 
not want to appear partial to my readers.”  
5.5 Theme Five: Activists’ online media has limited their access to specific groups of the 
public  
The interview analysis signified a strong notion that Internet access and usage inequalities 
narrow down the activists’ access to portions of the public that the Iranian Internet space over-
represents. Besides the geographical digital divide
42
, interviewees were concerned about Internet 
usage inequalities and different online behavior within social segments of the society. 
                                                          
42 The 2017 ICT Development Index (IDI) for Iran’s provinces showed Tehran scored 2.26 points above 
the national average, while the least developed province, the southeastern Sistan-Baluchestan, scored 2.4 
point below average (Iran’s ministry of ICT, 2017). The IDI is a standard tool to measure the digital 
divide and differences within and across countries in terms of their levels of ICT development (ITU, 
2017).     
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Interviewee 11 noted, while she was talking about the possibilities that the Internet gives 
activists in affecting public opinion: 
…[H]owever, a considerable number of women who we cannot access on the 
ground are also deprived from accessing the Internet. Even though they can find 
access to the net, they don’t know how to use it, particularly the housewives. We 
sometimes ignore this basic problem. 
Interviewee 7 asserted that activists cannot rely on the Internet for distribution of information 
about all topics because sometimes the target group does not use the Internet as its source of 
information. He exemplified working class women: “On the Internet, we cannot educate women 
who work in factories about their rights. Either they don’t have an Internet connection; or they 
don’t have the ability and the time to use.” Due to this weakness of the Internet, he believed that 
the Internet in Iran is not a public medium in comparison with traditional media, particularly 
Iran’s national broadcaster. “The influence of TV shows or series is far more than our sites. 
People from all classes of the society can watch them; even those in the remotest areas of the 
country where we can only have physical access.” He then narrated a personal experience:  
Last year, a TV producer asked us to convince one of those asking for our help to 
participate in his show and talk about her life. One of the ladies accepted to 
appear on the show with her children. The impact was huge. After the show went 
on air, we were called by many women who said they required our assistance. We 
have been publishing stories of these women on our [online] sites, but we had 
never experienced such a reaction. Thus, apparently, we had not reached enough 
of the population through our electronic channels.   
Interviewee 3 elaborated on this subject more than the other respondents. He said “some activists 
feel that on SNSs, they have access to all parts of the real society”. He called this feeling an 
illusion, believing “it is caused by the multiplicity of characteristics and perspectives in our 
followers’ networks. But we should really ask ourselves how many people are connected to the 
net?” In addition to the usage gap, he noted that people with the same level of Internet access and 
usage ability do not have similar online behaviors. “Those who have access, how do they use it 
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[the Internet]?  How much time per day? For what purposes do they use it?” He believed that 
Iranian people’s behavior in the online realm is very much diverse:  
We cannot analyze the extent to which our online discourses have entered the 
society because we don’t know which society we are talking about. We are not 
dealing with a homogenous society. Even in Tehran, [people in] the west and the 
east have different lifestyles. Both have Internet connection and the ability to use 
it. But they use it differently because they care about different issues. If you share 
a political post [on SNSs] you might receive ten likes by one and a hundred by the 
other. The situation would reverse if you share an entertainment post.    
The other assertion raised by this interviewee and two others was that on SNSs societal groups 
do not find equal opportunities to contribute to socio-political discussions. Interviewee 3 said 
what he could perceive on these online sites was “a kind of centralization of discourses around 
the issues of the urban middle class and elimination of the voice of marginalized groups.” From 
his perspective, social media in Iran has not only alleviated, but also reproduced, the existing 
exclusion of particular social groups such as ethnic minorities, rural, and lower classes:  
Why don’t the issues of the Kurdish minority get the same attention as the issues 
about Tehran and big cities? If a user from a small city or village writes about his 
issues, will he receive the same public attention? No! So, it is not all about the 
digital divide. This means that even when these groups enter [online] social 
networks, their voices are shut down.… Users in these networks [SNSs] have 
built their own mainstream and don’t give a place to other voices. This exclusion 
exists in the society and magnifies on the Internet.    
Interviewees 10 and 5 were also mindful of this exclusion. When phrasing her objection to 
activists who have limited their public communication to online spaces, Interviewee 10 asserted: 
“Instead of talking with people who could not find a place in this [online] space, we flee to this 
[online] space where we can hear the voice of users who just echo what they have in common.” 
Interviewee 5 referred to this exclusion by calling it ‘the classification of social demands’. She 
noted: “If I was a working class woman who lived in Pakdasht [a small town near Tehran], could 
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I find the confidence to write about my troubles on these networks [SNSs], where I could hardly 
find issues of my social class? No!”    
Interviewees 10 and 5 also suggested that the inequalities in retrieving and sharing online 
information are intensified when people need to use anti-filtering technologies to get access to a 
great number of activist websites and prominent social networking profiles. In line with their 
statement, the observation showed that among the four online cases, access to the websites of 
Bidarzani and Safe Home was blocked by Iran’s filtering committee. This while Facebook, as the 
most followed SNS of the cases, has been blocked since 2009. Interviewee 10 said: “We are well 
aware that many women, particularly older ladies and housewives, cannot circumvent the filters 
on our websites because they are not familiar with anti-filtering tools.” Interviewee 5 asserted: 
In Iran, people need a higher level of digital skills, because the full access to the 
Internet requires the ability to work with anti-filters. For us who have enough 
computer knowledge, this is not a big deal. But we should notice that we cannot 
expect women in remote cities to know about anti-filtering technologies.  
At various points during the interviews, the respondents raised their concern about the disparity 
in the digital lives of middle- and lower-class women. In addition to the abovementioned 
discussions, the subsequent data analysis chapter presents interviewees’ testimonies about 
activists’ internal arguments that have emerged from the realization of such a disparity and 
marginalization of the voice of the lower-class in Iranian cyberspace. Notably, a number of 
interviewed journalists raised this inequality as one of the reasons for their reluctance to rely on 
the Internet as their primary information source.  
5.6 Discussion  
This chapter has been responsive to the first research question. It projected the benefits and 
pitfalls of activists’ online media for their public communication. It revealed that Iranian 
women’s rights activism’s public communication has been enhanced by the deployment of 
websites and SNSs through three major opportunities. First, use of these online sites enabled 
activists to disseminate information that could not pass print media filters. Second, it enabled 
young and lower-profile activists to expose their viewpoints to the public. Third, SNSs and, to a 
lower degree, websites enforced bilateral communication between activists and their audience. 
The empirical evidence about these opportunities support a number of extant studies, presented 
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in the theoretical chapter, while dismissing others in relation to the Iranian case (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.1).   
This chapter illuminated that for women’s rights activism, the increased ability to reach out 
to the public is hardly the result of the Internet’s capability to compress time and space barriers 
(Ayres, 1999; Breindl, 2010; Deibert, 2000) and lower cost of communication (Almazan & Gil-
Garcia, 2014; Coombs, 1998; Kim et al., 2014; Obar et al., 2012). It is, to the largest extent, the 
outcome of the control the activists have gained over the content of their public messages 
(Bennet, 2003; Breindl, 2010; Coombs, 1998; Harp et al., 2012; Micóa & Ripollés, 2014; Myers, 
2000). 
The increased control over the dissemination of activism information is, above all, in respect 
to the effectiveness of activist websites and social networking profiles in circumventing Iranian 
press restrictions. Those studies in the Western context largely focused on the ability of the 
Internet to bypass editorial filters of mass media and elimination of news production 
intermediaries (Bennet, 2003; Breindl, 2010; Coombs, 1998; Myers, 2000). This study in the 
Iranian context signifies that the Internet assists activists in avoiding the editorial constraints 
escalated by state-imposed restrictions on the press. As well, it has served as alternative media to 
blocked offline publications.  
This chapter depicts that the activist groups and individuals have exploited this opportunity 
to spread knowledge of gender-related issues they want to address, as well to bring to light their 
vision, identities, and actions. The latter mode of Internet utilization by Iran’s women’s rights 
activists conforms to scholars’ discussion of the Internet embracement for act of ‘self-
presentation’, which raises activists’ public visibility and transparency (Cammaerts, 2012; Porta 
& Mosca, 2009; Pudrovska & Ferree, 2004). The interview analysis also suggests that activist 
groups’ self-presentation on their online spaces can encourage the country’s politicians to have 
second thoughts about their hostile attitudes toward women’s rights activists. The officials are 
also more likely to act “in a manner consistent with citizen concerns” (Garret 2006, p. 209) 
through the experience of their negative actions being broadcasted by women’s rights activists’ 
independent online media. The interviewees’ experiences in this study provide empirical 
evidence to the notion that more information available to the public results in more political 
accountability (Garret, 2006) on the part of governments. The value of activists’ online 
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information in this regard is magnified in Iranian society, where controlled media system filters 
the flow of political news.  
While it has substantially bypassed the press limitations, the Internet itself has not remained 
unaffected by the hardliner’s media control policies. The observational analysis and the context 
study of Chapter 2 show that the Internet censorship and filtering policies of the state have been 
extended to women’s rights activists’ online spaces. While women’s websites have been the 
subject of regular disruptions by the state, intriguingly, only two interviewed activists stressed 
this challenge. Their testimonies, which were presented in the final theme, referred to Internet 
filtering not as an obstacle for activists, but rather as a challenge for people who have difficulties 
in using anti-filtering technologies. The insignificance of this problem for the respondents can be 
related to the fact that the Internet filtering in Iran is becoming ineffective due to the 
advancement and prevalence of anti-filtering technologies among Iranians
43
. Also in this study, 
scholars’ fear that the Internet enables the Iranian government to track down challengers (e.g. 
Baldino & Goold, 2014; Michaelsen, 2011; Morozov, 2011) remains unfulfilled. Extant studies 
have reported this challenge mainly as the result of Iranian protesters’ use of social media to 
organize mass action, particularly following the 2009 presidential election. Although the 
interviewed women’s rights activists put great emphasis on the challenge of state monitoring 
their activities, they did not emphasize their own online activities facilitating state monitoring. 
This can be explained by the fact that women’s rights activists organize through private 
communication channels, mainly e-mail groups. 
Chapter 3 represented two studies that argued the potential of online activism to undermine 
control of elites on news production (Breindl, 2010; Micóa & Ripollés, 2014). The argument by 
these studies can be adapted to the case of this research in the sense that SNSs open up 
possibilities for low-profile young activists in bypassing the hegemony of high-profile activists 
over the production and dissemination of the activism discourse. However, these studies 
focussed merely on the dominance of elites in mass media. This while, besides Iranian print 
media, as the interview and observational analyses indicated, activist websites are also over-
represented by big name women’s rights activists. Thus, the case of this study shows that the 
                                                          
43
 The latest published national survey shows that 69.3 percent of the Iranian youth use VPNs to bypass 
Internet filtering (Iran Ministry of Youth and Sports, 2014) 
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editorial guidelines of activist groups’ websites can reproduce the hegemony that big name 
activists practice in offline media. In this situation, by providing individual activists with 
independent communication channels, SNSs facilitate what Micóa and Ripollés called a “move 
toward decentralization” (2014, p. 863) of activism information production.    
The findings from younger activists’ testimonies and observation of individual Facebook 
profiles expand the study by Kim et al. (2014) arguing that SNSs’ pre-defined features require 
less expertise to set up a public communication channel. In addition to these features, the 
informal nature of communication on these sites enables women’s rights activists who do not 
have enough media skills to express their viewpoints plainly and shortly. This chapter showed 
that this informality also contributes to the establishment of two-way communication between 
individual activists and their audiences.  
The private and informal communication channel that SNSs offer allows women’s rights 
activists to expose details of their personal lives and experiences to their audiences. It was 
illustrated by Theme 3 that this personal information creates a sense of intimacy and 
interpersonal relationship between individual activists and their visitors, which ultimately 
motivates the same visitors to share their personal issues on activists’ pages as well. Therefore, 
while this study assumes that dialogic communication creates interpersonal relations with online 
audiences (Taylor et al., 2001), it also suggests that it can be the other way around too. For cases 
such as women’s rights activism, which cares about taking private issues and transforming them 
into public concern, the trust and closeness that exist in interpersonal relationships are effective 
in motivating audiences to engage in dialogue with activists. The lack of this factor can be added 
to the reasons that public relations studies have put forward explaining the failure of non-profit 
organization in utilizing the dialogic capabilities of the Internet.   
Theme three also showed that individuals and groups differ in the level at which they heat 
up and extend conversations through engagement with their followers’ comments. The 
observational evidence indicated that the higher engagement of the individual activists 
encouraged more and longer dialogic loops on their Facebook profiles. This result reinforces 
scholars’ concern about the necessity of commitment in providing timely responses to visitors’ 
comments (Kent & Taylor, 1998; Bortree & Seltzer, 2009). Both lines of reasoning presented by 
public relation scholars can be applied in explaining women’s rights groups’ and campaigns’ 
lower level of engagement with readers’ comments. Particularly for the campaign, constraints of 
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time and resources can prevent them from consistent maintenance of their profiles - the problem 
raised by Kim et.al (2014) and Bortree & Seltzer (2009). However, one can give a greater degree 
of importance to the fact that Iranian women’s rights groups’ objective in creating SNSs’ 
accounts is, above all, to support their websites’ top-down information distribution function, 
rather than engaging in dialogue with visitors. As Waters and Jamal (2011, p. 321) explained, 
they tend to “use one-way models despite the potential for dialogue and community building on 
the social networking site.”  
Existing literature have argued for the negative effects of the lower cost and barriers for 
information dissemination on the value of activists’ information (Ayres, 1999; Garret, 2006; 
Surman & Reilly, 2003). The main points of concern for these studies are the availability of 
unreliable information and the difficulties to differentiate it from accurate information. The 
evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that Iranian activism is no exception to this 
concern. The absence of editorial constraints on SNSs, as the individual activists’ proprietary 
communication platform, may undermine the credibility of women’s rights-related online 
information. However, the devaluation of the activism information on these sites not only arises 
from the diffusion of unreliable information but can also be the result of a superficial 
presentation of activists’ perspectives. Informal and short posts distributed via activists’ social 
networking profiles have less ‘analytical value’ (Interviewee 7) compared to activists’ articles in 
the traditional press and websites. Therefore, this study suggests that the possibility for informal 
communication on SNSs can be a double-edged sword for activists’ public communication. On 
the one hand, it can facilitate the communication of younger and lower profile activists with 
society and encourage audiences to engage in dialogue with activists. On the other hand, it may 
lessen the depth and analytical aspects of activism’s discourses.  
The final interview theme depicted the other peril that threatens, above all, those women’s 
rights activists overwhelmed by the benefits of online communication. The Internet limits 
activists’ access to audiences who do not truly represent the totality of Iranian society due to the 
problems of Internet access and usage inequality in the country. The factors which, according to 
the literature, affect the access of societies to activists’ information appear to be related to the 
Iranian context: Internet control (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2008; Garret, 2006; Rod & Weidmann, 
2015), the digital divide, and media literacy (Breindl, 2010; Coombs, 1998; Harlow & Harp, 
2012; Surman & Reilly, 2003). This chapter suggests that the Internet inequality in Iranian 
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society is not limited to these widely discussed problems. The interviewed activists raised the 
concern that social media users in Iran belittle the voice of marginalized groups in favor of the 
mostly urban middle class. The complete validation of this assertion would require a separate 
study on the Iranian online society. However, by also considering the realities of the digital 
divide in the country, concerns are being raised over the fact that activists’ over-reliance on 
online communication can reinforce the existing societal gap among Iranian women by giving 
some groups more opportunity to receive the education that the activism offers online, and in 























WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTIVISM ON THE NET: THE IMPACTS ON ACTIVISTS’ 
INTERNAL RELATIONS 
One of the central questions prompting this research was in knowing how the internal relations 
of Iranian women’s rights activists have changed through utilization of the Internet. In an attempt 
to shed light on this question, this chapter uncovers the major impacts of the Internet on the 
activism network via four overarching interview themes. The previous chapter showed that most 
of the impacts on the activism-public communication have emerged from the utilization of both 
SNSs and websites, with only two sub-themes referring to SNSs specifically. In this chapter, 
however, it is demonstrated that the interviewed activists more strictly differentiated between the 
impacts of online technologies, e-mail groups, websites, and SNSs. 
The first theme contains the findings about the promises of e-mail groups for the activist 
groups’ collective decision-making. As remarked in Chapter 5, the interview analysis 
demonstrates that e-mail groups are the key online mediums used for activists’ internal 
communication. The groups and individuals within the women’s rights movement have exploited 
this Internet technology for the exchange of ideas, decision-making, and coordinating actions. 
The first interview theme is embedded with no observational analysis. The limitation that 
prevented the researcher from observing the private e-mail groups was highlighted in Chapter 4. 
The second theme elaborates on how both activist websites and e-mail groups facilitate 
collaboration among various women’s rights’ groups. The interview and observational analysis 
produced no evidence of activist website involvement in the coordination of joint actions. 
However, websites do influence the groups’ interactivity by familiarizing them with each other’s 
visions and actions, and through exhibiting their solidarity. This Internet technology is also 
utilized for the exchange of knowledge within the activists’ network. The third theme depicts this 
opportunity and discusses how the content disseminated through the groups’ websites 
theoretically while also practically empowering the individual activists constituting the women’s 
rights movement. The fourth theme discusses how individual activists’ usage of SNSs as a 
personal public communication channel raises tensions within the activism network. It should be 
highlighted that the interview and observational data provided no evidence to support the 
utilization of SNSs for activists’ internal communication and organization. The activists’ 
interactions within these online sites are limited to the exchange of ideas in the comment 
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sections. Similar to the previous empirical chapter, the final section outlines the key findings and 
evaluates the applicability of pre-existing discussions, first presented in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.1.3), to this Iranian case.  
6.1 Theme One: E-mail groups have facilitated collective decision-making 
According to the interviewees, e-mail group technology was first utilized by women’s rights 
activists during the One Million Signature Campaign, launched in August 2006 (see Section 
2.2.6 in Chapter 2). Three interviewees who were members of this well-known campaign 
recalled that the campaign’s e-mail groups gave them their first experience of online 
communication with other activists. For instance, Interviewee 2 explained:   
In the [OMS] campaign, information was only communicated via e-mail groups. 
This was the leading activists’ decision…. At that time, many activists, including 
myself, had not enough knowledge of working with a computer, let alone the 
Internet.… We started to learn because we had to join e-mail groups to be aware 
of discussions, news, and events. 
At the time of the interviews, 10 interviewees were members of one or multiple e-mail groups, 
while one was a former member of these online groups. What is important to note here is that no 
interviewee had used or formed a public e-mail group to raise women’s issues, signifying the 
activists’ reluctance to deploy this online technology as a public communication medium. 
The great majority of interviewees expressed that e-mail and, in particular, e-mail groups are 
their first and foremost tool for expressing and exchanging views to achieve common 
perspectives on various aspects of their activism. Interviewee 5 said that over the recent years a 
large number of decisions related to their activism have been made within these virtual groups. 
She recalled the process of discussing media policies to gain public awareness towards a family 
related piece of legislation. “Through our e-mails, we were talking about the best newspapers 
and journalists to contact and the main points we should raise.” “In some cases we exchanged 
over 200 e-mails,” Interviewee 4 said. She exemplified a heated debate amongst activists in the 
e-mail group of a women’s rights NGO about the effectiveness of their past activities. 
Interviewee 9 evidenced the cases of e-mail communication among high-profile activists over the 
wording of their statements. Interviewee 2 explained the story of the Simone de Beauvoir award, 
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which was given to a women’s campaign in Iran. It provides the clearest example of the e-mail 
groups’ function as a venue for collective decision-making: 
It was mentioned in the campaign statement that no financial assistance should be 
received from any governmental or non-governmental organization.… Whether or 
not we should accept the award was opened to discussion in the campaign’s e-
mail list.… It was about EUR 800, if I remember correctly…. It became a heated 
topic. About 500 e-mails were exchanged among the two sides of the debate. 
Finally, we decided not to accept the award. 
Focussing on the activists’ use of e-mail groups for dialogue and decision-making, the following 
sub-themes uncover that e-mail groups have enabled more Iranian women’s rights activists to 
exert influence on their groups’ decision outcomes by circumventing two restrictions that had 
previously undermined the groups’ collective decision-making processes: (a) geographical 
barriers, and (b) the financial and security costs of offline meetings.   
6.1.1 Bypassing geographic barriers 
A very recurrent statement in the interviews was that e-mail groups give activists the ability to 
participate in groups discussions without being confined to their geographical locations. “E-mail 
groups make decision-making more democratic because the activists who live in other cities and 
cannot attend meetings in Tehran have found the opportunity to take part in the debates,” said 
Interviewee 2. The importance of this participation for women’s rights activism was illustrated 
by Interviewee 10:     
For NGOs and campaigns, it is always critical to have the contribution of 
women’s rights activists in smaller cities. This is because the demands of Iranian 
women include a wide spectrum of issues. The only way to identify and address 
the issues of different cities and minorities is through local activists.       
This interviewee explained that prior to the usage of e-mail groups, face-to-face meetings were a 
major venue for activists’ internal deliberation. For this reason, the women’s rights activists in 
the capital were, to a large extent, prevented from contacting local activists from other parts of 
the country, a source of dissatisfaction with the latter group: “They believed that activists in 
Tehran were not aware of their particular difficulties and concerns.” She emphasized that e-mail 
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groups significantly addressed this communication gap, paving the way for participation of 
dispersed activists in the debates. Interviewee 8 clarified this opportunity by exemplifying the e-
mail groups that were founded by the Markaze Farhangi Zanan (Women's Cultural Center) to 
support activists’ communication throughout the OMS campaign. She explained that at the peak 
of their campaign, the number of members grew at an incredible pace. Besides Tehran, the 
campaign was able to set up offices in 16 other provinces. She continued:  
Well! E-mail groups were the only way to find regular and instant access to 
campaign managers and their members in other provinces.… How else could we 
receive reports and thoughts from those who, for example, lived in Zahedan
44
? 
That was how about 70-80 e-mail groups took shape when the campaign had hit 
its zenith. 
Three interviewees went further, suggesting that the opportunity e-mail groups provided for the 
participation of scattered activists prepared the ground for the creation of collective identity and 
trust among women’s rights activists who have no physical contact. From the perspective of 
Interviewee 11, physical proximity was a determinant factor in building trust and collective 
identity among the activists. She maintained that over the recent years, e-mails have, to a great 
extent, eliminated the problem of physical distance between activists. “Now our collective 
identity is, to a lesser extent, dependent on our physical interaction.” Interviewee 3 noted that 
“these [e-mail] groups have prevented the geographical gap from widening the mental gap.” He 
continued: “By setting a communication line which did not exist before, now an activist in a 
remote city in Iran realizes that those in the big cities care for her concerns.” He firmly believed 
that e-mail groups have assisted the activist groups in setting an agenda that encompasses the 
priorities and demands of “wider groups from wider geographical locations.” His assertion that 
e-mail groups have informed dispersed activists about each other’s views and expectations was 
underlined by Interviewee 2’s experience of the time she joined the OMS campaign in a small 
city in Iran: 
It was through these e-mail lists that we recognized the ideological differences 
between the guys [the activists] in Tehran and in smaller cities. For instance, 
                                                          
44 The capital of Sistan and Baluchistan Province, located at a distance of 1,605 km from the Iranian 
capital, near the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
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those who run the campaign offices in other provinces were more in favor of 
central leadership. In Tehran, the idea was not to limit the leadership to 
persons.… They were all agreed on the formation of leadership committees.  
The respondents did not limit the opportunity for receiving dispersed voices to activists inside 
Iran. They remarked that e-mail communication has been apparently influential in the 
participation of activists who had left the country for personal or political reasons in the 
decision-making. Interviewee 9 explained that before 2009 women’s rights activists who left Iran 
were mainly scholars aiming to pursue academic objectives. “For the activists inside [the 
country], it was crucial to have the valuable opinions of these activists.… The e-mail groups 
gave us this possibility.” Interviewee 8 reminded that contact with activists who pursued the 
OMS campaign in ten foreign countries was established through “a specific e-mail group known 
as Activists Abroad. It was a communication bridge between activists in different countries and 
the campaign organizers [inside Iran].”  
A number of respondents also pointed to the opportunity that e-mail communication 
provided for the large number of the activists who left the country after the 2009 presidential 
election “to maintain their participation in internal discussions while they couldn't be physically 
active,” said Interviewee 5. It was explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.6) that in the aftermath of 
the 2009 election, the women’s rights movement lost many of its members, who left Iran mainly 
on the pretext of state persecution. Interviewee 10 remarked that not all the activists overseas 
wished to maintain their ties with the women’s rights groups inside the country; but for those 
who did still feel connected, the Internet, in particular e-mail groups, has been the medium to 
remain attached to the activism: 
We lost the physical presence of these activists, but we used their knowledge to 
enhance our theoretical foundations. Therefore, the internet helped us to turn a 
part of this threat to an opportunity.… Many of these activists found the 
possibility to continue their studies or participate in international seminars. Some 
of them could get involved in local NGOs. Well! Many preferred to continue their 
activities independently from domestic [women’s rights] groups. But some stayed 
connected through the Internet. They were participating in e-mail discussions on 
the planning of activities.      
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Interviewee 11 put more emphasis on the harmful consequences of activists’ emigration in the 
years following the 2009 protests. “The wave of emigration was hugely disappointing because 
we are activists, so we are supposed to show more resistance.… It damaged our networks 
because the rate of immigration was higher than the participation of new activists.” However, she 
described the effectiveness of e-mail groups formed before 2009 in preventing these emigrant 
activists from being “completely and immediately” detached from the internal debates of 
activism. Her testimony also provides a preface to discussions on the next sub-theme: 
Since a few years before the emigrations, activists had been promoting the use of 
cyberspace in a bid to strengthen their networks. This was mainly because the 
small groups and the campaigns did not have the required facilities for in-person 
meetings. Besides, the government monitoring was tight.… After the [2009] 
election, these virtual groups [e-mail groups] came to help us to hear the voice of 
the emigrant activists.   
6.1.2 Reducing costs of offline meetings 
The interview evidence illustrates that by reducing the security and financial costs of offline 
meetings, e-mail groups have increased the number of sessions of deliberations within women’s 
rights groups. After maintaining communication with the scattered activists, the lower risk of 
state surveillance was the second most mentioned benefit of e-mail groups’ discussions. 
Therefore, the interview analysis suggests that these two factors were the initial reasons behind 
the formation of the activists’ e-mail groups.  
The expressed experiences on the issue of online interaction safety against the security costs 
of face-to-face interactions were entirely concentrated on the era of the Ahmadinejad 
administration and not expanded to the Rouhani administration. Interviewee 10, 2, and 1 
provided the most comprehensive explanation about the difficulties in holding offline meetings 
in the aftermath of the OMS campaign and the 2009 protests. Interviewee 10 explained: 
The days that followed his [Ahmadinejad] presidency caused the worst situation 
for activists. Many NGOs were forcibly shut down. So the activities mainly 
operated in the form of small and informal groups, which had no specific location 
and normally no defined set of members. These groups’ meetings were mostly 
controlled and restricted.… In this situation, e-mail lists were the only ways to 
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communicate. If we did not have them, the activists would have remained 
disconnected.       
Emphasizing that the situation for activism got harder after 2009, Interviewee 2 noted that:  “I 
consider the oppression to be very much influential on the use of e-mail.” To support her view, 
she said: “Other groups of activists who were under less state control, like those who were just 
working on children’s issues, used online spaces to a lesser extent.” Interviewee 1 explained that 
in the NGO she runs “the goal is to choose ways for social activities that would cause minimum 
damage to activists and at the same time would yield maximum results.” For this reason, she said 
online communication is considered the main communication channel by her NGO’s members. 
Similar to Interviewee 2, she considered “the exacerbation of tensions between the state and 
women’s rights groups” to be a positive in the growth of activists’ e-mail groups. Interviewee 11 
approached this issue from a different perspective. She noted that prior to the formation of e-mail 
groups, the major risk of activism was posed at “the core of activism - those who were regular 
participants in offline gatherings.” She emphasized that “the relocation of meetings to e-mail 
groups changed the situation in a way that only a few key actors don’t have to be responsible for 
all actions.”    
Besides security risks, the financial cost of offline meetings was named as the other 
significant barrier due to which the groups could not facilitate the participation of certain 
members in their internal debates. Interviewee 7 pointed out the possibility of e-mail 
communication saving the groups from the expenses of offline gatherings. When asked to 
explain the activist groups’ budget sources, and why cost reduction is of great importance to 
them, he replied by separating NGOs from informal groups and specific case-based campaigns: 
Budgeting has always been a very challenging issue. Normally, the NGOs are in a 
better situation. They have their own offices and defined sources of funding. They 
definitely deal with financial issues, but the problem is much more serious for the 
[informal] groups and the campaigns. They mostly run on members' 
contributions. One may devote her office or her home while others account for 
other costs. 
Interviewee 10’s testimony suggests that before the formation of e-mail groups, there was little 
room for the contribution of younger activists in the key debates due to the groups’ financial 
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constraints. “As they [women’s rights groups] could not afford the cost of large gatherings, they 
had to limit their invitations to those who were more influential due to their experience and 
reputation.” According to Interviewee 9, these gatherings were mainly held “in coffee shops, 
members' offices (after working hours), and in their homes.” Interviewee 5 noted that e-mail 
communication has not only saved expenses for meeting organizers, it has also eliminated the 
costs of trips by individual activists participating in the gatherings: “Many young activists were 
penniless. They had no source of income. [Via e-mail groups], they participated in the 
discussions on a daily basis without having to be troubled by the costs.”  
The interview analysis suggests that the participation of young and geographically dispersed 
activists, largely absent in the groups’ discussions before the formation of e-mail groups, has 
increased the quality of the groups’ decision outcomes. Interviewee 5 explained: “With the 
growth of e-mail interactions, because we gained the participation of activists from smaller 
cities, the diversity of opinions increased, so we witnessed more creativity in the decisions.” 
Interviewee 9 remarked that e-mail groups “help us scrutinize a subject and be aware of its 
hidden aspects because it is discussed from different perspectives.” More specifically, she 
acknowledged the constructive role of young activists in decision-making:  
Their contributions have been greatly influential.…They have unframed minds so 
they look at the issues from different angles.… Because they spend more time on 
the Internet and, unlike us [the older activists], they know how to search for the 
best sources of information, they are more aware of the events and discourses that 
are taking place globally.    
The analysis uncovers that the enhancement of the activist groups’ decision-making on e-mail 
groups is also related to the fact that the members, even the most experienced ones, do not resist 
the challenging ideas of young activists. This was a common finding both for leaderless groups 
like the OMS campaign, and those acting within more clear lines of leadership, like the NGO 
managed by Interviewee 7. The researcher asked Interviewee 2 and 8, both of whom provided 
the most details about brainstorming in the OMS campaign’s e-mail groups, to explain if the 
viewpoints of participating activists were treated similarly regardless of their age and experience 
and position within the leadership committees. Both respondents asserted that the value of an 
idea was not defined by its presenters, but by its strength and applicability to the situation under 
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investigation. Interviewee 8 said there were no limits for participants in expressing their ideas, 
and that every member, regardless of his/her background, could challenge others’ positions. 
Interviewee 2 provided a more detailed response to the researcher’s question: 
It cannot be said that such factors as age or the length of activism were 
determining factors in decision-making. There were activists like X and Y [two 
well-known activists], who were among the organizers and the main 
spokespersons of the campaign in the media. But no one felt like she/he should 
not reject their idea because of their position.… In most cases, the members used 
to agree on the stronger logic and not ideas that were stated more regularly or 
were presented by famous members.     
Similarly, Interviewee 7, who pointed at the opportunity that online communication has given 
him to involve his NGO members in key discussions, declared that he allows members to oppose 
his opinions. “In numerous cases, we modified the previously set policies when we were faced 
with the more novel opinions of our young members.”     
This theme suggests that as an activism which extends over the entire country and operates 
under state control and budget constraints, women’s rights activism has extremely benefited 
from the employment of e-mail communication in bypassing the obstacles of offline meeting, 
and in sustaining and strengthening its internal relationship. The constructive impact of e-mail 
technology on the activism’s internal relations will receive more evidence in the next theme. 
Aside from the utilization of e-mail groups for dialogue and decision-making, the following 
interview theme reveals that these online groups are also effective in the organization and 
broadcasting of collective actions across the network of the activism.  
6.2 Theme Two: Activist websites and e-mail groups have stimulated interactivity and 
collaboration among the activist groups  
It was explained in Chapter 5 that aside from disseminating information about women’s rights 
issues, the activist websites also spread information about their affiliated women’s rights groups 
and activists. The interview evidence suggests that in addition to generating publicity for the 
groups in society (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1), such online information enables activist groups 
to become aware of each other’s aims and activities themselves. Interviewees 10 and 11 
elaborated on this opportunity. Interviewee 10 noted: “Websites give the groups a voice to 
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introduce themselves. Thus, we become aware of each other without having to hold physical 
meetings and visits.” She emphasized that many of the activist groups are operating informally 
without any office. “We recognize these groups primarily through their websites. These websites 
do not only transmit information. They construct bridges between different ideologies and 
groups inside the activism.” Interviewee 11 focused on the relation that the websites have created 
amongst various women’s groups across the country: 
We can find information about the activities of hundreds of big and small 
organizations which operate in the country to assist women in resolving their 
difficulties. Having this information we [members of the group she cooperated 
with] can identify the groups that share goals with us, the ones that can help us in 
the pursuit of our objective. 
In addition to making the activist groups aware of each other, websites play a significant role in 
exhibiting their solidarity. Interviewee 9 recalled that in 2005, in protest to the massive filtering 
of women’s websites and blogs in Iran, an activist website called Teribune Feministie Iran 
(Iran’s Feminist Tribune), together with some other websites, sent a letter to the World Summit 
on the Information Society in Tunisia. In response to this action, two months later, Teribune 
Feministie Iran was filtered. She added: “In solidarity with this website on a certain day - it was 
in November, I guess - numerous women’s websites changed their names to Teribune Feministie 
Iran.” 
Besides using e-mails to process activism internal debates, the interview analysis reveals 
that Iranian women’s rights groups also use their e-mail groups to organize their actions and 
distribute information on their collective actions. The majority of the interviewees who were 
members of different e-mail groups referred to these online groups as the most common means 
of receiving and distributing notices of events and initiatives. Although they reported that this 
online technology is also used for intra-group planning, the greatest part of their testimonies was 
related to the opportunity that it has provided for collaborations among activist groups.  
Interviewee 4 asserted “e-mail groups have formed a network over which the activists from 
different groups can come together and organize their joint actions.” During the interviews, four 
cases of such collaboration were exemplified. Interviewee 2 maintained: “A few months ago, I 
was added to an e-mail group. It was formed by activists from three [women’s rights] groups in 
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which programs for the commemoration of International Women’s Day had been talked about.” 
Interviewee 8 explained that in multiple cases she signed statements that the activist groups had 
distributed through e-mail groups. Interviewee 9 provided an example of such statements. She 
named the coalition that 40 women’s groups formed prior to the 2009 presidential election to 
present women’s demands to the presidential candidates (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.6). She 
explained that the joint statement was shared with involved organizations and individuals 
through the coalition’s e-mail groups. She remarked that the formed e-mail groups were later 
used for the exchange of viewpoints about the post-election tensions. The explanations presented 
by Interviewee 10 about the coalition which was formed in protest to Ahmadinejad’s proposed 
Family Protection Bill (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.6) clearly illustrate the network building 
capacity of e-mail groups, while also showing how activist websites can manifest women’s rights 
groups’ solidarity: 
An e-mail group with about 400 members was formed. All the planning was done 
through this [e-mail] group. The responsibilities were divided among the [activist] 
groups, and of course individuals, who were acting jointly on this cause. Activist 
journalists accepted to interview the MPs. Well-known activists formed lobbying 
groups to meet with the MPs…. And finally we made arrangements so that in 
large cities, the activists would contact their MPs on ratification day and voice 
their objections…. They [the groups] also devoted a significant part of their 
websites to this cause. All the websites’ organizers agreed to put the logo [of the 
formed coalition] on their websites and publish brochures. 
The activist websites’ role in the above-mentioned case was observed in the Women for 
Parliament campaign, which was formed by activists from different women’s rights groups. 
Aside from the campaign’s website, websites of the involved groups contributed to the rise of the 
campaign popularity by publishing its statements and campaigners’ articles and interviews with 
the press. Also, as an act of support, activist groups such as Madreseye Feministi
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 (The 
Feminism School), Kanoone Shahrvandiye Zanan
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 (Women’s Citizenship Center) (see Figure 





6.1), and Kanoone Zanane Irani
47
 (Iranian Women’s Center), put the campaign logo and/or 
video clip on their websites’ homepages. The Women for Parliament website made evident the 
stronger affiliation that the campaign had with the Feminism School group. During the 
campaign’s lifetime, not only did the Feminism School continuously re-publish numerous 
materials of the campaign on its website, but the campaign’s website in turn circulated articles by 
Feminism School activists about women’s share in the country’s power structure.  
With regards to this theme, the interviews offered no evidence to support the same role for 
SNSs. This while, the observational analysis suggests that these sites, too, can be effective in 
fostering the interactivity of activist groups. First, in all four observed cases similar to the 
websites, Facebook profiles, too, presented information about groups’ and campaigns’ objectives 
and activists, although to a much lower extent, showing that SNSs, as well, have the potential to 
familiarize groups with one another. Second, an online investigation of the Women for 
Parliament campaign demonstrated that some groups which promoted the campaign through 
their websites also used their Facebook pages to manifest support (e.g. Madreseye Feministi and 
Kanoone Shahrvandiye Zanan). 
In order to explain an absolute lack of evidence in the interviews to consider the same 
impact for SNSs, a finding in Chapter 5 comes to the fore again. For women’s rights groups, 
their websites serve as the primary and official public communication channel, while SNSs 
support the Websites’ broadcasting role (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). In line with this finding, the 
interview evidence in this section suggests that when activist groups intend to become aware of 
each other's activities or contribute to the publicity of one another, websites come to play the 
main role. In the case of Women for Parliament, even the posts that women’s rights groups 
published on their Facebook pages about the campaign were not shared from the campaign's 
Facebook page, but rather were links to the campaign website. This theme offers fresh evidence 
that websites are the official online platform of activist groups in broadcasting their certified 
information. Seemingly, SNSs have not obtained such a status within activist groups yet.   
 




Figure 6.1: The Women’s Citizenship Center homepage. Retrieved December 05, 2015, from 
equalcitizenship.com. In the public domain. 
Note: On the left is the announcement of the Women for Parliament campaign’s formation and 
its official video clip.    
This theme demonstrated the role of websites and e-mail groups in fostering the cooperative 
network of women’s rights activism. Interviewees’ experiences showed that in recent years these 
online technologies have been a key player in the coordination of campaigns, coalitions, and 
other joint actions among the activist groups. In all 11 interviews, the greatest part of assertions 
about the promises of the Internet was expressed with respect to activists’ websites and e-mail 
groups. The next theme brings into light another benefit of activist websites.   
6.3 Theme Three: Women’s rights websites have fostered activists’ personal empowerment 
6.3.1 Knowledge building 
The evidence generated from the interviews shows that groups’ websites have advanced 
activists’ personal empowerment by training them, both theoretically and practically, on issues 
related to women’s rights. As remarked in the previous chapter, while the majority of 
information on activist websites addresses the general public, these online sites also generate 
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content that is particularly directed toward interested activists. Both interview and observational 
analyses provide instances of information as such. Interviewee 11 exemplified Madreseye 
Feministi (The Feminism School) website and explained that it provides specific articles and e-
books that “enhance activism’s theoretical foundation.” Interviewee 9 spoke of such articles as 
an attempt to bridge the gap “between theories or intellectual debates and practice.” Interviewee 
11 also mentioned that activist Websites actively publish articles that are self-critical of activism, 
such as: “the faults in dealing with obstacles, the weaknesses that exist in the organizations’ 
intra-relations, criticism of women’s campaigns and how they could have been more effective 
and so on.” From her perspective, the articles as such help activists to learn from their faults.  
Among the observed cases, Safe Home is the forerunner in the provision of materials which 
are of particular use to activists. The group holds online courses for women’s rights activists who 
have the experience of working with victims of domestic violence or who are lawyers or 
psychology graduates who intend to work on relevant cases. An online course on the 
“comparative analysis of domestic violence regulations in Iran and the UK” was held during the 
observation period. In the meantime, two sessions from a series of podcasts for social activists 
were published. Figure 6.2 shows these podcasts. The top one called ‘Analysis of Violence 
Patterns’ and the second, created from one of the online courses, is ‘Brainstorming Among 
Activists and Lawyers about Establishing Constructive Relationships with Domestic Violence 
Victims’. 
In addition, the group published informative articles, e-booklet, e-brochures, and 
PowerPoint presentations on its website to educate activists about the legal and social aspects of 
domestic violence. The PowerPoint presentations taught them about various subjects, such as 
‘The Solutions to Reduce Domestic Violence’, ‘The Principles of Writing a Report about a 
Domestic Violence Case’, and ‘Communication with Victim Clients’. In the note sections, these 
presentations also provide teaching instructions for activists wanting to present the same in their 
workshops. The researcher also found a distinctive link on the homepage, called ‘Capacity 
Building’, directing visitors to a guideline concerning capacity building in nonprofit 
organizations: the management of social projects, resource mobilization and management, self-
assessment, and alignment with society’s demands. It should be noted that no single material 





Figure 6.2: Safe Home podcasts produced to train activists. Retrieved May 02, 2015, from 
http://www.khanehamn.org/archives/category/podcasts. In the public domain.  
 
The amount of informative materials that are principally of use to activists was relatively 
lower in the other cases. Bidarzani.com presented legal documents and guidelines about the 
country’s Family Protection Law. The Stepdaughter website published an interactive diagram 
describing the chronology of Marriage with Stepdaughter clause, and linked viewers to 
numerous legislative and official documents compiled by campaign activists. The Women for 
Parliament website published a number of articles about how women’s rights activists can affect 
parliamentarians’ decision-making.  
The interview statements that constructed this sub-theme were, to the largest extent, 
concentrated on such materials as those specifically targeting activists. However, the testimonies 
of a number of respondents suggests that other professionally written materials conveyed through 
the groups’ websites, mainly research-based materials and translated articles, not only contribute 
to awareness-building among the public, they also boost activists’ knowledge. Interviewee 8 
explained that the “academically compiled materials” of the activist websites assisted her in 
creating her workshops’ agenda and discussions: “For example, the e-books that very 
systematically present statistics about domestic violence or women’s labor market.” This 
interviewee’s experience can be best observed in a booklet published by the Bidarzani website 
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called ‘The Effects of Population Policies on Women’. One part of the educational contents on 
the Bidarzani website are e-booklets written academically, and mostly in response to politicians’ 
decision-making. The aforementioned booklet, for example, was published in relation to the shift 
in recent years in birth control policies
48. It presented historical arguments about Iran’s birth 
control policies, discussed the possible drawbacks of the recent policy shift by taking a look at 
other countries’ experiences, and suggested solutions that should be considered by the 
government and activists alike in order to heal the unwelcoming consequences of these policies 
on women (“The Effects of Population Policies”, 2015). 
Three interviewees paid great attention to the knowledge-building potential of translated 
articles available on activist websites. Interviewee 4 elaborated on a very common trend among 
activists in translating academic and opinion articles about women’s rights activism in other 
countries: 
For many years, we have had an eye on the activities and breakthroughs of 
women’s rights activists in other countries, particularly regional and Muslim 
countries. Unfortunately, save for the Reform Era, there has been a very limited 
relationship between Iranian and regional activists. To fill this gap, since the 
beginning, activist websites have been publishing translations of articles about 
other countries’ activists and transformations related to women’s issues in the 
region. This is because we always feel an overwhelming desire to learn from their 
strategies.  
The last sentence in this quote clarifies more through one case exemplified by Interviewee 8 
about the initial idea behind the formation of the OMS campaign: “One of fellow activists found 
an article on a foreign website about a very similar campaign in Morocco. She told the activists 
in the Markaze Farhangi Zanan (Women’s Cultural Center) about it and the campaign was 
formed.” This interviewee emphasized that women’s rights activists always look for new ways to 
                                                          
48 For years, Iran could successfully control its population growth by promoting the idea that “two 
children are enough.” As a result, demographic growth went down from 3.9 percent a year in 1986 to 1.3 
percent in 2011 (“The Effects of Population Policies”, 2015). Since 2012, however, Iran has dramatically 
shifted its population policy to encourage population growth. The new policy pays families for each child 
and deposits money into that child’s bank account until their 18th birthday.  
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pursue their issues. To this end, she said: “The articles about other countries’ experiences or a 
theoretical debate help us to get ideas for our activities and avoid possible mistakes.” 
Acknowledging the efforts of her fellow activists who manage activist websites to identify and 
translate articles written in other languages, Interviewee 9 noted: “Compared to the 1980s and 
the 1990s, activists are much more informed about regional and international transformation and 
uprisings. Now we feel that we are moving in a brighter way.” 
In line with interviewees’ assertions, a significant amount of the translated articles published 
in the Bidarzani and Safe Home websites demonstrate the value that information about foreign 
women’s development has for Iranian women’s rights activists. Numerous articles published by 
Safe Home were, in fact, translations of foreign articles about the practices of activists, NGOs, 
and governments around the world in fighting domestic violence: articles about the most 
effective laws in Western countries, such as the UK, Muslim countries’ efforts and progress, and 
performance of international organizations to outlaw domestic abuse. Other translated articles on 
this website were opinion articles by foreign scholars and activists on the problem of domestic 
violence. 
The Bidarzani group concentrated mainly on compiling and translating articles and book 
excerpts addressing women’s rights on a theoretical basis: articles about feminism, gender, and 
sexuality written mostly by prominent gender studies’ scholars. Other translated articles narrated 
the experiences of activists around the world enhancing women’s rights in their own 
communities, ranging from struggles for black women’s rights by famous American activist 
Angela Davis to Afghan activists’ endeavors in battling the cultural norms imposed on women’s 
education.   
6.3.2 Maintaining activist websites 
Besides visitor activists, websites also empower activists participating in their maintenance. This 
was a common notion held by four interviewees who shared the experience of co-operating with 
activist websites. Interviewee 6 explained that each woman’s rights website, like other forms of 
publication, produces a new group of authors or provides more publications from existing 
authors. He remarked that “the new authors learn how to write. The experienced ones grow by 
subjecting their opinions to public judgment, and in this way, they revisit their viewpoints.” 
Interviewee 8 noted that the ability to write is essential for activists. To this end, she recounted 
that some women’s rights groups held writing workshops for activists: “These [workshops] were 
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essential, considering the fact that women are historically verbal and write less than men.” She 
remembered that for a number of activists, writing on the Kooche Be Kooche page on the OMS 
campaign’s website (introduced in Chapter 5, section 5.1.1) was their time expressing their 
experiences in written form.  
Interviewee 11's experience in co-operating with a number of women’s websites showed her 
that the maintenance of these websites increases activists’ sense of responsibility. Additionally, 
the content management activities “boost their ability to recognize and organize opinions, to 
analyze the situation, and to improve their writing capabilities.” Because of these benefits, she 
said, she always encourages activists in smaller cities “to launch their own websites and not be 
content with just co-operating with website teams in Tehran.”  
Interviewee 4 explained why the management of a prominent women’s campaign “was a 
precious experience and a sort of personal empowerment” for her: 
I took the responsibility of a job in which I had no experience. I had to learn news 
report writing skills, and other responsibilities as a website manager. Well, I had 
the experience of writing articles but not news articles. I used to check other 
websites to see how they portray their events so that they would gain maximum 
attention. I got help from activists who had journalism experience to teach me 
these skills.… I learned about the impacts of media, particularly at the point that 
we used website to report the government's disputes with the campaigners. 
This interviewee also said that her co-operation with this website reinforced her connections to 
other activists and social and political figures: “I had to contact them either to ask them to sign 
the statements on the website or to post their opinion articles.” Interviewee 11 raised a similar 
point, explaining that the management of the activist website strengthened the activists’ team 
working skills, “particularly at the occasions when [the state] repression did not allow the 
formation of collective actions.” 
6.4 Theme Four: Individual activists’ use of SNSs has raised tensions within the women’s 
rights activism network  
This theme emerges from a collection of interviewees’ experiences and observation of individual 
Facebook profiles’ posts and comments to suggest that the exclusive public communication 
platforms that SNSs provide for the individual women’s rights activists, despite the discussed 
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promises for their relationship with the public (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2), have given rise to 
internal tensions within the activism network. The following sub-themes explain that such 
tensions have emerged from two interrelated factors: the rise of individualism and so-called 
‘branding of the activism’.   
6.4.1 Persuasion of individualism 
There was an assumption among six of the eleven interviewed activists that, by providing 
independent spaces for activists to freely express their opinions, SNSs have increased 
individualism in two main ways: (a) individualism in the distribution of collective information, 
and (b) overemphasizing individual viewpoints. With regards to the former, the interview 
evidence demonstrates that tensions have been created by Individual activists’ attempts to share 
opinions and information that can be perceived by the public as representing the opinions and 
information of activist groups. Interviewee 9 noted that there have been many cases in recent 
years in which a group of activists got into trouble for what a single activist had distributed on 
her SNSs profiles. “For instance, we had arguments over the improper timing of publicizing 
details of meetings and correspondences that we had with officials.” Similarly, Interviewee 5 
explained that “one of the serious problems is that in these spaces [SNSs], the personal opinions 
of activists are demonstrated to a great extent. They are not in many cases in line with the 
collective position that we have taken in our groups.” She clarified by referring, specifically, to 
activists who introduced themselves as group members in their SNSs profiles, but then 
publishing independent viewpoints. She said this trend has caused challenges and disagreements 
within activist groups, and cited the following example: 
When Ms. Mollaverdi was selected as the vice president [for women’s affairs], we 
had not yet gained any official position about her appointment. But some fellows 
published personal comments supporting her. That created the impression that our 
group had approved her. After this, we had serious arguments that if we want to 
write as members of the group, we should reflect the group’s standpoint. 
The interview analysis suggests that activists’ relationship is not only threatened by 
individualism in presentation of collective information, which mainly results in internal disputes 
within the activist groups, rivalry and division has also been created amongst activists 
maintaining social networking sites’ profiles in which they place excessive emphasis on their 
139 
 
individual viewpoints. Interviewee 3 took the firm position that contrary to activist websites, on 
SNSs, “because of the existence of personal profiles, instead of concentrating on our 
commonalities, we concentrate on the differences. Instead of focusing on common objectives, we 
lay emphasis on showing ourselves.” Such a notion was explicit in other testimonies as well. 
Interviewee 11 remarked that while activist websites focus on presenting awareness-building 
materials, on social networking sites activists “overstress” personal opinions and analyses. 
Interviewee 6 compared the impact of activists’ SNSs profiles with that of e-mail groups, noting 
that in e-mail groups, through conversations, activists can reach alignment and convergence. “On 
the contrary we can see many disputes among the activists from different groups on social 
networks [SNSs].”  
The observation of the four individual Facebook profiles underlines the mentioned 
statements by providing examples in which the activists’ internal disagreements were opened to 
the public. In the post that was updated by Activist B, regarding the Stepdaughter campaign, she 
publicly blamed some of her fellow activists for justifying the parliament standpoint about the 
ratified clause: 
The debates under way these days about the legislation on marriage with 
stepdaughters remind me of the discussions about the elimination of legal 
limitations to polygamy. On the latter issue, the parliamentarians claimed that 
men could get married with the consent of their first wife and without having a 
court permission, saying they wanted to impose the law on this issue and claimed 
that they were working in favor of women. The major difference between today's 
debates and those discussions lies in the point that, by that time, nobody accepted 
that argument. We kept protesting until the law was abolished. But today many, 
including activists, are aligned with the parliament and they are justifying the 
parliament's legislation. The main issue is to know how we have become 
different. We ourselves, and not the parliament or government, must be at the 
receiving end of criticisms.      
The analysis of comments made to this post revealed a noteworthy point. As was foreshadowed 
by the testimony of Interviewee 6 (“These activists publicize their criticism of each other [on 
SNSs], which is not interesting for the public audience.”), the activist’s followers showed no 
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interest in getting involved in this internal disagreement. This post received the least number of 
comments compared to the other posts of this activist. The five comments made under this post 
were general viewpoints about the case without any hint of the core subject.  
In the case of the Women for Parliament campaign, posts updated by Activists C and D in 
support of the campaign received numerous comments by activists disagreeing with the 
campaign’s formation. The following comments best clarify the interviewees’ declaration: 
Arman: By lowering demands to this extent, this campaign closes the way to 
radical forces. It targets a short-lived target which will fade in the public memory 
without any achievement. With inefficient methods like ‘red card,’ this campaign 
is the fall of activists' demands. 
Sara: Undoubtedly female candidates' electioneering through this campaign will 
result in their disqualification [by the Guardian Council]. If this happens, will you 
accept the consequences of your strategy? Our friends in this campaign should 
have selected a group of women’s candidates in silence and postponed 
propagating for them until after the vetting process.      
Negar: We should first review the shameless speeches of women MPs in the 
parliament. Then we find out that increasing the number of biological women in 
the parliament will not heal our pain, and could even worsen them.   
Besides the campaign’s objective, the way that it was being operated was the subject of a number 
of arguments in the comments. As an example, the following discussion was formed between 
Activist C and another women’s rights activist, named here as Arash, by the post which was 
linked to the campaign’s official video clip:   
Arash: This video clip looks like those which are usually made by cinema super 
stars for persuasion of specific goals. Why should we think that we are 
celebrities? I believe that making fun in the video clip of a campaign that has a 
very serious message will destroy its image.”    
Activist C: why do you think that these kind of clips should be necessarily made 
by super stars? Why shouldn’t social and political activists who are much more 
thoughtful than celebrities make such works?   
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Arash: When did I say that activists should not make video clips? I am trying to 
say that we should not copy others’ work without thinking. We should have had 
our own approach so that the results will not be so meaningless and even with 
reverse ramifications. 
When Interviewee 8 argued of the negative consequences of SNSs, saying that “these networks 
[SNSs] have caused some internal divisions,” the researcher asked her if the divisions were 
created just on these online networks or were they a reflection of differences in the real world, to 
which she replied: “Yes. These differences definitely emerge from disputes in the real world. But 
when they enter social networks [SNSs], they get expanded.” She explained that while in the e-
mail groups, activists try to find a common solution, “on Facebook, where they are watched by 
users, their concern primarily is to defend their positions.” Another example, derived from the 
Facebook pages of Activist A, clearly supports this statement. In this case, Activist A remained 
uncompromising on her positions with no intention of reaching a common point of view with the 
activists commenting on her post. She posted a status update regarding the controversial 
Stepdaughter clause:  
The parliament published a report which says the number of this kind of marriage 
was concerning, that is why the parliament had to make it conditional upon family 
court approval. Where is their source? There are no statistics in their report. When 
we have no reliable report, we can judge based on our observation: such 
marriages were very exceptional. The law cannot be set based on exceptional 
cases.    
This post heated up a discussion between her and a visitor activist, named Dana in this thesis:  
Dana: “I think the logic behind your argument is not correct. We cannot judge 
based on our observation.” 
Activist A: “Based on our observation, they were exceptional. We cannot rely on 
the parliament report.” 
Dana: “First, I should say that I am strongly against this type of marriage. But I 
am also against your logic. You say the parliament report is not reliable. Well, 
how do you claim that your observation is reliable? Where is the basis of your 
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observation? Tehran? Have you also taken other cities into consideration? If we 
think the law is wrong, we should present a stronger and more reasonable 
argumentation.” 
The commenting continued with both activists insisting on their positions. The final comment by 
Activist A became intense in tone, which encouraged the commentator to leave the conversation:     
Activist A: “This is what I think is true. If someone thinks she has a better logic, 
she should start struggling with her own logic instead of wasting her time and 
energy on rating other activists’ posts.” 
Dana: “I think the goal behind posting comments is more than rating and 
competition. By the way, if my comments bother you, I’ll leave the conversation. 
Have a good day!” 
These comments underline the interviewees' concern about the substitution of deliberative 
arguments with personal disputes by the rise in individual SNSs profiles. As Interviewee 9 
described: “Everyone is defending their own alternative without considering the need for having 
a conclusion.” Such behavior can be related to the rise of interest in gaining personal popularity, 
a phenomenon specifically addressed by the next sub-theme.  
6.4.2 Branding of activism 
Interviewees 4 and 6 explained that in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election, many 
women’s rights activists started using SNSs because there was little room for on-the-ground 
activities. These interviewees emphasized that a number of these activists never managed to 
reduce their reliance on SNSs. “They were imprisoned by these spaces and preferred to use them 
as their main activism platform even when they were provided with opportunities for real world 
activities.” Interviewee 4 voiced this problem and related it to the sense of popularity that such 
activists have gained through SNSs. “They asked themselves, when I have thousands of 
followers on board, why should I leave these spaces [SNSs] and go back to where few might 
know me?” Against the risks of offline activism in Iranian context, this popularity seems to be 
what Interviewee 6 named ‘reward’. “Some chose these networks [SNSs] to the real world 
because they were given more rewards and less punishment.”  
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The two NGO managers interviewed for this study also remarked on the impact SNSs have 
in distracting activists from on-the-ground activities, based on personal experience. Interviewee 
7 noted that some of his NGO members, particularly younger activists, paid more attention to 
their public image on social media than achieving real outcomes. He remarked: “These 
networks’ [SNSs’] comments especially have made them reactionary in the way that they spend 
numerous hours on these sites defending themselves.” In this regard, he narrated a personal 
observation: 
We once asked a TV show to invite people and groups to co-operate with us. 
Well, this was followed by a wave of criticism on social media.… Some people 
believed that we should have not asked a state-sponsored channel for such a thing, 
as we are independent activists.… I remember that our younger colleagues were 
arguing with the critics, trying to reply to all the comments and messages … and 
this lasted for about a week. The discussions made them so exhausted.… I 
remember one of them came to me with her phone very anxiously and said, “Look 
what they have written!” I said, “Well, that’s their problem. Leave them alone and 
get back to work.” 
Similarly, Interviewee 1 asserted that the younger members of her NGO “dedicate a great 
amount of time, which should be devoted to the NGO activities, to capturing the attention of 
[SNS] users.” The emergence of online activities focussing on gaining popularity and the 
approval of audiences at the expense of the activism’s goals and persuasion is what Interviewee 
3 named “the branding of the activism.” Along with the majority of interviewees, he noted the 
growth of such activities on SNSs. The interview analysis uncovered two major conditions under 
which these activities turn to the source of division and tension among women’s rights activists. 
First, tension arises when, in search of more endorsement, some women’s rights activists 
overstress the importance of their own activities and/or the issues at hand by way of the direct 
and uncontrolled communication channels that SNSs offer. A number of respondents expressed 
disagreement with this trend, arguing that SNSs give some activists and their issues “fake 
importance” (Interviewee 3) in the eyes of the public, pushing those activists with less online 
social networking activity to the margins. Interviewee 9 stressed: “Some activists have more 
skills or time to present themselves on these spaces [SNSs]. So they make readers overestimate 
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the significance of the cases they are targeting.” She highlighted that this trend is particularly 
harmful to the activism “in the situation that in the absence of a free press, online media has 
found a critical position in society.” Interviewee 8 narrated a personal experience: 
Some of the activists, whom I know in person, don’t have considerable activities 
on-the-ground. But just because they are always on the Internet, they create this 
perception that they are among the most active of us! People have many times 
come to me asking, “What is X doing?” I’ve replied: “Nothing special. She is not 
participating in the meetings.” “Are you sure? She is always on Google Plus and 
seems so active.”  
The interviewee continued more angrily: “Such an activist is not making as much of an effort as 
the activists who deal with a variety of difficulties on real activities, but she is seen more by the 
public.” She then named a number of activists involved in big projects but are not used to 
promoting themselves on social media.  
Interviewee 5 criticized the same group of activists, saying that they have demeaned 
activism. “Our work is not only about launching media hype. Although sometimes media hype is 
necessary, what we need more of is a real action. Our work is about bringing real changes to the 
lives of women.” She then spoke of a noteworthy behavior. She said that on SNSs some of these 
activists not only build on their own activities, they try to get credit for activities that were 
conducted collectively. She declared that, aside from gaining public recognition, over the recent 
years, such online behavior has provided some activists with international opportunities, such as 
academic scholarships and research grants from international foundations: “Tensions were 
created between these activities and the groups they belonged to. Other activists asked why we 
should shoulder the burden of activities while others are using them to their own personal 
advantage.” This point was also raised by Interviewee 3. He took the firm position that not all the 
activists who left the country in recent years were motivated by political pressures. “If this was 
the case, how could we stay inside and continue our activities? Why in these years were we not 
imprisoned?” He then recounted that a great part of the emigration was due to the opportunities 
that international foundations provided to Iranian women’s rights activists, emphasizing that the 
number of such opportunities has risen since the proliferation of social media:  
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She [an activist] constructs ten pages in multiple social media. She writes in 
Persian and English. She introduces herself as a member of a women's campaign. 
It is definite that she gains more attention than her fellow activists who might 
have even made more contributions.  
The interview evidence suggests that the second cause that attention for gaining popularity on 
SNSs creates tension among women’s rights activists is that some activists concentrate more on 
women’s demands that hold more appeal for societal groups that dominate SNSs. As explained 
in Chapter 5 (section 5.5), the interviewees were concerned that, due to Internet access and usage 
inequalities, demands expressed by the online public do not represent the voice of the totality of 
Iranian women. The statements by Interviewees 10, 4, and 8 suggest that the division between 
the demand priorities of activists who overwhelmingly deal with their social media audiences 
and those who spend a larger portion of their time interacting with offline society has created 
internal arguments.   
Interviewee 10 noted that “the discussions on social media are the problems of the middle 
class. When we check them against the realities of society, we find out that there are many issues 
that are of greater priority for other social classes.” She made the internal argumentation over 
this issue more apparent by asserting that one of the main criticisms she always expresses to her 
fellow activists who cite discussions on SNSs is that “you are reproducing the hardships that the 
lower class always faces with in voicing its requirements, while a social activist is supposed to 
eradicate this deprivation.” Interviewee 4 noted that the activists who “immigrated” to SNSs are 
becoming ignorant of the sufferings of people who have no voice on these online platforms; for 
instance, working class women who “do not care about women’s participation in the political 
structure, but worry instead about their own economic situation.” Interviewee 8 brought to light 
an ongoing discussion among women’s rights activists over the issues of the compulsory hijab: 
I believe the demands that are being discussed on these spaces [SNSs] are to some 
extent working against reality. You can consider the compulsory hijab as an 
example. In recent years, some activists who gain their knowledge of society from 
SNSs are seriously following up on this cause. But those of us who are in touch 
with different groups of society, for example, through our workshops, know that 
there are more critical issues which should be addressed first. For instance, 
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enhancing women’s living situation by advancing laws about divorce and child 
custody. Well, now we can see that there are many arguments over the issue of 
hijab. They ask us why we do not co-operate with them on this issue. We tell 
them that this is not the priority. They blame us for being conservative. We blame 
them for being unrealistic. 
As Theme Four depicted, the concerns regarding the threatening impact of individual 
employment of SNSs on the network of activism were widespread amongst all generations of 
interviewed activists. To be discussed in the following discussion section is that the evidence of 
this study supports the argument that social media can promote ‘slacktivism’ by fostering 
narcissism and distracting activists from collective commitments. As Interviewee 3 expressed: 
The phony popularity that these activists receive on SNSs makes them ignorant of 
the necessity of collective actions. They have forgotten that, throughout the 
existence of the movement, the real changes have been achieved by offline 
collective organization. I am very much looking forward to seeing the time that 
they get disillusioned with these networks and get back to their real groups. 
6.5 Discussion 
This chapter explored how more than a decade-long utilization of cyberspace has affected the 
characteristics of women’s rights activism’s internal relations. As shown in Chapter 3, nearly all 
the studies suggested the within-activism contributions and limitations of the Internet, either as a 
general technology or as the result of a single online platform. Trere (2012) acknowledged this 
problem, noting that: “The main consequence of the one-medium bias for the study of online 
activism is that it can reduce the complexity of the Internet to just one of its comprising 
technologies or to certain particular portions of this complex environment” (p. 2362). The 
examination of the Iranian case in this study provides the grounds for comprehending the 
evolution of the impacts of the Internet that has been brought about by the utilization of e-mail 
groups, websites, and SNSs.  
Websites and SNSs serve activists’ external outreach, while e-mail groups add a further 
communication opportunity for women’s rights activists’ internal relations. E-mail groups have 
been the key Internet technology utilized for dialogue, decision-making, and action organizing 
among and within activist groups. The first three themes of this chapter suggest that for women’s 
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rights activism, the more conventional types of Internet technologies, e-mail groups and 
websites, improve three aspects of activists’ internal relations highlighted in the theoretical and 
empirical studies: communication and organization, within and among activist groups, and 
participation of individual activists. The final theme, however, showed that the growth of 
activists’ personal SNSs profiles has reverse impacts on activists’ internal relations. This theme 
provides empirical evidence for skeptical arguments, especially around so-called slacktivism.  
E-mail groups enhance women’s rights activism’s capacity to involve activists who might 
otherwise be absent in decision-making processes. While in the literature the potential of the 
Internet to transcend geographical limitations is widely illustrated through transnational activist 
groups (e.g. Zapatista: Clark, 2006; Anti MAI activism: Ayres, 1999; Deibert, 2000; Anti-
corporate globalization activism: Bennet, 2003; Juris, 2005), this research provides a pervasive 
national case which has substantially invested in this potential. Iranian women’s rights activism 
is dispersed across several provinces of the country, which have their particular female publics 
with a variety of demands. As well, a considerable number of women’s rights activists settle in 
Western countries and wish to contribute their experiences and knowledge to the prosperity of 
their compatriot women. The e-mail groups construct connection bridges for women’s rights 
activists who had been traditionally limited to contact with local activists.  
In addition, e-mail-groups eliminate the financial costs that are associated with the groups’ 
offline meetings. The women’s rights informal groups and independent NGOs operate with 
limited budgets and use online communication to prevent this constraint from weakening their 
internal relations. Also, when the women’s rights movement is under tight control and on-the-
ground space for interaction is restricted by the authorities, activists benefit from these online 
communication channels to circumvent the security costs associated with their personal 
meetings. While due to the constraints of cost and the state control, offline meetings have been 
limited to the attendance of high-profile activists and key members of the groups, online 
meetings, by contrast, have allowed for the participation of a younger generation of activists. 
The interviews provide no evidence to suggest that when women’s rights groups use e-mail 
technology for internal communication, they struggle with any of the three challenges that, 
according to Nielsen’s (2009) empirical research, may be entailed by the low cost of online 
communication among activists: overcommunication, miscommunication, and communicative 
overload. The absence of these negative consequences is most probably related to the tendency 
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of women’s rights groups to apply e-mail technology in collective form. Also, contrary to the 
activist groups examined by Nielsen, the women’s rights groups do not implicate other forms of 
online communication, such as websites and SNSs for the distribution of internal messages. 
Utilizing e-mail groups as a mere online platform for distributing internal messages prevents the 
publication of identical messages – and thus also the problem of overcommunication; eliminates 
the dissonance between different online mediums – preventing the danger of miscommunication; 
and reduces the number of contacts generated from numerous means of internal communication 
– thus avoiding communicative overload. 
By giving voice to geographically dispersed and young activists, e-mail groups provide the 
activism with a greater diversity of viewpoints. For women’s rights groups, elucidation of this 
diversity has not resulted in difficulty in reaching consensus or the tendency to split (see Clark & 
Themudo, 2006). On the contrary, the comparison of different views on these virtual meeting 
spaces bridges the differences within physically disconnected activists and boosts the outcome of 
decision-making. The e-mail groups owe this success to the consent of high-profile and leading 
activists in allowing younger and local ones challenge their perspectives. This consent is related 
to the fact that contemporary women’s rights campaigns and coalitions, including but not limited 
to, those named in this study, did not exhibit a strong leadership structure, as they were mostly 
led by a steering committee. Furthermore, the women’s rights NGOs and informal groups named 
in this research, or to which interviewed activists were affiliated, enjoy no or very few 
organizational levels. Thus, this research adds to scholars’ previous discussion on the ability of 
the Internet to promote non-hierarchical activist groups (Bennett, 2003; Surman & Reilly, 2003) 
by suggesting that there is also a vice versa relationship: that non-hierarchal organizational form 
facilitates Internet adoption for more collective and democratic decision-making. 
The culture of co-operation is also evident across the entire network of women’s rights 
groups. The women’s rights movement is constructed by NGOs and informal groups advocating 
collaboration and networking rather than separation and competition. It is this culture and the 
tendency to build coalitions and partnerships that make e-mail groups and websites effective 
tools in facilitating interactivity across the activism network. As Surman and Reilly (2003) 
pointed out, networked technologies can provide a platform in which civil organizations can 
work together. They, however, do not offer “the skills or culture necessary to make online 
collaboration work” (p. 25).  
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Benefiting from women’s rights groups’ enthusiasm for collaboration, e-mail groups are 
vital in planning and co-ordinating joint actions, as well in keeping participant activists abreast 
of plans. The array of activist groups’ websites is not used directly for the coordination of 
coalitions. However, by offering two possibilities, they are nonetheless important elements of 
interactivity across the activism network. Firstly, Simi and Futrell (2006) noted that “over the 
past decade, activists and organizations have emphasized the development of the movement's 
web presence precisely for the purpose of providing new channels of access to other movement 
groups, members, and cultural items” (p. 117). In line with this notion, this chapter revealed that 
websites provide groups with the possibility of identifying others with similar interests who 
might otherwise be unknown to them. The respondents’ statements that the familiarity of the 
women’s rights groups with each other opens the prospect for future collaboration correspond to 
the notion by Surman and Reilly (2003) that the understanding of a common purpose and culture 
is vital for a successful collaboration. Secondly, by exchanging symbolic items, such as logos 
and video clips, and publishing shared content, the websites exhibit solidarity amongst women’s 
rights groups organizing or supporting a coalition. Over the recent years, they have served as 
tools for manifesting the width and power of women’s rights coalitions.      
This chapter demonstrated that the array of activist websites shares knowledge across the 
network of women’s rights groups and individuals. While scholars overwhelmingly studied the 
knowledge building potential of activists’ online spaces for public audiences and participants, the 
consequences of these spaces for knowledge-building among activists remain understudied. The 
case of this research suggests that, aside from affecting the public awareness, the content of 
activist groups’ websites also enhances the knowledge of member and non-member activists. 
Moreover, behind these websites are teams of activists who improve their personal capabilities 
by practicing new technical and media skills, which are required for web management.   
The chapter provides empirical evidence for the line of theoretical inquiry that asks to what 
extent the Internet promotes collective identity among social actors that can result in the 
formation of collective actions. The interview and observational findings make it clear that 
collective identity according to Melucci’s (1996, pp. 70-71) definition (‘interactive and shared 
definition’ constructed through network of active relationships among actors) is reinforced by 
more conventional forms of online communication, e-mail groups and websites. The e-mail 
groups create a virtual network for more regular discussions over “the ends, means, and field” (p. 
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70) of the real-world actions of women’s rights activism. They provide the ground for “mutual 
recognition” (Melucci, 1995, p. 45) between activists who, conventionally, had little contact 
opportunities. Websites inform the activists of different women’s rights groups about each 
other’s causes and objectives, and e-mail groups facilitate the negotiation over different aspects 
of their collectivity. Meanwhile, by sharing symbolic content, websites demonstrate, and 
encourage the unity of activist groups and individuals involved in the women’s rights 
movement’s campaigns and coalitions.   
The success of these two forms of online technologies in promoting collectivity can be also 
explained by Diani’s (2000) notion that virtual networks operate at their best in the promotion of 
collectivity when they are backed by real social linkages. The virtual networks, built through 
women’s rights activists’ e-mail groups and websites, are affiliated with real-world groups that 
govern decision-making and organizing processes. It is evident, through the observational 
analysis of the campaign cases and the interviews, that women’s rights groups use digital media 
more as a means of ‘managing participation and coordinating goals’ rather than ‘inviting self-
organization of action’ (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). For these groups, the deployment of online 
communication has not resulted in the emergence of what was defined by Bennett and Segerberg 
(2012) as ‘connective actions’- technologically organized action with no or loose organizational 
linkages around a personalized interpretation of problems. The notion promoted by Diani (2000) 
is most evident in the following quote from Interviewee 2: 
When the groups had no possibility to plan actions - for instance, during 
Ahmadinejad’s government - even the Internet could not break this stagnation. The 
virtual spaces have been only effective in supporting activities when the cause that 
they promoted had been raised by women’s civil groups, like NGOs. For us, the 
Internet has never been the creator of an action.  
This chapter’s findings raise concerns about the fact that by encouraging individualism and an 
interest in gaining personal popularity, activists’ individual SNSs profiles can threaten the 
activism’s collective identity. The collective network, which has been underpinned by an array 
of women’s rights groups’ websites and e-mail lists, can be entangled in tensions arising from 
the growth of individual online social networking activities. As Trere (2012) pointed out, this 
finding “reminds us that future scholars must take particular care not to fall prey to fascination 
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with the newest online applications … and avoid the trap of the attractiveness of the latest, 
cutting-edge applications for activism” (p. 2372). 
Skoric and Poor (2013) proclaimed that the comprehension of slacktivism lacks a defensible 
basis, since most of the literature about slacktivism is merely commentary and not founded on 
data. The findings presented in the fourth theme about SNSs provide empirical evidence for two 
lines of argumentation among existing theories about slacktivism. First, it was referred to by 
Morozov (2009) and Breuer and Farooq (2012) that in slacktivism the primary focus is shifting 
from contributing to the achievement of a public good to the persuasion of “selfish and 
narcissistic” objectives. This notion particularly ties in with the case of this research. While e-
mail groups facilitate debates for finding mutual solutions, SNSs serve as a stage on which 
individual women’s rights activists act to promote the legitimacy of their own perspective. While 
the activist websites manifest the groups’ and the activism collective achievements, the existence 
of personal profiles on SNSs make it possible for some activists to promote their personal 
activities to – as Breuer & Farooq (2012) put it – gain social prestige.  
Second, the claim made by scholars like Morozov, (2009), Lee and Hsieh (2013), and Skoric 
and Poor (2013), that low-cost and low-risk online activities encourage previously active 
activists to pull out of real civic actions, finds evidence in the usage of SNSs by women’s rights 
activists. The interviewees’ testimonies suggest that since 2009, activist groups have lost the 
active participation of some of their members who decided to remain active on social media and 
not get back to on-the-ground activities more likely to get them in personal trouble. Concerns 
were also raised in that, by devoting a substantial portion of their time in capturing the attention 
of their online audiences, some of activists, in particular young ones, are distracted from their 
collective commitments. Whether or not such least effort-consuming digital activities have been 
ineffective in acquiring real changes in policies – as Christensen (2011) and Skoric (2012) posed 
- remains an open question.  
The previous chapter illustrated the promises of SNSs for individual activists to make direct 
and unlimited contributions to the public communication practices of the activism. This chapter 
suggests that activists should take advantage of this opportunity with caution in order to avert 
backlash in their groups. In recent years, there have been conflicts within activist groups over the 
power that individual activists have gained through these sites in disseminating information. 
Thus, with respect to SNSs, this study reaffirms the notion suggested by Surman and Reilly 
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(2003) that by de-centralizing the power over content, the Internet has created new tensions 
within civil organizations. This study, however, differs from the argument made by these authors 
in the sense that for women’s rights groups, the struggle is not about which level of organization 
hierarchy has the right to publish information; rather it is concerned with any member who 
publishes information that can be identified by readers as a group’s collective information.   
Finally, the Iranian case of this research provides a noteworthy and distinctive finding. The 
Internet, in particular SNSs, as the main online media for hearing the public voice, has formed, 
seemingly, a division amongst women’s rights activists over prioritizing women’s demands. This 
division is a reflection of the inequalities in Internet access and usage patterns by the public, 
which widely caught the attention of activists and, as will be shown in the next chapter, the 




















ACTIVISM ON THE NET: THE RESONANCE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
ISSUES IN THE IRANIAN PRESS 
 
This chapter addresses the third research question seeking to explore the impact of activists’ 
online media on the resonance of women’s rights issues in the print media. It draws upon the 
interview data with both sides of the story, that of activists and that of print media journalists. 
The findings are presented via two overarching interview themes. The first holds the notion that 
the level to which activists’ online efforts influence the print media agenda is indeterminable and 
unsteady due to a dependence on factors which are particular to Iran’s media environment and 
the activism’s characteristics. Aside from the magnitude of the influence manipulated by the 
factors explained in the first theme, the second theme reveals three mechanisms through which 
activists’ online media has become effective in resonating women’s rights discourse in the press 
agenda. The analyzed testimonies by both groups of respondents concentrated on the impacts of 
the activists’ public communication platforms, websites, and SNSs. Some prominent activists 
who had established relations with the press pointed at the use of e-mail technology for their 
correspondence with journalists. However, apart from such peer-to-peer applications, neither the 
journalists nor the activists asserted experiences suggesting that e-mail communication has had 
any significant and evident influence on the print media agenda.  
7.1 Theme One: Factors which manipulate the influence of activists’ online media in the 
press agenda 
When asked about effects of activists’ online media on print media coverage of women’s rights 
issues, most of the interviewed journalists and a number of interviewed activists complemented 
their answers by drawing a broader picture of the situation. The analysis of their testimonies 
discloses two factors affecting the rise and fall of women’s rights issues in the Iranian print 
media; and consequently the success of activists’ online media to exert influence on the press 
agenda: (a) press readiness to covering women’s rights issues; and (b) the dynamism of women’s 
rights’ activism on the ground.  
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7.1.1 Press readiness to covering women’s rights issues  
The interview analysis reveals that in a situation in which the state restricts what can be covered 
in the press, the level to which activists’ online media can exert an agenda-building influence is 
dependent on how much the press is allowed to open up women’s rights issues. Interviewees 
raised the point that since freedom for the expression of women’s rights discourse has been ever-
changing under different administrations – something also illustrated in Chapter 2 – accordingly, 
the press has had varying degree of readiness to resonate the activists’ issues49.  
Interviewee J6 stated very strongly right at the outset of the interview that “one should not 
investigate the reflection of women’s demands [in the print media] without considering the social 
and political situation in which the press acts.” She noted that women have had a varying portion 
of the country’s media within different administrations. “Those [administrations] who accepted 
women’s rights as a national demand had a closer relation with activists and NGOs. Thus, 
newspapers had more chances to talk about women’s issues.” Interviewee J1 raised the case of 
Zanan (Women) journal, among the most prominent platforms for the women’s right movement 
(see Chapter 2, Sections 2.2), to clarify different governments’ standpoints toward the activism. 
She explained that Zanan magazine gained its license under the Rafsangani administration, 
reached its peak during the Khatami administration, was banned by Ahmadinejad’s, and after 
seven years was authorized to resume printing under the Rouhani administration. “What 
happened to Zanan was because the Khatami and Rouhani administrations look at women’s 
rights issues as social and national demands. While for Ahmadinejad, women’s rights activists 
were threat to national security.”  
The impact of the alternating viewpoint of governments on the presence of women’s rights 
demands on the press was further illustrated by Interviewee J3, who exemplified the demand of 
women employment in public managerial posts:  
Administrations like that of Rouhani consider women’s employment in 
managerial posts to have a key and serious national appeal. The press publishes 
more reports about this issue. Therefore, the Internet plays a more substantial role 
                                                          
49  Although press freedom in Iran has been notably affected by a conservative judiciary, which has a 
representative in the Press Supervisory Board and is the main power over the press jury, as explained in 
Chapter 2, presidential administrations also hold a great role in freedom of the press. The Minister of 
Culture, for example, is the Chairman of the Press Supervisory Board which grants licenses to 




in finding related news and debates. For sure, if a hardliner was elected [instead of 
Rouhani], we would not have such freedom to cover the case.  
The obstacle of government control on the press agenda was also reinforced by interviewed 
activists. Interviewee 9 recalled the ever-existing conflict between the state and women’s rights 
activists, saying: “That is why newspapers can more freely reflect the debates of activist groups 
like environmental organizations, but they get into difficulties when talking about women’s 
rights groups.” When the researcher asked if she thinks the activist online sites that she knows of 
have strengthened activists’ voice in the press or not, Interviewee 4 cautiously replied: “We are 
not talking about a unique media space. There were eras in which activists had a very close 
relationship with the press and there were those that we had no access to traditional media.”  She 
emphasized that “if someone says that the activists’ websites have not increased their influence 
on the newspapers, I will say I am not sure if this is due to press censorship or Internet 
ineffectiveness”. A number of other interviewed activists remarked the difficulties of accessing 
press due to state control when they were explaining the ability of their websites to bypass press 
restriction (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). 
While the major source of concern for respondents was state-imposed restrictions, a number 
of testimonies indicated that press concentration on political subjects was another factor limiting 
activists’ power to push their issues into the print media. Interviewee J4 explained that the 
majority of newspapers in Iran are owned by political figures from both the reformist and 
conservative factions. He noted that a very limited number of newspapers and journals are 
published by professional media graduates. This explanation helps understand the point that was 
brought up by Interviewee J7, who expressed that the concentration of most Iranian newspapers 
on political issues makes women’s issues underreported because women make up a smaller 
portion of the country’s politics. “The editors say we need to increase our audiences. For readers, 
political topics, which are mostly about men, are more attractive. In this situation, women-related 
topics will definitely receive less coverage.” An interviewed activist also raised this problem, but 
from a different perspective. Interviewee 11 explained that, routinely, women’s rights activists 
raise their voice through reformist and moderate newspapers. She, however, complained of the 
problem that “even the reformist press perceive women’s demands as a political dispute and 
analyze the costs and benefits of entering such disputes. Certainly, some of our demands, like a 
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bigger share in governmental posts, are related to politics but they are not any political dispute as 
such.”  
Related to this line of argumentation was the notion held by some of interviewees that the 
presence of female journalists in the editorial boards of the press increases coverage of women’s 
rights issues. Interviewee J6 and J1 provided the most comprehensive explanations for this 
factor. Interviewee J6 stated: “I think if we consider that the Internet has been successful in the 
amplification of women’s voice in the press, we should not ignore its concurrency with the 
growth of women journalists.” She said that a few years before women’s rights activists started 
using the Internet to have their voices heard, “a very precious event” happened in the Iran media 
sphere: “Journalism became extremely popular among female students. Therefore, during the 
Reform Era, a new generation of female journalists entered the press. Many of them reached the 
position of news editor.” This respondent noted that such an increase in the number of female 
journalists even resulted in the formation of associations focusing on women’s media activities50. 
According to Interviewee J1, the presence of women in the editorial boards of the press makes 
news being looked at also from a feminine perspective. Additionally, it let more women-related 
news flow into the press agenda, an assertion supported by the experiences of an interviewed 
activist, Interviewee 7: “All these years, I have worked with many female journalists. Definitely, 
we have higher access to journals with female editors.” Interviewee J1 explained that during the 
time of Ahmadinejad, the crackdown on female journalists and their ensuing emigration reduced 
the number of female editors and publishers. “This while in the current administration, the 
number of female managing editors has seen a considerable upturn
51.”  
7.1.2 Dynamism of women’s rights activism  
According to responding journalists, the press inclination for reflecting the activism issues, and 
thus attention to activists’ online media, is also influenced by the dynamism of activist groups 
and individuals on the ground. Interviewee J4 asserted that when the activism enters an inactivity 
status – even though they use online spaces to broadcast their issues – they lose a great part of 
                                                          
50 The Researcher searched for such associations. The prominent ones included the Anjomane Zanane 
Rooznamenegare Iran (Association of Female Journalists), Anjomane Zan va Resane (Association of 
Women and Media), and Anjomane Zanane Nasher (Association of Female Publishers).     
51 The percentage of female managing editors increased from 10% in 2013 to 40% in December 2016 
(Vice President of Women’s Affairs, 2016) 
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media attention. “On the contrary, you can see that the more they are engaged and operate, the 
more they receive press attention. For instance, in the months before elections when they 
presented their demands to candidates or supported women’s candidacy.” Interviewee J7 said 
when activists follow up on women’s cases on the ground, instead of just reporting them, they 
give the press more reasons to include their case in their agenda. Interviewee J1 noted that the 
prominent journals and newspapers she has worked with would cover online issues followed by 
real world activity. “When we hear that women [activists] have visited MPs or issued letters to 
officials, we feel that it is our duty to reflect their issues.” She continued: 
Unfortunately, these days, many of the women rights discourses on social media 
have become short-lived discussions. The activists speak about their concerns 
without following up on them to make them a real public cause of concern. 
Definitely, such discussions find negligible resonance in the newspapers. 
Implicit in the abovementioned quote is an underlying concern also raised by Interviewee J6. She 
firmly believed that some activists had misinterpreted their main role. “The social responsibility 
of an activist is not to broadcast news. This is up to journalists. Their responsibility is chiefly to 
react to decision-making and events in their fields. This has been overlooked in recent years.” 
She noted that she was talking about social and political activists in any field, not just women’s 
rights. This interviewee, who used activists’ online information in her reports at a minimum level 
compared to that of other interviewed journalists, said this is one of the reasons she rarely uses 
activists’ online information and works in person with specific women’s rights activists and 
NGOs involved in real world projects.  
The interview analysis shows that offline activities enhancing the activism’s media 
presentation also includes women rights’ groups’ and coalitions’ strategies and efforts in 
sourcing and contacting the Iranian press. In response to the probes relating to the third research 
question, three interviewed activists believed that what is more significant than online activities 
is having a clear plan for a media relationship. “In many cases, we defined a media strategy. We 
contacted the chosen newspapers and introduced persons [activists] they could interview,” said 
Interviewee 5. Interviewee 10 pointed at the meeting with journalists during the campaign in 
protest to revisions in the Family Protection Law (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.6; and Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2), recounting: “We owe our success to raising our voices in the press with such 
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efforts.” The significance of the activists’ media plan was raised by one interviewed journalist. 
Interviewee J2 named one of the campaign cases observed in this research, ‘Changing the 
Parliament’s Male Face/Women for Parliament’52. She explained that prominent reformist 
newspapers – including, but not limited to, Shargh, Bahar, and Etemade Melli – as well as 
numerous leading news websites, reflected and discussed the campaign’s demands. As one of the 
journalists who covered this case, she expressed a noteworthy experience:  
This [coverage of the campaign by the press] was not after the presence of the 
campaign on the Internet. We [the journalists] started to reflect on the news after 
the campaigners held a press conference and a number of meetings with the 
participation of activists, academics, and journalists. Because then we realized 
this is a serious cause.  
Theme one disclosed that the interaction between women’s rights activists’ online 
alternative media and the Iranian press should not be seen in vacuum. Such interaction 
takes place in a particular context of Iran in which the press is not truly independent in 
choosing the subjects they cover. Having to consider state-defined ‘red lines’, the Iranian 
print media’s readiness to resonate activists’ issues is greatly determined by governments’ 
standpoints toward women’s rights discourse. Such readiness also shrinks when the press 
puts the focus on political disputes, something traditionally perceived as the domain of 
men. The interviewees’ experiences also suggested that online issues have more 
opportunities to find their ways into print media when they are accompanied with the 
efforts of activists on the ground. 
7.2 Theme Two: Contributions of activists’ online media to the resonance of their issues in 
the print media   
Aside from the scale of the influence manipulated by factors raised in the previous theme, this 
theme explains how activists’ online media exerts such on the press agenda. The first sub-theme 
uncovers the primary mechanism, which is usage of the activists’ online information by print 
media journalists. The second sub-theme illustrates that the online media also contributes to the 
spread of women’s rights issues in the press by amplifying women-related reports initially 
                                                          
52 As explained in Chapter 4, the interviews with journalists started in April 2016, i.e. two months after 
the end of the campaign in February 2016.   
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produced by journalists either online or offline. With regards to the first two sub-themes, the 
interviewees’ testimonies concentrated on the impacts of both websites and SNSs. Specifically, 
with regards to SNSs, the analysis of the respondents’ experiences suggests that users of these 
sites are becoming influential intermediaries in the interplay between activists and print media. 
The final sub-theme, which is derived from the journalists’ side of the experience, uncovers that 
the day-to-day articles and analysis published by activist websites can have indirect and more 
persistent effects on the print media agenda by influencing journalists’ awareness and attitude 
toward the key debates around women’s rights.  
7.2.1 Journalists’ use of information on activists’ online media  
While two journalists expressed that they hardly consider information which is circulated by 
activists on the Internet, others spoke of the use of activist websites and SNSs as their potential 
source of news in the women’s field. These journalists’ testimonies were mostly about the use of 
online news and reports on activists’ online sites. The analysis of journalists’ interviews reveals 
that the flow of activists’ online information into journalists’ reports is controlled by the 
concerns about: (a) credibility and objectivity, and (b) the relative importance and precedence of 
such information. Despite their enthusiasm for online information gathering, these concerns 
made Interviewees J1 and J6, the oldest interviewed journalists, dismissive of the activist online 
spaces as a source of information. Pointing at one or both of these factors, the other five 
journalists spoke of the use of activists’ online information with caution. For them, these factors 
are the main filters that activists’ online information should bypass in order to be resonated in 
their reports. After these factors are outlined, this sub-theme notes a significant result about the 
way journalists make use of activists’ online information.  
 
Concerns for credibility and objectivity  
Interviewee J6, among the most prominent and experienced of Iranian newspaper reporters, was 
the most critical of the accuracy of online news. She clarified at the beginning of her interview 
that she never used online information produced by people and social actors about a social 
phenomenon, as she believed such information is far from what she has always known to be 
credible information. “There is no gate keeping on these spaces. I’d rather stick to my traditional 
sources of information.” Interviewee J1 questioned the “accuracy and objectivity” of the 
activists’ online information and that this was why such information is rarely reflected in her 
160 
 
reports. She explained that “formal online spaces” like news agencies and officials’ websites are 
her regular sources of news and that she never trusts those “online spaces which do not take 
responsibility for the accuracy of their information.”  
For the other interviewed journalists, this concern has not entirely devalued activists’ online 
reports. It was evident in their statements that they think of the Internet as less credible than their 
offline sources. Nonetheless, by applying validity measures, they use activists’ online 
broadcasted cases to get ideas for their news stories. Interviewee J2 noted:  
I think as a journalist I should consider any issue that they [the activists] raise on 
the Internet as raw data, and start researching about them to see whether they are 
real or otherwise are the result of activists’ subjective realization of the situation.  
She exemplified the case of child marriage in the rural areas of Iran. “The activists raised the 
alarm that the rate of child marriage in villages is concerning, and that the officials are ignorant 
of this problem.” She narrated that the importance of the issue encouraged her to embark on an 
inquiry with related bodies. Her investigations found that the activists were right. “As they 
warned, the rate was alarming. I was persuaded to prepare a comprehensive report on it.” 
Interviewee J3 said: “In our newspaper, we never trust online news and statistics that are spread 
by any other online sources than official news agencies. In many cases, we found the women’s 
rights activists’ information wrong.” He believed such invalid reports are particularly spread by 
activists in exile “because they are detached from the realities of the society, which cannot be 
explored without real observation, and because they often have unreliable sources.”       
Three interviewed journalists compared activist websites and SNSs profiles in terms of their 
credibility of online information. They firmly considered the websites as being a more valid 
newsgathering source. “The websites write things in a more journalistic way. They often have 
administrators who check the validity of the contents,” said Interviewee J3. Interviewee J5 said: 
“If a website publishes false information, all group members have to take responsibility. This is 
not the case with social media.” (See Chapter 5, Section 5.4 for interviewed activists’ discussion 
of the same problem.) She exemplified many fake stories spread on SNSs about domestic 
violence. “Many such stories do not make sense. Some of them are even written on very popular 
activist profiles.” Interviewee J7 remarked that the fast-paced news generation in social media 




Concern for precedence and newsworthiness  
Six out of seven journalists discussed that reporters and editorial boards of the press select cases 
from activists’ online sites which they assume are valuable and captivating to their readers. They 
pictured situations in which some women-related online reports, even if they are credible, find no 
way into print media because they do not take precedence over other social cases.  
In this regard, the first line of argumentation centered around SNSs. The previous data 
analysis chapters presented testimonies of activists who believed that SNSs in Iran hardly echo 
the voice of lower class and marginalized women (see Chapter 5, Section 5.5 and Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4.2). Intriguingly, a similar concern was explored from journalist’s assertions. Some 
journalists highlighted that a significant part of the debates on SNSs do not receive newspapers’ 
attention because they do not present the demands of a larger part of society. “We see that much 
of the subjects reflected by social media are the problem of affluent people,” said Interviewee J1. 
“Issues such as under-18 marriage do not spread on online spaces because they are not the 
problems of the middle and upper classes.” She emphasized that “women's rights movements in 
most parts of the world were started by the middle class; however, this should not result in only 
taking into consideration the middle class.” 
Sharing this view, Interviewee J2 said she does not favor hot topics on activists’ social 
networking sites pages, such as the hijab, over problems she identifies through interaction with 
the domain: “I and my newspaper ask which issues should be addressed first, the issue of the 
hijab or the Ilami women
53
 who escape their living conditions through suicide.” She then 
emphasized: “Undeniably, the living problems of the Ilami women need more attention of the 
government.” The complaint made by Interviewee J6 suggests that not all Iranian journalists care 
about the subject of their stories as much as Interviewee J2 does: 
We should not neglect the importance of real observation. Some of our journalists 
are so indolent that they find most of their news stories through the Internet. A 
large part of women’s problems in Iran do not find a way into online spaces (the 
issues of smaller cities, minorities, etc.). They do not bother themselves to explore 
these subjects and hear the voice of voiceless people. 
                                                          
53 Ilam is the capital of Ilam Province and one of the biggest Kurdish cities in Iran. 
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The other line of argumentation, according to two interviewed journalists, is that it is the 
diversity of women’s demands in the country, and the lack of a defined set of objectives among 
women’s rights groups, that strengthens journalists’ and editors’ role in rating the prominence of 
women’s rights issues. “We can hardly find common demands among women’s rights activists, 
contrary to, for instance, environmental activists,” said interviewee J2, emphasizing that “when 
the activists cannot set their priorities, it is the newspapers that decide which demands need more 
attention.” Interviewee J7 noted: “We have to define what the news value is for such subjects 
[those raised by activist online sites] because the Iranian women’s demands are very diverse. We 
should ask ourselves to what extent our readers are affected by that case.”  
Two interviewees raised the point that some of the activists’ issues have lost their appeal for 
newspapers and their audiences due to overexposure and repeated reporting. Interviewee J4 
maintained: “It happened that we did not publish a report about causes that they [women’s rights 
activists] have in hand because our editors believed that, for many people, the causes were of no 
more interest." An example of such a perception came from Interviewee J1. She exemplified the 
case of debates around women’s involvement in the political sphere:  
It is definitely a crucial issue for activists and elite women. Right! But we cannot 
expect ordinary women to constantly follow the debates that have been forming 
around this issue for decades. Ordinary women care more about tangible issues 
that have relevance to their day-to-day lives, issues like “white marriage”54.    
Statements by some interviewed journalists and activists uncovered the existence of a factor 
which can alter the press view of the prominence of cases reported by activists’ online media 
outlets: that of intensive follow-up on such cases by social media users. Interviewee J7 believed 
that when users get very sensitive about a subject, they make newspapers react. Interviewee J3 
recounted: “It happened many times that we did not cover a case at the outset. But a few days 
later, because it became a very hot topic in social media, we started to run an investigation into 
the story.” While the journalists tried to use terms like ‘persuasion’ to describe the effect of 
social media users on their news selection process, the interviewed activists believed that the 
press is ‘forced’ to carry coverage of an issue against its initial will because of a sudden 
explosion of the issue on social media. “Sometimes our [online] reports were so influential on 
                                                          
54 This refers to the growing trend of Iranian young unmarried couples living together.  
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the users that it forced the traditional media to resonate our debates,” said Interviewee 2. 
Interviewee 5 noted that in some cases the Iranian press did not wish to cover women-related 
issues, but when “the issue was spread by users on the Internet … then word of mouth 
newspapers had to talk about it because their silence was a sign of their backwardness.” It should 
be noted that such an impact by social media users was not acknowledged by those interviewed 
journalists who, as shown earlier, were skeptical of social media as an indicator of case 
prominence.  
Before ending this sub-theme, a significant result of this study about journalists’ usage of 
activists’ online information should be noted. The five journalists receptive to activists' online 
sites as sources of information revealed that they utilize these sources only to the extent of 
getting news ideas. That is to say, their use of these sites has not gone so far as to provide them 
with a new source of contacts and investigation. They consider a case brought up by an activist, 
one which could pass the aforementioned filters, as a possible news subject, and then prepare 
their reports using their traditional sources. Interviewee J2 supplied the clearest explanation for 
this trend: 
After I make sure about the accuracy of a case noted by these [activists’ online] 
sites, I start my investigations. I consider the case as a starting point but try to 
address it in its broader context. I interview MPs and officials. I ask them if they 
are aware of such cases. What are their plans to address them? Then I contact civil 
organizations and women’s rights activists. I ask them what their plan is about. 
What have you done so far? I review related reports. For instance, to prepare a 
report on child marriage, I tried to find out the divorce rate and maternal death 
rate among girls married underage. 
When asked whether she would contact the activist or organization who raised the case on the 
Internet, J2 replied: “Not when the organization’s activities do not relate to the case. I prefer to 
contact those who are responsible or who are conducting efforts or research on the field.” It was 
revealed in the previous data analysis chapters that women’s rights groups significantly use their 
online sites to inform the public about the details of their missions and activities. In spite of such 
information, neither this interviewee nor the other journalists spoke of the use of these online 




Interviewee J7 expressed that more than 70% of the links informing her reports were 
permanent. “I have been working with well-known NGOs and activists. I have known them for 
many years.” As an example, she described the time when the bill for women’s early retirement 
was proposed in Parliament
55
. Investigating the case, she contacted women MPs with whom she 
had regular contact. She also named three prominent women’s rights activists who were regular 
sources. “I called them to know about their opinion on the impact of the legislation.… I asked if 
they had made any contacts with MPs.” Interviewee J4 mentioned more explicitly that “the 
Internet might have affected my reports’ subjects, but not the individuals or organizations I speak 
to during my investigations.”   
The experience of Interviewee 1, among the most known of activists for print media 
journalists, reinforced the journalists’ testimonies. When asked about the effects of her NGO’s 
website on the coverage of her efforts by the press, she responded:  
As a matter of fact, I cannot see much change. I have been always called by the 
same journalists like X, Y, etc. The others find me after my meetings with 
officials in [the Tehran] municipality or police. In some cases, I contact the 
journalists whom I know myself, when I want to inform people about a problem.       
A closer look at the above-mentioned testimonies suggests that print media journalists mainly 
speak to prominent activists who have longer experience of working with newspapers and are 
more recognizable in the public eye. This finding is echoed by the testimonies of two young 
activists who said they did not think that their online presence would provide them with more 
opportunities of being contacted by journalists because the print media preference is to interview 
well-known activists. Interviewee 5 explained the journalists who actively write on women’s 
issues normally have a define set of links within women’s rights groups. To describe this set of 
activists Interviewee 6 used the term spokespersons: “Because of many years of co-operating 
with newspapers, they are considered by the press as our spokespersons.”  
                                                          
55 According to the bill, public organizations should accept the early retirement requests of their female 
employees if they have worked at least 20 years. A few months after the interviews, the bill was 




7.2.2 Activists’ online media amplify journalists’ reports of women’s rights cases 
This sub-theme came up from both interviewed journalists’ and activists’ observation that 
activists’ online media has also contributed to spreading women’s rights discourse in the press by 
amplifying journalists’ reported cases. It was a common experience among both groups of 
interviewees that part of the debates around women’s rights emerges from cases initially 
disclosed by print media journalists. An interviewed activist, Interviewee 8, explained: “We 
regularly monitor newspapers. Some cases that we follow up on are uncovered by newspapers, 
for instance news of new policy making.” On the other side of the story, interviewed journalists 
raised the same point: Interviewee J1: “In recent years, a number of women-related cases have 
been reported by journalists that then are followed up on by women’s rights activists. They were 
particularly written by female journalists.” Interviewee J4 maintained that: “some cases are 
initially reported by activists who have access to the field. But some are disclosed by journalists. 
We [activists and journalists] both use each others’ information.”  
The activist groups and individuals interested in women-related reports in newspapers or 
journalists’ online platforms contribute to its publicity through their online media. Interviewee 4 
pointed at the publication of such reports by activist groups’ websites: “Not only can our sites be 
used by newspapers, but newspapers can also feed our websites. A part of the articles that we 
publish on our websites is derived from newspaper reports on women-related cases.” When 
asked if her group has followed up on the case in the real world, she explained: “There were 
cases that we followed in our groups, but not always. Look! Even if we don’t follow them, 
because we reflect them on our sites, we will make it a noteworthy case for people and other 
activists.” Interviewee 2 put emphasis on the role of SNSs in such processes: 
Today, social media has given journalists the possibility of immediately spreading 
their news and interpretations. We follow their pages and share their posts, those 
that are in line with our field of activity.… I follow many journalists, especially 
on Twitter. If I find relevant posts, I will share them on my own [SNS] pages.      
The interview analysis suggested that such interaction between activists’ online sites and 
journalists amplifies journalists’ reports and expands their coverage by the press. Interviewee J7 
expressed: “The more we present a narration of an issue, the more we have prompted the press to 
inspect it.” Interviewee J4 explained his own experience: “Some of women’s [rights] websites 
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have particular sections for newspaper articles. I am sure these would be read by journalists like 
me…. Once I read a journalist’s report on these [activist] websites and asked myself why I have 
not worked on this case yet myself?” While Interviewee J6 entirely dismissed the use of 
activists’ online information in her reports, she praised the efforts of women’s rights activists in 
spreading journalists’ reports: “When activists and their readers spread our reports, it is like we 
stick our fingers in the eyes of other newspapers to gain their attention.” Among the interviewed 
activists, Interviewee 5 provided the most explanation of this process: 
Look! This is a loop. Journalists’ reports penetrate the online world. There, they 
are read by people who are not newspaper readers. There are many people who do 
not read newspapers every day but check their Facebook multiple times a day. 
The issue is repeated in the virtual world. Because of this repetition, it enters 
traditional media spaces once again and informs a larger part of the public who 
are not among our online audiences. Therefore, I think our sites and newspapers 
reinforce each other.       
The above quote and experiences expressed by the interviewed journalists provide more 
evidence for the finding raised in the previous sub-theme that a social media stir can cause 
journalists’ reaction. Interviewee J3 named two main groups of information on SNSs feeding his 
reports: “news and information” and “people’s reaction to news.” As regards the latter, he 
explained: “When our reports are published online, my colleagues and I inspect the public 
reaction. We find out if the case needs a follow-up or not.” Interviewee J5 explained: 
Sometimes we covered a case in the form of news on an event page. Later, when 
it sparked heated debate on social media, we got back to it and scrutinized it. We 
published more analysis of the case. For example, if it was a case of violence, we 
published articles about its social and psychological aspects. Therefore, in my 
opinion when [social media] users get very sensitive about a subject, they make 
the newspapers expand their coverage. 
Interviewee J7 recounted a recent case to clarify this interplay between journalists and online 
media. She said that after newspapers published reports about the parliament-government 
discussion over the women’s early retirement bill, the case soon found its way into the Internet 
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by a number of women’s rights websites. “The controversy56 that emerged amongst activists and 
people over its impacts was so great that it made us react fast. For example, we conducted 
interviews with MPs who approved and disapproved of the bill.” Testimonies by Interviewees J3 
and J5 shows that such online stirrings not only push journalists to expand their reports but also 
feed their interviews with officials. “In recent times, a very common trend is to ask officials 
about public reactions to a case that is disclosed either by us or by activists [on the Internet]," 
said Interviewee J5. Interviewee J3 asserted: "We tell officials that people have got worried 
about this situation. What is your response to them? Or we ask them about backlashes among 
activists, scholars, or experts.”  
7.2.3 Activists’ online articles affect journalists’ knowledge and attitudes towards women’s 
rights   
A significant finding of this study is that the effects of activists’ online sites on the print media 
agenda do not merely emerge from online-offline spillover, as was the case with the two 
previous mechanisms. This sub-theme suggests that the increased availability of analytical 
articles on the different aspects of women’s rights, thanks to online communication channels, can 
inspire a change in the print media agenda by influencing journalists’ knowledge and attitudes 
towards women’s rights.  
A common experience among a majority of the interviewed journalists was that of 
newspapers rarely publishing or citing activists’ online articles because opinion pieces in the 
press are routinely written by guest writers, including prominent women’s rights activists. In 
spite of this trend, five out of the seven journalists emphasized that they regularly read the 
activists’ opinions and research on their websites. The female journalists paid more attention to 
the usefulness of such articles for obtaining a coherent analysis of women’s rights issues and 
their context. Interviewee J7 explained: 
A very notable impact of the articles that activists produce on their sites is that 
they raise journalists’ knowledge and understanding of different cases pertaining 
to women. They are experts in their fields. They have done studies and field 
                                                          
56 The pivotal issue was that middle class women would bear the brunt of lowering the age of retirement 
because they prioritize progress and occupational promotion. Therefore, they would feel the harmful 
consequences of this piece of legislation. Meanwhile, lower class women who lose their lives under the 




works. So their analysis of situations sheds light on aspects we might fail to 
notice.  
This journalist emphasized that she does not directly reflect the viewpoints of activists in her 
own reports, only that such reading has influenced her perspective when she investigates a 
women-related case. Examples of such an impact came from Interviewee J2, who said activists 
had published numerous articles on their websites about the importance of women’s 
organizations to realize and expose women’s demands. “These articles notified me about the 
influence of such organizations on policy-making,” she said. “So, in some pieces of legislation, I 
paid more attention to the roles of these organizations.” Interviewee J5, meanwhile, focused on 
activists’ research and groundwork.  
Some of the activists are conducting very promising research projects and even 
journalistic investigations which impressed me a lot! For instance, the articles 
they publish about the effect of war on women in Syria and Iraq. I remember a 
few months ago, one of these websites dedicated an issue of its monthly online 
magazine to different aspects of women and war. 
When asked if reading this online magazine persuaded her to prepare a report on women and war 
herself, she said: “No. I did not follow the subject. But it did raise my awareness.”  
It is apparent that for male journalists, Interviewees J3 and J4, the impact of reading 
activists’ online items has gone beyond gaining assistance in the comprehension of women’s 
rights issues. They spoke of a more profound influence on their mindset towards not only 
women’s rights issues but also the activists themselves. Interviewee J4 remarked that “for me, 
the greatest impact of women’s websites was that they gave me sensitivity about the women’s 
rights debate.” He maintained: “I understood that their debates are around social problems, 
something which requires me, as a journalist, to think about them more seriously.” Interviewee 
J3 recounted that some years ago, when there were much less writing and analysis of women’s 
issues, he had a very limited understanding of women’s rights. “Now I know how broad this field 
is and that it encompasses a wide range of demands.” He said, for instance, that he understood 
that activist groups follow cases other than just those involving discriminatory laws, such as the 
empowerment of employed women in underprivileged cities, and giving legal assistance to 
victims of domestic violence and imprisoned women.  
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The male journalists’ experiences underline interviewed activists’ statements about the 
promises of their websites for boosting the public image of the activism (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.1.1). Their testimonies also echo the statement expressed by one of the interviewed activists: 
“The pace of spreading the egalitarian dialectic was increased by women’s websites. This turned 
many male journalists to our proponents. They started to spread this dialectic as one which 
would benefit both sexes,” said Interviewee 10.  
7.3 Discussion  
Drawing upon interviews with Iranian journalists and activists, this chapter provided an 
understanding of the influence of women’ rights activists’ online media on the Iranian press 
agenda. This section outlines the main findings of the chapter and discusses them with respect to 
the related body of literature presented in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.2).   
The first theme introduced factors which can influence the inter-media agenda-setting power 
of the activism’s online media: (a) press readiness to include women’s rights issues in their 
agenda, and (b) the dynamism of the activism. This interview theme supports the Pfetsch and 
Adam (2011) assertion that the online-offline dynamic is context–sensitive. It provided in 
particular empirical evidence for the influence of offline media outlets, country characteristics; 
as well as issue characteristics on the online-offline spillover process, properties of which have 
been explained by these authors.  
This study confirms that, as Pfetsch and Adam foreshadowed, the openness of the receiving 
media outlet influences the likelihood of spill-over. However, in the Iranian media system, such 
openness is not only defined by editorial orientation or “political leaning of the media outlet” (p. 
11), but, to a more significant degree, by state control on the mainstream press. Country 
characteristics, therefore, become influential. In a context such as Iran, with its controlled media 
system, the impact of political structure on the online-offline dynamic should be seen not only 
from the perspective of the “openness of political structure toward challengers” (p.12), but 
should also be examined in terms of the relation between political structure and mainstream 
media. In Iran, it is also the state control on the mainstream media that affects the spillover from 
activists’ online sites to the press. As demonstrated in this chapter, the online-offline spillover of 
women’s rights issues is more likely when the press is not restricted by the state to reflect upon 
women’s rights debates. With regard to issue characteristics, the case of this research supports 
Pfetsch and Adam’s anticipation that the issue fields in which challengers are active have a 
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higher chance to be reflected by the media. When women’s rights activism entered an inactivity 
mode in the offline realm, it was given less of a presence in the media agenda, in spite of having 
significant online activity. As Pfetsch et al. (2016) explained: “The rise of an issue through 
communication is dependent on collective movement actors putting resources into the fight for 
the cause” (p. 50).  
The second overarching theme revealed that activists’ online sites advance the inclusion of 
women’s rights issues in the print media agenda through three processes. First and foremost, the 
spillover of activists’ online information into Iranian print media reports, when journalists make 
use of activists’ online news and case specific reports in order to get ideas for news subjects. In 
accordance with earlier empirical studies (Casero-Ripolles & Feenstra, 2012; Lester & Hutchins, 
2009; Mico & Ripones, 2014), this investigation shows that the selection of activists’ online 
information by print media journalists occurs in the case of women’s rights activism. It is a 
process, however, that is restricted by journalists’ concern about the credibility and objectivity of 
activists’ online reports and the prominence and newsworthiness of their cases. Compared to the 
former concern, which is definitely not particular to the Iranian context, the second concern is 
more associated with the characteristics of Iranian women’s rights activism. When issues 
addressed by women’s rights activists are varied and there is no agreement over demand 
priorities, print media journalists and editors have more power to define the prominence of 
activists’ issues.   
This chapter exposed a noteworthy finding: Despite the concern that SNSs are not 
representative of the totality of Iranian society, the online stir created on these sites is influential 
upon journalists’ reports. All three data analysis chapters exposed a very recurrent assertion that 
SNSs in Iran marginalize the voice of the lower class in favor of the middle and upper. However, 
this chapter illustrated that it has become a trend among journalists and the press to measure the 
newsworthiness of their cases with social media users’ reaction. While applying such measures 
can increase the resonance of women’s related cases in the Iranian press – as suggested by some 
interview testimonies in this chapter - it remains an open question that if it can contribute to the 
further marginalization of social groups absent on social media.     
The analysis of activists and journalists’ responses reveals that activists’ self-presentation on 
the Internet has not evidently affected journalists’ sources of contacts and investigation. For the 
journalists interviewed in this study, activists’ online information impacted the subject of their 
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reports without entailing any evident change in their investigation process. Like journalists in 
Jha’s (2007, 2008) studies, these journalists preferred to stick to their traditional informants, 
mainly high-profile activists. This chapter cannot conclude that all Iranian journalists are 
resistant to the use of activists’ online sites to identify new informants. However, the absence of 
such evidence in this study is noteworthy as the interviews were conducted with journalists from 
seven prominent Iranian newspapers. Additionally, the activists’ side of the experience conveyed 
the same result. The studies as such can complement the examinations by public relations 
practitioners who have examined activists’ deployment of their webpages in building a 
relationship with conventional media journalists (e.g. Reber & Kim, 2006). While Chapter 5 
uncovered women’s rights activists’ efforts in increasing their public visibility through their 
websites and SNSs, this chapter shows that this opportunity is not well exploited by print media 
journalists.    
This study also revealed a second process through which activists’ online platforms act as an 
agenda-builder in the women’s rights field: When activists reflect and/or follow journalists’ 
reports on their online sites, they contribute to the amplification of activism’s related issues in 
the print media. Also, activists’ and social media users’ reactions to a publicized case persuade 
the publication of follow-up reports. The interview analysis suggests that the activism and print 
media have had mutual agenda-building impacts. It was not only the activists who could affect 
media agenda, but on many other occasions, activists followed a case initially broadcasted by 
journalists of print media. When activists’ online sites in harmony with their social media users 
echo these cases, they capture the attention of more journalists.  
The third identified influence of activists’ online media on the press bears evident signs of a 
longer term change in the relationship between women’s rights activists and journalists of print 
media. It was revealed that besides affecting journalists’ knowledge, activists’ online opinion 
articles can leave a more profound impact on journalists’ mindset toward women’s rights issues. 
These articles can create a sensibility for journalists, who are mentally detached from women’s 
rights discourse. In the case of this study, this effect was particularly witnessed in male 
journalists. They considered reading activists’ online information as a determinant factor in 
gaining interest to covering women’s rights issues. Through her empirical study, Jha (2008) 
claimed that journalists’ attitudes and dispositions towards movements may affect the 
democratizing impact of the Internet on print media. The final sub-theme in this chapter suggests 
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that the impact is not one way, but mutual.  The attitude of journalists toward activist groups can 
be enhanced by the awareness-building power of activists’ online media, which can, 


























CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
  
This thesis began with a key concern: to explore how the Internet has affected Iranian activists. It 
has concentrated on women’s rights activism, among the most prominent and dynamic activist 
circles in the country. It contributes to a growing body of critical research on Internet-mediated 
communication for activism, in which countries like Iran with their own social and political 
particularities have been insufficiently examined. The three data analysis chapters of this thesis 
have provided empirical findings in response to three research questions directing the 
investigation of this research on women’s rights activists: (1.) How has Internet utilization 
affected the activism’s public communication? (2.) How has Internet utilization affected the 
activism’s internal relations? and (3.) How has the activists’ online media affected the resonance 
of women’s rights issues in the traditional Iranian press? This concluding chapter will not 
summarize all these findings again, as was done in the previous chapters’ discussion sections. 
Instead, it sheds light on the implications of these new findings for theory, practice, and future 
research. It also highlights the main limitations of this study.      
8.1 Theoretical Implications 
The discussion sections in the data analysis chapters discussed the findings of this study in light 
of previous ones. This concluding chapter takes the contribution to the existing knowledge one 
level further. Aggregating the findings of the promises and pitfalls of Internet deployment for 
women’s rights activists’ public communication, internal relations, as well as for their media 
presentation, this section provides insights on the grand theories that were denoted in the 
theoretical framework chapter to help understand the conceptual framework of the study, 
namely: (a) social movements’ opportunity structure, framing process, and mobilization 
structure; and (b) agenda-setting and agenda-building.  
8.1.1 Social movements’ opportunity structure, framing process, and mobilization 
structure  
Despite the fact that opportunity structure, framing process, and mobilization structure have been 
widely referenced in the social movement literature (see e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1996), very few empirical studies have openly discussed the relationship between these 
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components of the social movement paradigm and the Internet. The results of this study have 
implications for the understanding of this relationship, particularly in terms of social movements 
operating in a transitional political context with a constant closing and opening of the civil 
society.  
The opportunity structure, in particular political opportunity, for social movements within 
the Iranian context is more dynamic and less predictable compared to societies benefitting from 
more autonomy of civil society, and more stable policies toward democratic entities. For 
instance, as explained in Chapter 2, women’s rights activists experienced the most serious 
crackdowns on their activities by the Ahmadinejad administration, after they had gained 
unprecedented ground for resisting, bargaining, and pressing for women’s rights during the 
Reform Era of Khatami’s presidency. In such a political context, the consequences of the Internet 
for social movements in terms of opportunity structure can be viewed from two perspectives. 
First, online communication assists in circumventing periodical restrictions imposed by the 
political structure. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated how the Internet moderated the impacts of 
crackdown on the activists’ public and internal communication, especially during the two terms 
of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Women’s rights activists deploy the Internet to maintain their 
communication line with the Iranian people when press freedom is restricted, and to protect their 
internal network when face-to-face meetings entail high security costs. Second, the ability to 
bypass state and press regulations over the flow of information causing a more independent 
framing process can generate a longer-term enhancement of the opportunity structure. Although 
the Internet itself is not free from government control, it has provided Iranian women’s rights 
activists with an alternative media to spread frames about their causes, objectives, and activities 
more independently and frequently. It has enabled them to challenge frames describing them and 
their issues wrongly; those that were either developed by their opponent within the state to 
downplay their legitimacy or were created by people due to a lack of access to reliable 
information sources about such activism. This has offered the women’s rights movement three 
possibilities that can enhance the environment for its activities, and therefore its opportunity 
structure: (a) creating greater societal awareness of the activism and its issues (see Chapter 5, 
Section 5.1-5.3); (b) moderating politicians’ antagonistic attitudes and behavior toward women’s 
rights demands and towards the activists themselves(see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2); and (c) 
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influencing journalists’ knowledge and viewpoints toward women’s rights discourse (see 
Chapter 7, Section 7.2.3).  
Whether the Internet is deployed as a replacement to the activists’ restricted offline meeting 
venues or is utilized as a complement to their face-to-face interactions, it aids the mobilization 
structure of the women’s rights movement and its participant groups. The first aspect of 
mobilization structure in McCarthy’s (1996) well-cited definition of mobilization structure, 
presented in Chapter 3, is concerned with the mechanism of engagement in collective actions. At 
the movement level, websites and e-mail groups stimulate interactivity and collectivity among 
women’s rights groups. Over the past decade, through their websites, the activist groups have 
identified each other with common objectives, paving the way for future collaboration and 
coalitions. In addition, e-mail groups have played a key role in planning and coordinating 
coalitions and partnerships between the movement actors. At the level of activist groups, such e-
mail groups have facilitated collective decision-making with the participation of more individual 
activists, including previously excluded geographically dispersed and young activists.  
This study’s investigation of the way women’s rights activists have utilized Internet 
communication suggests that the activist groups’ websites and SNSs have also affected the 
second aspect of mobilization structure in McCarthy’s (1996) definition: activists’ tactical 
repertoire. A finding emerged in this study supports the argument that the Internet not only 
supports, but also extends, activists’ existing tactics (see Vegh 2003; Van Laer & Van Aelsts, 
2010): The Internet has developed the activists’ tactic of raising public awareness and support to 
include activists’ self-presentation – for, prior to the advent of the Internet, through the print 
media, activists could mainly promote only their issues and not themselves. Moreover, for 
women’s rights activists, Internet utilization has gone beyond the extension of existing tactics 
and has created new action possibilities as well, as indeed was foreshadowed by Wells (2015). 
Websites and SNSs have been utilized for an action possibility rarely existing in the activists’ 
offline repertoire of action: mobilizing the public for (online) collective action. It should be 
noted that such mobilization has not been for actions on the ground, but for online actions, such 
as electronic petitions and online photo campaigns. Therefore, the activists’ offline repertoire of 
action still does not include participation of the mass public. However, since Internet utilization, 
the activism has started to promote its public support by calling on Internet users to online 
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collective actions. In line with the non-confrontational nature of the movement, such online 
actions are persuasive and do not include confrontational tactics, such as virtual sit-ins. 
While contributing to the knowledge about the potential of Internet-mediated 
communication, the results of this study have had significant implications for understanding the 
unintended consequences of the Internet, specifically individual SNSs profiles, on social 
movements’ framing process and mobilization structure.  
Social movement theorists have emphasized that the development of social movements’ 
frames is a contested process between different movement actors who take different positions 
(e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Actors in the women’s rights movement 
have different ideological orientations (secular, religious, modern, and traditional) and address 
demands of women from different social classes and geographical areas. As noted in the 
Introduction, as a new social movement, the women’s rights movement operates through a 
decentralized and leaderless network of activist groups and individuals. Due to these 
characteristics, reaching a frame unity and consensus in describing their objectives and priorities 
is a very challenging task. For this movement, e-mail groups have facilitated negation over 
internal disagreements in defining and describing movement objectives and activities. In 
addition, websites and social networking sites profiles affiliated with women’s rights groups and 
campaigns have supplied the activism with public platforms to publish the collectively defined 
frames. However, this study reveals that the activists’ individual profiles on SNSs have 
challenged the movement’s framing unity. Through these profiles, some women’s rights activists 
disseminate frames of collective actions which have not been validated by discourse and debates 
within activist groups. Therefore, the empirical findings of this study raise the possibility that, 
unlike the frames published through activists’ collective online spaces, the movements’ frames 
disseminated through individual activists’ SNSs profiles remain as individual interpretations of a 
movement’s actions because they are not built through a discursive, strategic, and contested 
framing process (see e.g. Benford & Snow, 2000 for discussion of movements framing process). 
While the literature has focused on Internet opportunities and threats in terms of the flow of 
movements’ frames to the public, by this discussion this study also draws attention to Internet 
effects on the development of collective frames.  
The evidence obtained from this study also suggests that social movements’ mobilization 
structure could be under threat by the growth of individual online social networking activities. It 
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was revealed that SNSs distract women’s rights activists from participation in collective actions 
by offering them more public recognition and less personal costs. Also on these sites, individual 
activists tend to put emphasis on their individual gains rather than the activism’s collective 
achievements. Such a trend threatens the activists’ collective identity, and consequently their 
engagement in collective actions. 
This thesis contributes to the theoretical debate on ICTs and collective identity as a key 
element of new social movements’ mobilization structure by suggesting that different Internet 
technologies can entail different impacts on collective identity. For women’s rights activism, 
while e-mail groups and websites foster collaboration, direct and individual channels that 
personal SNSs profile provide for activists' public communication encourage individualism and 
damage the sense of unity. Activists’ e-mail groups are a means of strategic planning and 
deliberation. However, their SNSs profiles act as window-dressing: in other words, a lot of ideas 
but no strategy. Within e-mail groups, negotiation about aspects of the activism take place in 
private. The aim is to reach convergence and consensus. On the contrary, on individual social 
networking sites profiles, since the frame contest occurs on a public stage, the principal aim is to 
promote the legitimacy of personal interpretations and to gain more public recognition. When 
they are being watched by the public, activists do not negotiate but instead manifest the 
individual meanings they insert to women’s rights activism. 
8.1.2 Agenda-setting and agenda-building     
This study emphasizes the recent call that the classical agenda-setting theory should be revisited 
by taking into consideration the contribution of online media in shaping the public agenda (see 
e.g. McCombs, 2005, 2014; Weimann & Brosius, 2016). The research suggests that in recent 
years a new landscape for agenda-setting on women’s rights issues has been created in Iran. The 
activists’ alternative Internet media has challenged the press power in directing the public agenda 
on women’s rights issues. Chapter 5 illustrated how activists’ websites and SNSs pages inform 
the public on issues that cannot bypass mainstream press restrictions. Chapter 7 showed that 
even when an issue can circumvent the press filters, journalists may still lag behind activists’ 
online sites and social media users in reporting issues. Also, by gaining an unprecedented 
opportunity for self-presentation through their online public platforms, women’s rights groups 
seek to build a portrayal of themselves and their movement as not being mediated by the press 
and state. As was foreshadowed by recent agenda-setting thinkers (McCombs, 2005), under this 
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new informational environment, the Iranian public can receive a more diverse agenda on 
women’s issues. Especially with the growth of activists’ individual SNSs profiles, people are 
provided with more heterogeneous accounts of an issue, albeit the effect of this possibility on the 
Iranian public is yet to be uncovered. A serious question is: Will the diversity of perspectives on 
individual activists’ SNSs profiles lead to fragmentation of public debate, as was warned by 
Habermas (2006)? 
This thesis has also disclosed that activists’ online alternative media has both a first- and 
second-level agenda-building influence on the Iranian print media agenda. Evidence from 
interviews with journalists and activists shows that the activism’s online sites influence the print 
media at the first-level of agenda-building via two processes: (a) print media journalists making 
use of activists’ online news and case specific reports in order to get ideas for news subjects (see 
Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1); and (b) women-related reports initially produced by journalists either 
online or offline being subsequently amplified by activists’ online sites and their social media 
followers, consequently capturing more attention of the press (see Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2). It 
was revealed that in both processes, the online stir created by social media users has the potential 
to affect press decision about the newsworthiness of a case. When the activists’ online issues are 
promoted by online users, they gain more coverage in journalists’ reports. Thus, the research 
suggests that in this era, social media users can act as catalyst in enhancing the agenda-building 
influence of activists’ alternative media. 
This study has provided no evidence to show that print media journalists also reflect 
attributes in activists’ online reports. Indeed, the journalists interviewed in this study used such 
reports only to the extent of getting ideas for subjects of their reports. It suggests, however, that 
the relationship between activists’ online media and print media journalists generate an effect 
which can result in second-level agenda-building. The experience of interviewed journalists 
showed that, although attributes in opinion articles published through activist websites are not 
directly resonated in their reports, these articles enhance their knowledge of women’s rights and 
help them scrutinize related issues from new angles. Therefore, such online articles inspire a 
change in their perspective when developing coverage of women-related cases.  
8.2 Recommendations for Future Practice 
From the start, the researcher’s intention was to develop a study that, in addition to contributing 
to the theoretical field, would be used by the country’s activists as an empirical and objective 
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assessment of the consequences of the Internet for Iranian activism. This study suggests that for 
women’s rights activists, Internet-mediated communication has opened the prospects for 
independency from the mainstream media and government restrictions in spreading their causes 
and attaining public support; has improved their media presentation; has stimulated more 
interactivity and collaborations among and within activist groups; and has enhanced participation 
of dispersed and low-profile individual activists in decision-making processes and collective 
action. At the same time, the study alerts the downsides of individual utilization of SNSs by 
these activists. Due to the rise of activism 2.0 and the growing importance of social networking 
sites in Iran’s socio-political sphere, this section offers two recommendations for the future 
practice of women’s rights activists on these sites: social media education for individual activists, 
and more collective and strategic usage of social networking sites. These recommendations can 
be also used by other Iranian activists to prevent the pitfalls of social media use explored in this 
study.    
It should be highlighted that due to the high pace of advancement in technology, a 
noteworthy change has happened in Iran’s online sphere since the research fieldwork: social 
messaging applications have been gaining popularity amongst the Iranian public and activists. 
Given the fact that SNSs and social messaging applications are both faces of social media and 
developed around social networking platforms and user-generated content technology, the 
following suggestions can be also helpful for the deployment of social messaging applications, 
although further research is needed to explore the impacts emerging from the particular features 
of this new social media technology and the ways in which they are utilized by Iranian activists.         
The results of this study revealed that women’s rights activism has been damaged by a 
number trends on social networking sites. To wit: an unreliable and shallow presentation of 
activism issues; emphasis on personal rather than collective understanding of activism objectives 
and actions; aiming to gain the approval of social media users, causing the propagation of 
individual activities and achievements rather than collective gains; distraction from on-the-
ground activities; and overlooking the demands of women marginalized on social media. These 
trends indicate that the online behavior of women’s rights activists on SNSs is in serious need of 
revision. The solution would be not to reduce individual online social networking activities, 
because as this study has revealed, the individual profiles on SNSs have empowered, in 
particular, younger and lower profile activists and have added to the number of communication 
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channels with the Iranian public. Activists can use the results of this study to develop their own 
solution to tackle the problem. Meanwhile, this study suggests that a reasonable approach would 
be to educate individual activists on the harmful impacts of social media and its effective usage. 
These activists may not be fully aware of how they can hurt their collective identity when they 
overstress their personal ideas and achievements on their social media profiles. They do not 
know how to use these online sites for their individual activities in a way that does not threaten 
the unity of the activism. The activists would need to be reminded that their online social 
networking activities can distract them from their collective responsibilities; and turn them from 
an activist to a slacktivist. They would also need training on the principles of content generation 
on SNS in order to maintain the quality of their public information. In addition, to increase 
public support for the women’s rights movement, they could benefit from analytical articles on 
the role of social media in today’s movements, and how activists in the world are effectively 
using these online technologies.   
Although individual activists are personally urged to raise their media knowledge, it is 
recommended that activist groups take the main responsibility for giving activists the skills 
needed in the new media environment. Chapter 6 reported observations of varying types of 
materials on activist groups’ websites to educate activists on various aspects of the activism. In 
an era in which social media has become a key activist media and a political tool, women’s rights 
activist groups are urged to include social media training as educational subjects on their online 
sites, otherwise they would leave behind their target elements within the Iranian government, 
which have initiated a strategic and planned usage of social media to increase their public 
legitimacy (see Naeli, 2013).  
The activist groups are also urged to develop a more collective and strategic use of SNSs.  
While the evidence of this study suggests that women’s rights activist groups act more 
successfully in the utilization of SNSs than individual activists, the former use these sites as a 
complementary platform to websites and, in a very similar way, for top down information 
dissemination to the public. This study showed that activist groups and campaigns have not fully 
exploited the interactive and network building potential of this online technology. In addition to 
their dialogic features, these sites also provide cost-effective and high-speed content production 
platforms; and as push mediums, they can gain the attention of people who are not interested in 
women’s rights discourse. Considering the unique communication features of these sites, their 
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growing popularity among Iranians, and their increased usage by politicians to affect public 
opinion, this study recommends the activist groups increase their social media presence. 
However, this study suggests a definite need for developing capacities and strategy for an 
effective deployment of social networking sites. When there is no clear and agreed-upon social 
media strategy, the groups cannot take maximum advantage nor avoid its downsides.  
8.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of unavoidable limitations to this study. As mentioned previously in Chapter 
4, the research was faced with two data access problems that might have affected its 
investigation. First, it has suffered from a common weakness of online observation: lack of 
access to private messages. While interviewees’ testimonies about the activist websites and SNSs 
were triangulated through observational analysis, it is due to this problem that the represented 
findings about activists’ internal communication through e-mail groups should only be read as an 
analysis of interview data. In spite of this problem, due to the representative combination of the 
interviewed activists, and the fact that there was no considerable contradiction between the 
interviewees’ statements about e-mail communication, these findings are still noteworthy. 
Second, the study was limited by access to women’s rights activists who left the country, 
particularly after the 2009 protests. Although the chief focus on the interviewees’ selection was 
on activists in the country, the researcher's intention was also to reflect the viewpoints of 
diaspora activists who are still involved with the women’s rights movement in Iran. 
Unfortunately, all efforts at convincing them for an interview failed. For this reason, what this 
research presents about the Internet activities of these activists is based on the experience of their 
fellow activists in the country.           
An additional limitation to this study was imposed by virtue of its research design. The 
qualitative analysis of this study allowed for a rich understanding of the impacts of Internet-
mediated communication on women’s rights activists. The important question is to what extent 
the results of this study can be extended to other Iranian activists. Any attempt to generalize the 
results about the case of women’s rights activists to activists of other fields should be verified 
carefully particularly for two reasons. First, this research proved that a great many of the impacts 
of the Internet, particularly the downside of SNSs’ deployment, has been linked with the 
behaviors of individual women’s rights activists. Social media usage and the habits of other 
activists may follow different patterns depending on their personal and professional situations. 
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As Donmoyer (2000) noted, during his call for rethinking the notion of generalizability in social 
science, “in the fields in which there is a concern with individuals, not just aggregates, all 
research findings are tentative” (p. 52). Second, this study illustrated that women’s rights 
activism’s characteristics influence its relationship with the Internet. Activist groups working on 
other domains may have different experiences with Internet utilization due to their particularities. 
For example, it was discussed that the benefits of the Internet for women’s rights activism’s 
internal cooperation is stimulated by the decentralized organizational structure of activist groups 
and the enthusiasm for co-operation amongst these groups. The application of these benefits to 
Iranian activists who do not operate within such a co-operative network should be done with 
caution. This research also uncovered that the role that the Internet has gained as women’s rights 
activists’ alternative media, also as an internal communication channel, is to a large extent 
related to its ability to bypass state control and monitoring. The Internet might not play the same 
role for activists faced with fewer restrictions due to their raising issues not perceived by the 
state to be potentially destabilizing.  
It is important to note that although the particularities of women’s rights activism limit the 
generalizability of its results, it nonetheless offers projects beyond itself, the factors of which 
could manipulate the impacts of Internet-mediated communication on activists, such as the 
aforementioned government control and internal organizational structure. The achieved results 
about women’s rights activists also alarm activists in other fields about the potential harm of the 
Internet. They also form questions for investigation in future studies on other activism cases.    
8.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
At least four potential directions for future investigation about the social and political potential of 
the Internet in Iran have emerged from this research. First, more research is required on Iranian 
activism in the Internet age. As mentioned in Chapter One, the current study is among the very 
few academic empirical works on Iranian activists’ usage of the Internet technologies. It is 
unable to represent the wider population of Iranian activists due to its single-case study design. 
Therefore, its results should be supplemented by future research on other areas of Iranian 
activism. Such research might elaborate upon the findings emerged from this study. For example, 
findings about the impacts of women’s rights activists’ SNSs profiles can inspire future research 
on how collective actions and identities among other Iranian activists are affected by social 
media. Or, while this study illustrates that state control has influenced the utilization and impacts 
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of the Internet on women’s rights activists, further studies could be conducted to determine how 
the functions and impacts of online communication differ for challengers, such as environmental 
activists, who are facing less state control. This comparative approach might provide more 
consistent, even more generalizable, knowledge about Internet-mediated communication among 
Iranian activists.  
Second, further work could attempt to unravel the anatomy of Iranians using the Internet for 
socio-political expression. The analysis of interview data in this study supplied initial insights 
into the reproduction of social class inequalities on social media. Both groups of interviewees, 
activists and journalists, made the assumption that, on SNSs, the voices of the lower class of 
society are marginalized mainly in favor of the urban middle class. This assumption throws up 
questions in need for future investigation. How much does the Internet make it possible for a 
society’s lower class and marginalized groups to make their voices heard? To what extent are the 
demands of the lower class echoed on social media similarly to the demands of the middle and 
upper class of that society? While much of the speculation on Iranian social media concentrates 
on restrictions imposed on public online participation by external factors such as state control 
and Internet access inequalities, research is also required in determining the relationship between 
the demographic and social factors of online users and the status they could attain in online 
discussions. It is also recommended that such research engage with theoretical debates on the 
Internet as a new public sphere. Has the ‘virtual space’ in Iran, “a forum for political 
deliberation”, elevated into a ‘virtual sphere’ which “could facilitate discussion that promotes 
democratic exchange of ideas and opinions” (Papacharissi, 2002, p. 11)? Do social groups of 
Iranian society experience freedom and equality in expressing their viewpoints on social media? 
Third, as little is yet understood empirically about the agenda-building power of online 
alternative media in Iran, further research in this field would be of great theoretical and practical 
significance. The findings of Chapter 7 supplied evidence of the resonance of activists’ online 
information in the print media agenda and, inversely, the spillover of women-related reports 
from print media into activists' online sites. However, it was beyond the scope and time span of 
this research to study this two-way spillover via content analysis. Therefore, future inter-media 
research might be carried out based on quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the Iranian 
activists’ online sites and the country’s press to examine the online-offline transition of issues 
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and frames. This would extend and triangulate the interview findings of this study and draw 
more decisive conclusions.  
Finally, future research could move the debate forward by investigating the impacts of 
online alternative media on the political agenda. Also, public engagement in political issues 
through social media highlights the need to include the public as a key force in such studies. Of 
particular interest is finding out if and how the role of Iranian civil society actors in policy 
making is affected by this new media environment. Do civil society organizations experience any 
change in their relationship with administrations by deployment of the Internet? And how does 
the political structure of the country limit or facilitate the influence of the Internet on the political 
agenda? Therefore, further research could explore the macro-level effects of online alternative 
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Appendix A: Semi-structured Interview Questions  
 
Interview with women’s rights activists: 
Part One: Related to RQs 1 & 2 
1. How have you been using the Internet for your tasks as a social activist?  
 Probes included: 
o How have you and the groups you have worked with used the Internet in your 
communication with the Iranian people?  
o How have you and the groups you have worked with used the Internet in your 
internal relations? 
2. How do you perceive the effects of your online activities in your communication with the 
public? 
 Probes included: 
o How do you assess the advantages? 
o Have you experienced any challenge or an unintended impact? 
3. In a broader context, have you witnessed any change in terms of women’s rights activism’s 
public communication since the activists have utilized online communication? 
4. How do you perceive the effects of your online activities in your relationship with other 
activists and with the activist groups you work with? 
 Probes included: 
o How do you assess the benefits? 
o Have you experienced any challenges or an unintended impact? 
5. In a broader context, have you witnessed any change in terms of women’s rights’ groups’ 
relationship with their members and with other activist groups since they have utilized the 




Part Two: Related to RQ3 
6. How do you perceive the effects of activists’ online information on the print media agenda? 
 Probes included:  
o If you think you have influenced the press through the Internet, can you be more 
specific? 
o What do you think of the possible reasons, if you think there is no influence?  
7. Have you had any relationship with print media journalists during your causes? If yes, has 
your online presence affected this relationship? 
Closing question: Is there anything you regret saying, any answer you would like to revise, or 
anything you would like to add? 
Interview with the print media journalists 
1. How do you perceive the influence of women’s rights activists’ online media on your 
reports? 
2. Do you use activists’ online information during your coverage of women’s related issues? 
 Probes included:  
o How do you use this information and to what extent? 
o If you do not consider this information in your reports, what are the reasons?  
2. Can you think of any other ways in which your reports about women’s issues are influenced 
by activists’ online sites? 
3. Do you consider women’s rights activists as your source of information? If yes, have you 
experienced any change in your relationship with the activists that can be attributed to the 
Internet? 
Closing question: Is there anything you regret saying, any answer you would like to revise, or 




Appendix B: Zusammenfassung der Forschungsergebnisse/ Summary of the 
results 
 
Die Dissertation untersucht den Einfluss von internetbasierter Kommunikation (IBK) auf 
Iranischen Frauenrechtsaktivismus. Damit wird die Rolle des Internets im Kontext eines der 
wichtigsten und dynamischsten Aktivismusfelder im Iran und der Region analysiert. Die 
empirische Untersuchung wird von drei Forschungsfragen geleitet, die über eine 
Auseinandersetzung mit Charakteristika von Frauenrechtsaktivismus und dem empirischen und 
theoretischen Forschungsstand von IBK für Aktivismus und soziale Bewegungen hergeleitet 
wurden. Diese lauten: „Wie hat die Internetnutzung die öffentliche Kommunikation von 
FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen verändert?“, „Welchen Einfluss hat Internetnutzung auf die internen 
Beziehungen von FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen?“ und „Wie haben die Online Medien der 
AktvistInnen die Rezeption von Frauenrechtsfragen in der Iranischen Presse beeinflusst?“ 
Methodologisch wurde zur Beantwortung der ersten beiden Fragen ein Methodenmix aus 
qualitativen Interviews mit FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen und Beobachtung von Onlineaktivitäten 
von Frauenrechtsgruppen und -kampagnen durchgeführt. Daten zur Beantwortung der dritten 
Forschungsfrage wurden über qualitative Interviews mit FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen und Print- 
JournalistInnen gesammelt. Die Datenauswertung eröffnet neue und bedeutende Perspektiven auf 
die Nutzung und den Einfluss dreier Internet-Technologien, die zum Zeitpunkt der 
Datenerhebung von FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen größtenteils genutzt wurden: E-Mail–Listen, 
Webseiten und Soziale Netzwerke.  
Die Ergebnisse mit Blick auf die erste Forschungsfrage zur Nutzung von IBK zur 
Kommunikation „nach außen“, konzentrieren sich auf Webseiten und Soziale Netzwerke. Diese 
zeigen, dass Frauenrechtsgruppen und individuelle AkteurInnen von der Nutzung von Webseiten 
und Sozialen Netzwerken hauptsächlich dadurch profitieren, dass Restriktionen von klassischen 
Printmedien umgangen und die Kontrolle über öffentlich zugängliche Informationen von Seiten 
der AktivistInnen beibehalten werden kann. Soziale Netzwerke dezentralisieren zudem die 
öffentliche Kommunikation der Aktivistinnen, indem auch low-profile AktivistInnen sichtbarer 
werden, die im Gegensatz zu high-profile AktivistInnen auf den Webseiten und den Printmedien 
häufig unterrepräsentiert sind. Zudem stellen soziale Netzwerke und zu einem kleineren Teil 
auch Webseiten, Kommunikationskanäle zwischen AktivistInnen und deren Audiences in beide 
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Richtungen bereit. Die Studie zeigt allerdings auch, dass Soziale Netzwerke neben ihrer 
emanzipatorischen Rolle, der öffentlichen Kommunikation der AktivistInnen in zwei Formen 
schaden: Erstens leidet die Qualität des Aktivismus-Diskurses auf Grund der informellen 
Kommunikationsformen und einem stärkeren Fokus auf die individuellen Profile der 
AktivistInnen. Zweitens, auf Grund starker Disparitäten in Internetzugang und -nutzung im Land 
ist die Audience der Online-Medien der AktivistInnen stark beschränkt und repräsentiert nicht 
die Iranische Gesellschaft.  
In Bezug auf die zweite Fragestellung zeigen die Studienergebnisse erstens, dass Email-Listen 
als wichtigste Internettechnologie zur Kommunikation untereinander und zwischen Gruppen von 
AktivistInnen genutzt werden. Im Gegensatz zu Treffen offline erleichtern sie kollektive 
Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse, indem auch geographisch weit auseinanderliegenden 
AktivistInnen einbezogen werden können, gleichzeitig sind sie kostengünstiger und tragen 
weniger Sicherheitsrisiken. Zudem weist die Studie nach, dass die konventionelleren Formen 
von IBK, namentlich Webseiten und Email-Gruppen, die kollektive Identität der AktivistInnen 
stärken und Kollaborationen im weiteren Netzwerk  anregen. Drittens, das Angebot von 
Aktivismus-Webseiten mobilisiert den Austausch relevanten Wissens unter verschiedenen 
Frauenrechtsgruppen.  Gleichzeitig allerdings kann, viertens, die Nutzung Sozialer Netzwerke 
einzelner AktivistInnen Spannungen innerhalb der Frauenrechtsnetzwerke  hervorrufen und die 
kollektive Identität der AktivistInnen gefährden. Die individualisierte (Selbts-)Darstellung von 
AktvistInnen auf Sozialen Netzwerken fördern Slactivism, indem narzisstische Repräsentationen 
begünstigt und AktivistInnen von ihrer Partizipation im Kollektiv „auf der Straße“ abgelenkt 
werden. 
Bezüglich der dritten Forschungsfrage zeigt die Analyse, dass Möglichkeiten des Agenda- 
Settings über die Nutzung von Online-Kommunikation von FrauenrechtsaktivistInnen durch 
zwei voneinander abhängigen Faktoren beeinflusst wird. Der erste Faktor ist die Offenheit der 
Printmedien, Frauenrechte auf ihre Agenda zu setzen. Diese Bereitschaft ist nicht nur auf 
redaktionelle Leitlinien, sondern zu einem bedeutenderen Anteil auch auf staatliche 
Restriktionen zurückzuführen. Der zweite Faktor betrifft Aktivismusformen und -dynamiken. 
Wenn der Frauenrechtsaktivismus offline eher inaktiv ist, hat dies auch Konsequenzen für die 
Präsenz in den klassischen Medien, auch wenn zu dem Zeitpunkt signifikante Online-aktivitäten 
verfolgt werden.  
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Neben Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die Frauenrechts-Agenda, welche von diesen beiden Faktoren 
abhängen, identifiziert die Studie drei Mechanismen, welche effektiv Resonanz zu 
Frauenrechtsthemen in Printmedien erzeugen: Erstens, JournalistInnen nutzen Online-News und 
Fall-Reporte der AktivistInnen zur Berichterstattung und Erarbeitung eigener Ideen. Zweitens 
werden Artikel von JournalistInnen, welche Frauenrechte thematisieren, von Online-Präsenzen 
der AktivstInnen geteilt und zusätzlich von deren Followern auf Sozialen Netzwerken 
vervielfältigt. Damit wird mehr Aufmerksamkeit für die klassischen Medien erzeugt. Drittens 
beeinflussen die von AktivistInnen online veröffentlichten Artikel das Wissen und die Haltung 
von JournalistInnen gegenüber den AktivistInnen und den von ihnen aufgegriffenen 
Problemstellungen.  
Die gesammelten empirischen Ergebnisse dieser Studie leisten einen innovativen Beitrag zur 
Forschung zu Internet und Aktivismus im Kontext von sich stetig öffnenden und schließenden 
Freiräumen für die Zivilgesellschaft. 
 
Summary of the results 
The objective of this thesis is to explore the impacts of Internet-mediated communication on 
Iranian women’s rights activism. This activism provides a window to understanding the role of 
the Internet in the context of one of the most prominent and dynamic activist circles in Iran and 
the region. The empirical investigation was directed by three research questions derived from a 
review of the characteristics of women’s rights activism and the extant theoretical and empirical 
studies about online communication for activism and social movements. To wit: “How has 
Internet utilization affected women’s rights activists’ public communication?”, “How has 
Internet utilization affected the activists’ internal relations?”, and “How has the activists’ online 
media affected the resonance of women’s rights issues in the Iranian press?” The methodological 
approach taken to answer the first two research questions was a mixed methodology based on 
qualitative interviews with women’s rights activists and observation of the online activities of 
women’s rights groups and campaigns. The data for the third research question was collected 




The interview and observational analyses in this investigation has generated a fresh, in-depth 
insight into the patterns of use and the impact of three Internet technologies that, at the time of 
data collection, were being utilized by women’s rights activists to the greatest extent: e-mail 
groups, websites, and social networking sites (SNSs). The findings with respect to the first 
research question concentrate on the websites and SNSs as the main Internet technologies 
employed for the activism’s public communication. The results show that women’s rights 
activist groups and individuals benefit from the deployment of websites and SNSs, firstly and 
chiefly, by the ability to bypass print media restrictions and increase their control over the flow 
of their public information. Also SNSs decentralize the activists’ public communication, giving 
more of a voice to low-profile activists suffering from the hegemony of high-profile activists in 
websites and print media. In addition, SNSs and, to the lower degree, websites create a two-way 
communication between the activists and their audiences. This investigation shows that besides 
its empowering role, however, activists’ online media can also inflict harm to activists-public 
communication in two ways. First, the quality of the activism’s discourses is undermined on 
SNSs due to the informal nature of communication on these sites and the increase of activists’ 
individual profiles. Second, due to the problem of Internet access and usage inequalities in the 
country, activists’ online media limits their access to audiences who do not truly represent the 
totality of Iranian society. 
Findings in relation to the second research question uncover that e-mail groups, as the main 
Internet technology employed for the activist groups’ intra- and intercommunication, facilitates 
collective decision-making by giving a voice to geographically dispersed activists and 
eliminating the financial and security costs of offline meetings. The study finds, too, that more 
conventional forms of Internet-mediated communication, e-mail groups and websites, strengthen 
the activists’ collective identity and stimulate collaboration within the network of the activism. 
Also, the array of activist websites mobilizes and shares the activism-related knowledge across 
women’s rights groups. At the same time, however, deployment of SNSs by individual activists 
raises tensions within the women’s right activism network and threatens activists’ collective 
identity. The thesis discusses that women’s rights activists’ individual representations on SNSs 
give rise to ‘slacktivism’ by fostering narcissism and distracting activists from participation in 
collective on-the-ground activities.   
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The analysis with regards to the third research question reveals that the agenda-building 
influence of women’s rights activists’ online media on the traditional Iranian press is 
manipulated by two interrelated factors. The first factor is press openness to include women’s 
rights’ issue in its agenda, which is not only defined by editorial policies but, to a more 
significant degree, determined by state-imposed restrictions on the Iranian press. The second 
factor is the dynamism of the activism. When women’s rights activists enter an inactivity mode 
in the offline realm, they are given less presence in the media agenda, despite having significant 
online activity. Aside from the magnitude of the agenda-building influence manipulated by these 
factors, this thesis uncovers that the activists’ online media has become effective in resonating 
women’s rights discourses into the press agenda through three major mechanisms: print media 
journalists making use of activists’ online news and case specific reports in order to get ideas for 
news subjects; women-related reports that are initially produced by journalists either online or 
offline are amplified by activists’ online sites and their social media followers, consequently 
capturing more attention of the press; and activists’ online articles affecting journalists’ 
knowledge and attitude toward the activism and their issues. 
The first hand empirical results of this study make a contribution to the academic knowledge of 
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